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Abstract
Research into end-of-life care presents a major challenge because it is difficult to obtain the
views and experiences of representative samples of patients. Studies relying on patients'
accounts prior to death are potentially biased, as they only represent that proportion of
patients with an identifiable terminal illness, who are able and willing to participate. An alter-
native approach that overcomes many of these problems is the retrospective or "after death"
approach. Here, observations are gathered from proxies acting on behalf of the patient, after
the patient's death. Usually this is a relative involved in their care. This approach has been
used in a number of influential studies and has provided important insights into death and
dying in the late 20th century. In spite of its widespread use, little is known about the validity
of proxies' accounts. This thesis presents a systematic review of studies that have examined
the validity of the approach by comparing proxies' accounts with those of the patient. Agree-
ment was shown to be poorer for aspects of patients' experiences that were more subjective in
nature, for example pain, anxiety and depression. Focusing on these aspects, a series of
research questions were posed and investigated. These included proxies' comprehension of
surveys questions, judgments regarding patients' symptoms, the influence of proxies' own
emotions on their reports and consistency of responses over time. Using qualitative and quan-
titative methodologies thirty bereaved relatives were interviewed approximately three months
after the patient's death, and followed-up 3-5 months later. These investigations provide
researchers with a greater awareness of reasons why disagreement between patients and prox-
ies accounts might occur. Understanding possible biases and errors will facilitate the develop-
ment of methods to improve the validity of proxies' accounts. In addition to this,
recommendations are made to improve existing measures and for future research.
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction
The provision of hospice and palliative care for patients at the end of life is growing. Recent
estimates in the UK show that approximately 19% ofpatients with cancer die in a hospice and
approximately 60% of cancer patients who die are cared for by palliative home care teams
(The Hospice Information Service, 2000). Palliative care is a multidisciplinary specialty,
whose aims are,
"the active total care ofpatients whose disease is not responsive to curative
treatment. Control ofpain, ofother symptoms, and ofpsychological, social and
spiritual problems is paramount. The goal ofpalliative care is achievement of
the best quality oflife for patients and their families. "
(World Health Organization technical report series 804, 1990, p.ll)
As this definition implies, palliative care goes beyond purely symptom control to incorporate
quality of life, physical, spiritual and emotional aspects. This is commonly referred to as a
holistic approach to the care of the individual and their family. This requires the skills of a
variety of different professionals, including doctors, nurses, social workers, chaplains, thera-
pists and sometimes psychologists or psychiatrists.
With the prevailing ethos for evidence-based practice and economic constraints, the
provision of palliative care, like other areas of health care, has had to respond to demands for
efficiency and effectiveness. The implication of this has been a move toward greater evalua-
tion of services and to clinical audit. Evaluation and audit within palliative care serves various
essential functions beyond economic concerns. These include identifying patient and family
needs, assessing palliative care outcomes such as quality of life, monitoring standards and
identifying training needs (Higginson, 1993). Thus, the methodologies employed must be
both reliable and valid if interventions and policies are to be implemented in response to find-
mgs.
This chapter presents a brief introduction to some of the methodological challenges
associated with evaluation and audit of services for the dying and their families. Since this
Ph.D. is concerned with the retrospective or after death approach, the emphasis will be on this
method. In retrospective palliative care studies, other people (family, friends, and health pro-
fessionals), commonly referred to as proxies, respond on behalf of the patient. Most of the
criticisms levelled at this approach have centred on the use of these proxies and how accu-
rately their responses reflect the patients' experiences (Higginson et al., 1994; Hinton, 1996).
In order to better understand the issues, this chapter examines the use of proxies in other areas
of health. By expanding the review to include a wider range of literature, an insight into fac-
tors likely to affect the validity of proxies' reports may be identified. This will also provide a
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basis upon which to critically evaluate the literature on the use of significant others as proxies
for patients at the end of life: the focus of Chapter 2.
1.1 Methodological problems when evaluating care of the dying
When evaluating services for patients at the end of life and their families, researchers are con-
fronted with a number of methodological challenges. One such problem is the difficulty in
ascertaining the views and experiences of terminally ill patients. Apart from ethical concerns
about interviewing patients, studies relying on patients' accounts prior to death, the prospec-
tive approach, are potentially biased as they only represent a proportion of the population that
is less impaired and therefore able to participate, and willing to take part. A decline in per-
formance status is seen at the end of life in many cancer patients and is a good indicator of
prognosis (Vigano et al., 2000). It is at a point in time that the assessment of patients' quality
of life are most needed (Aaronson, 1991). Prospective studies are also limited to diseases such
as cancer that have an identifiable terminal phase, and where patients are likely to be known
to relevant services (Morris et al., 1986). Added to this, high attrition rates, small sample sizes
and difficulties associated with predicting survival rates can also hamper attempts to conduct
valid research (McWhinney et al., 1994; Rinck et al., 1997).
1.2 Retrospective approach
An alternative approach, that overcomes many of the problems associated with prospective
studies, is the retrospective or after death approach. Here, observations are gathered from
proxies acting on behalf of the patient, after the patient's death. Usually this is the patient's
next-of-kin or a health professional involved in the patient's care. This approach has been
used in a number of influential studies on the care of the dying (Cartwright & Seale, 1990;
Seale & Cartwright, 1994; Addington-Hall & McCarthy, 1995a). The largest survey of its
kind in the United Kingdom is the Regional Study of the Care of the Dying (RSCD) (Adding-
ton-Hall & McCarthy, 1995a). Being retrospective, the authors were able to identify those
individuals who had died within a specific time period; in this case the last quarter of 1990.
From these, representative samples of 270 deaths from each of twenty different health dis-
tricts in England were extracted. By selecting patients based solely on time and place of
death, there is no inherent bias towards any particular cause of death. Thus, deaths from dif-
ferent causes could be represented (Addington-Hall et al., 1995; McCarthy et al., 1996;
McCarthy et al., 1997). The results of the RSCD show that the current health care and social
services in England are in need of significant improvement before they can fully meet the
needs of terminally ill patients and their families. Similar methods have been used in other
countries, for example in the SUPPORT study where bereaved relatives provided information
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on patients' last three days of life (Lynn et al., 1997). These studies have provided important
insights into death and dying in late 20th century.
However, collecting information indirectly from proxies at some later point in time
introduces potential problems regarding the validity of reports (Higginson et al., 1994; Hin-
ton, 1996). Validity, in this context, refers to the degree to which the proxy's account accu-
rately reflect the experiences of the individual they are representing. At present, little is
known about the accuracy of proxies' responses, despite the fact that inaccuracy may compro-
mise validity and lead to erroneous conclusions. Given that proxies are a significant source of
information and are often the only available source for a large proportion of dying patients, it
is vital to understand how and why their accounts might differ from those of the patient. The
validity of proxies in other areas of health has been evaluated. Therefore, before critically
evaluating the literature it is important to examine the use of proxies in other areas of health.
The discussion begins with the validity of significant other proxies in areas of health and then
moves on to examine health professional as proxies.
1.3 Proxies in other areas of health
Similarly to palliative care, proxies report on the experiences of those who are not able to
report for themselves such as children, those with learning difficulties, cognitive and emo-
tional impairments, Proxies can also be used to corroborate information provided by self-
report when there is some reason to doubt the accuracy of self-report, for instance when
reporting on habits such as smoking, drug and alcohol consumption. Another area where
proxies are widely used is in epidemiology research. In this instance an alternative source is
used when the individual is not available or unable to give a self-report. More often than not,
this is another member of the same household. Research that has examined the validity of
proxies in these areas will be discussed, with the exception of studies that concern patient-
proxy agreement involving children, adolescents and individuals with learning difficulties.
These groups have their own specific needs as indicated in recent reviews examining the use
of proxies with these groups (Stancliffe, 2000; Eiser & Morse, 200la; 2001h).
1.4 Significant others as proxies
1.4.1 Epidemiology
Epidemiology field studies often rely on other family members to provide information on
morbidity, demographics and behaviours such as physical activity, smoking, diet, and alcohol
consumption in exposure-disease research. Proxies are used because interviewing the individ-
uals themselves may not be feasible, for example in individuals with conditions that are rap-
idly fatal, cognitively or communicatively compromising and with some psychiatric
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conditions (Nelson et al., 1990). In studies of morbidity and morbidity information is some-
times sought from proxies after the patient's death (Rogot & Reid, 1975; Pickle et al., 1983;
Lerchen & Samet, 1986). Proxies also provide researchers with more representative samples,
as Kolonel et al. (1977) points out, samples would consist of only those individuals at home
who are available for interview, such as housewives and the elderly. Moreover, it is less time
consuming and more economical to interview proxies.
Given the importance of the information in identifying diseases and the links between
disease and exposure to hazards, there have been numerous studies examining the reliability
of proxy data (see Nelson et al., 1990; for review). Comparisons between proxies and absent
household members and/or medical judgments suggests that proxies can provide reliable data
with regard to certain types of information. Several studies have shown proxies' reports are
reliable for factual informational such as age, height, occupational history (Rogot & Reid,
1975; Hatch et a/., 1991; Colt et al., 2001), smoking status (Rogot & Reid, 1975; Kolone1 et
al., 1977; Herrmann, 1985; Lerchen & Samet, 1986; Emont et al., 1991; Hatch et al., 1991;
Ha1abi et al., 1992), dietary intake (Moore et al., 1970; Kolone1 et al., 1977; Lerchen &
Samet, 1986), health care utilisation (Mosley & Wolinsky, 1986) and certain health condi-
tions (Halabi et al., 1992). However, the findings have been variable with differing levels of
congruency and poorer levels of concordance in reporting some aspects. Among these are
alcoho1consumption (Hatch et al., 1991), occupational history (Lerchen & Samet, 1986),
some health conditions (Halabi et al., 1992), pregnancy outcomes in reproductive studies
(Fickree et al., 1993), dietary history (Herrmann, 1985) and number of cigarettes smoked
(Lerchen & Samet, 1986). This has lead some investigators to question the use of proxies.
Several factors appear to contribute to the accuracy of proxy reporting in epidemiology
studies. Evidence suggests that the type of information sought from proxies is important. Hal-
abi et al. (1992) found that proxies were reliable for providing information on conditions that
were salient, such as heart disease. Whereas, agreement between patients, proxies and medi-
cal examination were lowest for back pain. Correspondingly, Claridge and Massagli (1989),
in a study of female proxies, found that agreement on the presence of twenty-two physical and
psychological complaints was better as the persistence and thus the saliency of the problem
increased. Proxies in this study were found to underestimate self-reported complaints, which
the authors suggest was due to the lack of gravity given the type of complaints (e.g.cough,
sinus trouble, rash). Claridge and Massagli's (1989) study was also significant because it
showed that there was a poor level of agreement for the less observable and more subjective
psychological complaints of nervousness and depression.
The type of proxy has important repercussions regarding how the information sought
by the researcher is affected. In a study of exposure-mortality, Pickle et al. (1983) found that
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siblings were better able to respond to questions about the deceased individual's immediate
family and events occurring early in life, while spouses and offspring were best able to
describe events that occurred during adult life. Alternative proxies, such as more distant rela-
tives and friends were the poorest at responding to questions. Other studies have shown the
that the reliability of proxies is related to the person who is acting as the proxy. Emont et al.
(1991) used proxies to corroborate self-reported smoking cessation and found that discrepan-
cies in accounts were influenced by the opportunities the proxy had to observe the individual
in different social contexts. These findings highlight the importance of the proxy having
access to the relevant information. Naturally, proxies who reside together are usually the most
reliable source and are likely to provide the most complete information (Emont et al. 1991;
Anonymous, 2000).
The ability of the proxy to provide information also appears to be influenced by the
level of detail required. Pickle et al. (1983) found that the completeness of the information
was affected by the amount of detail requested. For instance, proxies were more accurate at
stating whether the patient smoked but were less accurate at giving the number of cigarettes
smoked (Lerchen & Samet, 1986). With regard to characteristics of the patient and proxy
there has been little consistency in the findings with some studies identifying factors (Pickle
et al., 1983; Ermont et al., 1991; Hatch et al., 1991) and others finding no association (Kolo-
nel et al., 1977; Herrmann, 1985).
1.4.2 Quality of life
The use of proxies allows patients who would otherwise be excluded to take part in studies
and thus improves the validity and generalisability of the research. However, more impor-
tantly, accurate assessment of patients' quality of life by significant others is vital in monitor-
ing their condition and its management. Since many relatives are also carers for the patient,
they are often called upon to be proxies. For this reason, the validity of significant other prox-
ies for patients with acute and chronic conditions, cognitive/intellectual and communicative
impairments and with older individuals is important and has been extensively investigated. In
the following overview of the subject, for ease of clarity the subsections are divided but in
reality there is often overlap between the areas. Consequently there is some overlap in the
studies.
Acute & chronic health conditions
Proxies have been employed to report on behalf of a number of patients with acute and
chronic health conditions. These include trauma, surgical and medical patients in hospitals
and the community receiving treatment (Sneeuw et al., 1992; Rogers et al., 1997; Capuzzo et
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al., 2000). To date, the investigations conducted have been with chronic health conditions
such as cancer, heart and lung diseases have been with older individuals (e.g. Magaziner et
al., 1988; Epstein et al., 1989). Few studies have specifically evaluated proxies in younger
adult populations or in the context of critical and acute health care settings. Within the context
of intensive care studies the evidence has been contradictory. Capuzzo et al. (2000) found that
although accuracy of emotional aspects of quality of life were lower, agreement between
patients' and their relatives' ratings of quality of life prior to admission to the unit were excel-
lent. The authors concluded from these findings that proxies can be acceptable substitutes for
patients. Contrary to this, Rogers et al. (1997) comparing patients' and relatives' ratings of
quality of life at discharge and six months after discharge from a critical care unit, found that
overall agreement was weak, with some improvement at six months follow-up. Again, relia-
bility was poorest for mental health. Differences in the timing of the assessment and the
patient's health could have contributed to the inconsistencies observed between these studies.
Older individuals
In older individuals cognitive, physical and sensory deficits may prevent them providing self-
reports or information on some aspects of their functioning. Limitations that are not uncom-
mon in this group (Magaziner et al., 1988; Evans et al., 1990). Studies of older individuals'
functioning have in general been consistent in finding that agreement between the patient and
proxy is good for more observable aspects of functioning. These include activities of daily
living (e.g. bathing, dressing), physical activity, and conditions with more observable mani-
festations, or as Magaziner et al., (1996) points out conditions that are likely to be discussed
or are more serious such as diabetes and cancer (Rubenstein et al., 1984; Epstein et al., 1989;
Magaziner et al., 1988; Weinberger, et al., 1992; Segal & Schall, 1994; Magaziner et
al.,1996; 1997; Long et al., 1998; Okamoto, 2000). While agreement is lower for less observ-
able and more subjective aspects, such as emotional status (Rubenstein et al., 1984; Kiyak et
al., 1992; Weinberger, et al., 1992; Segal & Schall, 1994; Magaziner et al., 1997; Okamoto,
2000), less overt conditions like arthritis and hypertension (Farrow & Samnet, 1990; Maga-
ziner et aI., 1992; 1996) and symptoms like pain (O'Brien & Francis, 1988; Werner et al.,
1998). Only moderate correlations between elderly individuals' and their relatives' ratings of
pain have been reported (Werner et al., 1998). Agreement on measures of quality of life were
also low to moderate (Slevin, 1988; Sprangers & Aaronson, 1992).
Bias toward reporting greater disability (Rubenstein et aI., 1984; Epstein et al., 1989;
Rothman, et al., 1991; Magaziner et al., 1992; Weinberger, et al., 1992; Magaziner et al.,
1997), pain (Werner et al., 1998), poorer quality of life (Slevin et al., 1988), pain (Ell et al.
1988), cognitive function (Bassett et al. 1990) and psychological health (Epstein et al., 1989;
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Magaziner et aI., 1996; 1997), have been shown. One explanation for the tendency of proxies
to over- and underestimate, concerns the role of caregiving. There is evidence that family
members' psychological distress and/or perceived caregiver burden are related to the accu-
racy of assessment of patients' impairments, with greater burden associated with patients
being rated as more impaired (Magaziner et al. 1988; Rothman et aI., 1991; Long et al.,
1998). Other factors such as the frequency of contact and the patient's health condition have
also been shown to affect the level of concordance (Epstein et al., 1989). Magaziner et al.
(1988) found that agreement was better when the patient was not cognitively impaired or
depressed. Okamoto (2000) identified spouses as being more accurate than other family mem-
bers, such as children, in a study of elderly individuals living in the community.
Cognitive/intellectual and communicative impairments
Neurological conditions, such as Alzheimer's disease (AD), epilepsy, cerebro-vascular acci-
dent (CVA) and traumatic brain injury (TBI) can impair cognitive functioning and communi-
cation. The vast majority of the research has been conducted on patients with AD and related
conditions where family members are used as proxies. Few have specifically examined the
validity of proxies for patients with epilepsy (Hays et al., 1995), CVA (Segal & Schall, 1994;
Sneeuw et al., 1997c; Duncan et al., 2002) and TBI (Cusick, et al., 2000). Generally agree-
ment is better for those individuals who have higher cognitive functioning (Magaziner et al.,
1988; Kiyak et al., 1994; Werner et aI., 1998; Loewenstein et aI., 2001; Novella, et al., 2001),
or are less severely affected in CVA patients (Sneeuw et al., 1997c; Duncan et al., 2002).
Kiyak et al. (1994) comparing family members' reports with those from older demented
patients' and non-demented patients' reports, found that those with dementia were rated as
more impaired. As a result levels of agreement vary depending, to some extent, on the popula-
tion being studied. For example poor to moderate agreement has been found for self-report
and performance based measures of functioning and disability in AD patients (Loewenstein et
al., 1991; Novella, et aI., 2001). While, other studies have found high levels of agreement for
functioning that is more concrete and observable, like physical functioning, between proxies
and patients with TBI (Cusick et al., 2000), CVA (Segal & Schall, 1994; Snueew et al.,
1997c; Duncan et al., 2002) and AD (Zanetti et al., 1999). Once again aspects of a subjective
nature such as psychosocial functioning, thinking and memory were less congruent with
patients' ratings (Segal & Schall, 1994; Snueew et aI., 1997c; Duncan et al., 2002).
A consistent finding is that assessment of subjective aspects of patients' functioning
and quality of life have been less concordant. Proxies' estimates of patients' cognitive func-
tioning has been shown to be poor (Cusick et al., 2000) and overestimated in some studies
(Bassett et al., 1990; Hays et al., 1995). Proxies' assessments of patients' quality of life and
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subjective aspects such as pain, emotions, social and role limitations also diverge from the
patients (Segal & Schall, 1994). A number of biases have been identified. These include
underestimates of patients' quality of life in AD patients (Novella, et al., 2001) and overesti-
mates of levels of depression in patients with dementia (MacKenzie et al., 1989; Novella, et
al., 2001). Proxies also report lower levels of functioning than the patients themselves (Kiyak
et al., 1994; Sneeuw et al., 1997c). However, proxies have been shown to overestimate
impaired dementia patients' objective functional performance (i.e. tell the time, identify cur-
rency) (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
One explanation for the inaccuracies observed relates to the patient's neurological con-
dition and the symptom being assessed. Some symptoms may be problematic because they
are difficult to differentiate in patients with cognitive impairment. For example, overlap
between depression and dementia symptoms such as difficulty concentrating, and loss of
interest are thought to have contributed to family members' overestimations of dementia
patients' depression ratings (MacKenzie et al., 1989). Teri and Truax (1994) examined
whether family caregivers own depression was reflected in their ratings of patient depression.
Although the proxies' depression was found to be moderately linked to their ratings of
patients' depression, there was no substantial association. Thus the authors' concluded that
caregivers were not biased on account of their own mood. However, it is important to note
that the levels of proxy depression were mild in this study. Despite this finding, characteris-
tics of the proxy have been shown to contribute to discrepancies in their ratings. In a study of
very mild and mild dementia, the family members' perceived level of caregiver burden was
associated with differences in patients' and proxies' ratings of activities of daily living and
physical functioning (Zanetti et al., 1999). Consistent with the finding in older individuals
(Okamoto, 2000), spouses were found to be more accurate than other family members
(Novella, et al., 2001).
In assessing quality of life in patients with acute and chronic conditions, older individ-
uals and patients with cognitive/intellectual and communicative impairments, there has been
no other consistent relationships demonstrated between demographics associated with either
the patient or proxy, even though a number of studies have found factors. For example,
patient and proxy age, (Rothman et al., 1991; Magaziner et al., 1996), educational attainment
(McCusker & Stoddard, 1984; Hays et al., 1995; Magaziner et al., 1996) and gender (Maga-
ziner et al., 1996). Variations in the populations, context, methods and measures could
account for this. Consistent with the epidemiology studies, the congruency between the
patient and proxy in quality of life assessment varies according to the measure. Complex or
ambiguous questions can lead to different interpretations of the same question (Magaziner et
al., 1988; 1996). The number of response options is also important, as scoring is better for
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dichotomous responses than for multiple response options (Magaziner et al., 1997). In addi-
tion to this, the reliability of the scale can influence the level of agreement (Snueew et al.,
1997).
1.4.3 Health care decisions
When patients are incapable ofmaking judgements about their care and treatment, proxies are
sometimes used to make decisions on their behalf. There is increasing interest in this area
with advance directives (Aikman et al., 1999; Volicer et al., 2002). More often than not, prox-
ies' and patients' decisions regarding treatments are compared in hypothetical clinical situa-
tions. For example, Seckler et al. (1991) investigated the accuracy of proxies' decisions
compared to chronically ill elderly patients' wishes in hypothetical situations regarding cardi-
opulmonary resuscitation (CPR). One scenario was in present health and another scenario
under circumstances of progressive dementia. Agreement was poor with no significant direc-
tion to discrepant responses (to provide or withhold treatment). Another study found that
proxies' overestimated patients' preferences for CPR (Uhlmann et al., 1988). The findings
have raised questions about the use ofproxies given that family members have not adequately
predicted patients' decisions regarding treatment decisions in a number of studies (Uhlmann
et al., 1988; Diamond et al., 1989; Ouslander et al., 1989; Seckler et al., 1991; Hare et al.,
1992). Although there are exceptions with agreement on treatment (Libbus & Russell, 1995;
Potkins, et al., 2000) and care setting preferences (Mattimore et al., 1997).
To further investigate the accuracy of substituted judgments, Sulmasy et al. (1998)
examined factors associated with levels of accuracy in patients with a terminal diagnosis and
medical patients. Accuracy was associated with the treatment and the scenario. In permanent
coma scenario accuracy was better than when there was coma with a chance of recovery, and
severe dementia. In addition to this, multiple factors were related to congruency. Agreement
was higher when there was explicit discussion between the patient and proxy about their pref-
erences, in better educated patients and proxies, and when the patient had private health insur-
ance. Conversely, a diagnosis of heart failure, the proxy's experience of life-sustaining
treatment, the proxy's involvement with religious services and the patient's belief that they
would live longer than ten years, was negatively related to agreement. An understanding of
factors that influence agreement will be useful for identifying conditions under which accu-
racy is likely so that ways to improve it can be instigated (Sulmasy et al., 1998).
1.5 Health professionals as proxies
Health professionals as part of their role, routinely use their judgment to make decisions about
the patient's condition, treatment and care. As Zanetti et al. (1999) points out, accurate
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assessment is necessary for monitoring the patient's condition and for planning and imple-
menting appropriate care. For the reasons outlined earlier, (Section 1.3) patients are not
always capable or willing to express themselves. This section will discuss the validity of
health professionals as proxies when making health care decisions and assessing quality of
life.
1.5.1 Health care decisions
The majority of studies that have assessed the accuracy of health professionals' decisions as
substitutes for the patient, have compared doctors and patients using scenarios involving
threatening situations and treatments. Evidence from these studies is consistent in finding that
doctors often do not reflect patients' wishes regarding treatment (Uhlmann et al. 1988;
Zweibel & Cassel, 1989; Seckler et al., 1991). In fact, Seckler et al. (1991) found that doctors
did no better than chance. Others studies have found more positive results. Examining choices
for nursing home residence, Mattimore et al. (1997) found that compared to significant others
as proxies, doctors' ratings were more divergent. However, overall agreement was relatively
high for both types of proxies. Another study found that preferences for CPR were congruent
but varied according to the decision. Agreement was better when preferences which were nor-
mative, as opposed to unusual or contentious preferences (Layde et al., 1995). For example,
agreement was higher for those patients choosing CPR than for patients not choosing CPR
(Layde et al., 1995). Thus far, the evidence implies that doctors can not be relied upon to
approximate patients' wishes. One explanation for the disparity may be the difficulties in pre-
dicting patients' health values. This is a problem identified by Tsevat et al. (1995; 1998),
where seriously ill patients' rated their health status higher than their doctors. Added to this,
the patient's health status did not predict their health values. Ifdoctors' decisions are based on
health status they are likely to be inaccurate. Consequently, a better understanding of patients'
health values may be a measure to determining accurate preferences (Tsevat et al., 1995).
1.5.2 Quality of life
The vast majority of the research using health professionals as proxies has involved assessing
quality of life in patients with chronic conditions such as cancer, and for patients at the end of
life. The evidence suggests that doctors' and nurses' ratings diverge from those of the
patients. Doctors' ratings of quality of life have been found to be poor to moderately congru-
ent with the patients' ratings (Pearlman & Uhlmann, 1988; Slevin et al., 1988; Sprangers &
Aaronson, 1992; Kivinen et al., 1998), although higher levels have been reported (Sprangers
& Aaronson, 1992). In line with the research on significant others as proxies, agreement is
higher for physical symptoms and functional items rather than psychosocial symptoms
20
(Brunelli et al., 1998). Symptoms that are more subjective in nature, such as pain, anxiety,
depression, drowsiness and nausea differ significantly between doctors and patients (Gross-
man et al., 1991; Sprangers & Aaronson, 1992; Cleeland et al., 1994; Grassi et al., 1996;
Brunelli et al., 1998; Nekolaichuk et al., 1999a). There is definitely a tendency for doctors to
underestimate patients' quality of life (Pearlman & Uhlmann, 1988; Sprangers & Aaronson,
1992; Grassi et al., 1996), problems (Brunelli et al., 1998), symptoms (Derogatis et al., 1976;
Teri & Wagner, 1991; Nekolaichuk et al., 1999a) and pain (Peteet et a/., 1986; Au et al.,
1994; Nekolaichuk et al., 1999a). Although overestimates of quality of life (Jachuck et al.,
1982), anxiety (Derogatis et al., 1976; Sensky et al., 1989; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993) and
problems (Higginson & McCarthy, 1993) have been found. In one study doctors' ratings of
patients' quality of life were seen to improve over time (Grassi et al., 1996). In contrast symp-
tom assessment by doctors did not, with symptom assessments significantly lower than the
patients on both assessment times (Neko1aichuk et al., 1999a).
The findings have important implications for managing patients, as Cleeland et al.,
(1994) identifies, discrepancies between patients' and doctors' estimations of pain are predic-
tive of poor pain management. Indeed, the level of congruency has been found to be lower in
patients' experiencing significant pain (Grossman et al., 1991). Several explanations have
been proposed for the observed differences. Within the context of acute medical settings,
Jachuck et al. (1982), explains the lack of agreement as the dearth of objective clinical mani-
festations to measure subjective feelings, shorter consultations, inadequate communication
and poor patient insight. Grossman et al. (1991) who reported that doctors', medical oncology
fellows' and nurses' perceptions of pain intensity were not the same as the patients, implies
that concern with issues, such as addiction and side effects, explains the disparities. However,
many of the studies have taken place in palliative care settings where there is more contact
between the patient and doctor. Moreover, the doctors are often oncologists who specialise in
the area. What the studies do reveal is the complexity of quality of life and the inherent diffi-
culties doctors contend with when assessing particular aspects.
Nurses' assessments as proxies have centred on patients' suffering with regard to pain
and psychological distress. Estimates of pain show that nurses underestimate pain and prob-
lems associated with pain control (Grossman et al., 1991; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Au
et al., 1994), and identify more problems than the patients themselves (Higginson & McCa-
rthy, 1993). Again agreement is better for physical symptoms as opposed to those of a psy-
chological nature (Holmes & Eburn, 1989; Peruselli et al., 1992; Nekolaichuk et al., 1999b).
Accuracy of nurses' assessments of patients' symptoms, like doctors' assessments, have not
been shown to improve over time (Nekolaichuk et al., 1999a).
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Measures of affective states (i.e. depression, anxiety) suggest that nurses, in general,
overestimate the patients' suffering (Mason & Muhlenkamp, 1976; 1981; Husted & Johnson.
1985; Muhlenkamp & Joyner, 1986; Biley, 1989; Farrell, 1991; Higginson & McCarthy,
1993). Though underestimates of depression and anxiety have been found between nurses and
patients in a palliative care setting (Nekolaichuk et al., 1999b). A number of variables have
been shown to influence nurses' assessments of patients' suffering. Davitz and Davitz (1981)
in a series of investigations found that nurses' stereotype patients based on age, socio-eco-
nomic status, gender, ethnic background and illness. For example, illnesses that were life
threatening or where there was the possibility of long-term severe disability were considered
psychologically distressing. A number of studies concur with Davitz and Davitz (1981) find-
ings. Mason and Muhlenkamp (1976) in a study of nurse proxies for acutely ill patients who
had undergone surgical amputation, found that nurses' rated patients as more anxious,
depressed and hostile than the patients themselves. Attribution of anxiety by nurses has also
been shown to be positively correlated with patients' social status, occupation and education
in hospitalised arthritis patients (Mason & Joyner, 1985). While estimates of hostility
ascribed to patients at the end of life were negatively correlated with patients' life expectancy
(Husted and Johnson, 1985). There is also evidence in doctors' assessments that they stereo-
type based on patients' age and sex (Cleeland et al., 1994; Kivinen et al., 1998).
Jennings and Muhlenkamp (1981) suggest that in line with Wright's (1960) conceptu-
alisation of mourning, nurses may view the patient as less fortunate and expect them to suffer
in order to safeguard their own values of health and well-being. This may be useful in under-
standing the bias observed with mood states but does not explain nurses' underestimations of
patients' pain. Furthermore, the bias to overestimate mood states may in some instances be
attributable to the patient's own assessment. For example, denial by the patient has been
shown to influence concordance (Jennings & Muhlenkamp, 1981; Husted and Johnson,
1985). Although the findings suggest that nurses' assessments of patients' suffering may be
unreliable as a result of perceptual bias and stereotyping, others have failed to identified a
relationship between the level of disagreement and characteristics of the patient or proxy.
More work is therefore needed to examine when and where stereotyping is likely to occur and
how to reduce its effects.
To date, only a few studies have compared agreement between significant others and
health professionals with those of the patient. Higginson and McCarthy (1993) found that pal-
liative care teams' ratings of patients' problems were closer to the patients than family mem-
bers. Others have found that both spouses and nurses are more in line with the patient than
other health professionals or family members (Novella, et al., 2001). Nekolaichuk et al.
(1999a), comparing health professionals' ratings with those of advanced cancer patients,
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found that nurses' average ratings of nine symptoms, using the Edmonton Symptom Assess-
ment System, were closer to patients' ratings than to the doctors' average ratings. Similar
findings have been reported by Wilson et al. (2000) with proxies for advanced cancer
patients. As nurses and significant others are likely to spend more time with the patient, they
may have more opportunities to observe and assess the patient.
1.6 Discussion
Despite the diversity of the studies and areas evaluating the validity of proxies, there are con-
sistent findings that emerge. Firstly, proxies need to have access to the information, either
through interacting or observing the patient in order to make judgments. In the context of their
home this is often a significant other who lives with the patient, while in hospital, nursing
home or hospice it is likely to be nurses as they have more exposure to the patient. A caveat to
this is the perceived burden of caring, which can bias proxies' perceptions of patients' quality
of life; leading them to overestimate aspects of patients' functioning. Secondly, congruence is
better for objective more observable phenomenon, such as physical functioning than subjec-
tive aspects like mood states and pain. The reliance on proxies for these less overt aspects
may lead to mismanagement of some symptoms and spurious conclusions in research investi-
gations. For example, the prevalence and severity ofpain may be overestimated by significant
others, while health professionals may underestimate it. This may have a bearing on conclu-
sions regarding interventions and audit of services. Thirdly, the amount and type of detail
requested has been identified as a factor that can affect levels of agreement. In several of the
areas discussed information that is ambiguous or complex, or that requires the proxy to make
specific judgments, such as frequency, are less congruent than those which are explicit and
request less extensive information (i.e. absence or presence).
Within the different areas discussed there are also consistencies. In general, patients'
levels of cognitive functioning influences agreement between significant others and patients.
Other considerations include the patients' illness or condition, and the timing of the assess-
ment. The literature investigating health professionals as proxies uncovers some degree of
stereotyping when assessing patients. This could account for the differences observed, since
assessments may be based on characteristics of the patient rather than observations. Stereo-
typing may be a product ofbeing socialised within the context of the health care environment,
where beliefs regarding patients' suffering may be shared. This would explain why agreement
was related to nurses' experience (Jennings & Muhlenkamp, 1981; Husted & Johnson, 1985)
and the stereotyping of older patients by doctors (Cleeland et al., 1994; Kivinen et al., 1998).
Few decisive conclusions can be made regarding proxies when making health care decisions
due to the dearth of literature. Only that significant others are more in line with the patient's
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wishes than their doctors. Despite this the evidence does cast doubt on the reliability of prox-
ies in this area.
In conclusion, the findings raise questions about the use of proxies, which if relevant to
palliative care also raises important questions concerning the retrospective approach. Not-
withstanding, the proxy may reliably report on less subjective aspects of the patients' experi-
ences, which are also important elements in the evaluation of patient care. Whether the
research discussed translates to significant others as proxies for patients at the end of life
remains to be seen. This is the focus of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2: Proxy systematic review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a comprehensive and critical review of studies that assess the validity
of proxies acting for patients at the end of life. The emphasis is on significant others as prox-
ies for the patient. These include family members, friends or neighbours, but exclude health
professionals. This is because the focus of retrospective surveys reported to date, rely on sig-
nificant others acting as proxies rather than health professionals1. Relevant literature from
palliative and health care, survey methodology and psychology is drawn upon to examine fac-
tors likely to affect the validity of proxies' reports. From this, a broader insight into factors
that can affect the validity of their reports may be revealed. In an attempt to explain the find-
ings theories from social and cognitive psychology will be drawn upon. From this, a set of
hypotheses will be posed as a means of investigating the validity of the retrospective
approach further.
2.2 Method
2.2.1 Literature search strategy
A systematic review of the literature, using a recognised search strategy (Centre for Reviews
and Dissemination, Report 4, 1996) was performed.
Databases
British Nursing Index (1998-2002), CINAL (1982-2002), BIDS, MEDLINE (1980-2002),
RCN Journals database (1985-2002), PSYCHINFO (1984-2002), EMBASE (1980-2002).
The BIDS (Bath Information and Data Services) EMBASE, SOCIAL SCISEARCH (Social
Sciences Citation Index) and IBSS (International Bibliography of the Social Sciences) data-
bases were searched for the period 1993 to 2002 using the same search terms.
Search terms
The search strategy used for these databases followed that suggested by CRD Report Number
4 (1996; Appendix AI) using the following words either singly or in combination:
proxy#, surrogate#, advocate#, respondent#, next-of-kin#, carers#, health professionals#,
spouse# used singularly and exploded to include all subheadings
palliative care or terminal or end-of-life or care ofdying or hospice or bereavement combined
with each of the mesh terms (1.)
1. Proxy will be used to refer to significant other proxies unless otherwise stated.
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satisfaction, symptoms, emotions, pain, quality oflife, quality ofhealthcare, attitude to death,
health, depression, anxiety, grief, care combined with each of the mesh terms (1.) and the
results of search 2.
evaluation or assessment or audit or surveyor interview or outcome combined with each of
the mesh terms (1.) and the results of search 2 and search 3.
retrospective, prospective, validity, reliability combined with each of the mesh terms (1) and
the results of search 2, 3 and 4.
Restrictions on the searches were that they were written in English, and were published
between the dates specified above for each database. Subheadings not relevant to the area of
interest were excluded in searches 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Hand searches
The following journals were searched by hand from the first date of issue 1990 to May 2002:
British Medical Journal, European Journal of Cancer, Journal of Pain and Symptom Manage-
ment, Journal of Palliative Care, Palliative Medicine, British Journal of Cancer, Social Sci-
ence and Medicine
The Internet
Cancer sites on the Internet were also investigated for general and more up to date informa-
tion on the most recent cancer publications. There are two main sites of use. The first is Can-
cerWEB (www.graylab.ac.uk copyright 2002) which is put together by the National Cancer
Institute. This site provided useful overview information but no additional references to those
achieved from the other searches. The second site is OncoLink (www.oncolink.upenn.edu
copyright 1994-2002, The trustees of the University of Pennsylvania).
2.2.2 Inclusion/exclusion criteria
For the purpose of the review only studies that investigate outcomes relevant to care at the
end of life, where at least some of the subjects have an advanced disease or a terminal illness,
are included. Excluded from the review are studies that have compared patients and health
professionals' reports at the end of life as these were discussed in Section 1.4. In addition to
this, all those studies that concern patient-proxy agreement involving children and adoles-
cents this is because this group have their own specific needs at the end of life.
2.2.3 Data collection
From each study relevant to this review the following information was gathered: authors,
year, country, study design, patient and proxy populations included, outcomes and outcome
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measures, main findings in terms of levels of agreement and factors affecting the degree of
agreement or bias.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Methods for testing the validity of proxies
A review of the literature revealed that thirty six papers met the inclusion criteria. From the
qualifying literature, a limited number of methods for testing the validity of proxy responses
were identified. One approach is to compare patients' and proxies' views. In these studies,
validity equates to the proxy's agreement with the patient's own responses. The majority of
validity studies have used this approach to prospectively compare patients and significant oth-
ers' responses to a number of outcomes including symptoms, quality of life, family well being
and evaluations of care. Table 2.1 contains a summary of studies and their main findings.
Studies are divided into cross-sectional designs that compare reports at a point in time or
repeated measures designs, which make comparisons over time. Repeated measures designs
have the advantage that trends in the levels of patient and proxy agreement can be interpreted
in light of changes in the patient's condition. From this, extrapolations can be made to
patient's who are more impaired (Sneeuw et al., 1997a; Sneeuw et al., 1997b). Furthermore,
the validity of proxies reports can be examined in terms of responsiveness to changes in the
patients condition over time, relative to the patients own reports impaired (Sneeuw et al.,
1997b; Sneeuw et al., 1998).
As Table 2.1 shows, agreement is investigated at both the individual and group level.
Individual level agreement exposes incongruency between patient-proxy dyads, which can be
masked at the group level. This is the proportion of exact one-to-one agreement or approxi-
mate agreement. From this, factors associated with discrepancies can be distinguished. At the
group level, systematic reporting biases (underestimation and overestimation) between
patient and proxy agreement can be detected along with the magnitude of the bias. Besides
this, groups can be divided based on various factors likely to influence patient and proxy
agreement, such as the level of functioning (Sneeuw et al., 1997b). Alternatively, groups can
be divided based on the degree of congruency. In a study by Kurtz et al., (1996) they dis-
cerned differences between patient and proxy characteristics among congruent and non-con-
gruent patient-proxy dyads.
A less commonly used approach is to examine the patient and proxies ratings independ-
ently. This does not assume that the patient is the gold standard upon which the significance
of proxies' reports can be assessed. This is an important consideration, as Sneeuw et al.
(1998) acknowledge, patients' reports are themselves prone to bias. An observation that is
supported in the literature (Pennebaker, 1983; 1984). If patients reports are biased it is
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unlikely that patients and proxies reports will be similar. One method, by which this can be
achieved, is to separate out the proportions of variance attributable to a score. If variables
other than those expected account for a large proportion of the variance, then this suggests
that the responses are not valid (Sneeuw et al., 1998). Using this method, Sneeuw et al.
(1998) found that both patient and proxy ratings of patients' quality of life were explained
largely by patients' health status supporting the validity of their responses. The advantage of
this approach is that the identity of factors that contributed to patient and proxy ratings can be
extracted. For example, Elliott et al., (1996) found that the proxy's knowledge and attitudes
contributed a large proportion to their pain reports whereas this had little bearing on patient's
reports of pain. The reliability of patient and proxy responses can also be compared. For
example, Sterkenburg et al., (1996) found both patient and proxy reliability was high over a
three hour time period. Others have reported, in general, that patients and proxies reliability
estimates are similar (Sneeuw et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1998).
The vast majority of the work to date has used prospective research methods (Table
2.1). These studies do not address the validity of proxies' responses during the bereavement
period. Few studies have addressed this issue as Table 2.2 illustrates. Of the four studies iden-
tified, only two studies have compared the proxy's report prospectively with those retrospec-
tively after the patient's death, in an attempt to judge the effects of bereavement on proxy
reports (Higginson et al., 1994; Hinton, 1996). All the studies have made comparisons
between the patient before death and with the proxy at varying times during bereavement.
Consequently, assertions about the validity of the retrospective approach have had to rely to a
large extent on evidence from validity studies conducted prospectively. Having examined
methods used to assess the validity of proxies at the end of life, the review will discuss the
findings from the validity research (Tables 2.1 and 2.2).
Table 2.1: Prospective studies comparing patients and their significant other's ratings





















Main findings from patient/proxy comparison
At entry: similar mean scores for physical and psychosocial aspects of
the perceived health status; recreations/pastimes, rated higher by
patients; sleep/rest. rated higher by proxies; 3 months flu: agreement
similar to those at entry; agreement lower if the patient had a terminal
illness, lower education, not living with the proxy
No differences for QL and symptoms, functioning, life and sexual satis-
faction, fun, medical costs and usefulness; proxies reported more pain
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Table 2.1: Prospective studies comparing patients and their significant other's ratings






































































Main findings from patient/proxy comparison
Agreement good for presence ofpain, cancer and treatment related
questions less agreement for pain frequency and duration of pain;
agreement poor for intensity and effects on activities; proxies rated pain
as more intense; agreement related to the proxy living with the patient
and familiarity with the patient's pain
Agreement good for factual questions regarding medical history, sup-
port and life events; less agreement on attitudes and personal informa-
tion regarding support and life events. ADL agreement ranged from fair
to good
At entry: Patient anxiety pain and symptom control rated higher by
proxies; non-significant tendency for proxies to rate family anxiety
higher; proxies rated more problems; tendency for proxies to be more
satisfied with services4-6 weeks flu: similar to entry; in one area
patients' and proxies' ratings of general practitioner and district nurse
improved
Agreement good for "objective" ADL and duration of caring; moderate
agreement for average daily pain, current and total physical symptoms,
feeling depressed and marital distress; agreement poor for "subjective"
aspects, such as thoughts and feelings about the illness and worst pain
in the month; proxies perceptions of illness experience more negative
Agreement good for worse pain, pain levels; proxy's rated average level
slightly higher; patients underestimated the degree of spousal distress
caused by pain; proxies less satisfied with the amount of support coping
with pain; proxies more concerned about cancer pain, less positive
about pain relief and duration of relief; patient's stoic attitudes related to
proxies pain estimates
Proxies' ratings higher than patients for patient anxiety, pain and symp-
tom control; higher overall score; no significant differences for family
anxiety, practical aid, wasted time communication with health profes-
sionals.
No differences in the frequency of symptoms; lack of agreement for
physical and emotional symptoms except for sickness; agreement good
for adequacy of support and preferred place of death; proxies viewed
the patient's outlook and emotional state more negatively; significant
differences in ratings of anxiety
Levels of agreement were moderate for pain, emesis, dysponea, diar-
rhoea and appetite loss; fair agreement for financial impact, fatigue and
emotional functioning; agreement poorest for dysphagia
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Main findings from patient/proxy comparison
Agreement good for help required, ADL, evaluations of care and
absence/presence ofphysical symptoms; less agreement for symptoms
of a psychological nature, symptom distress, mood, anxiety and depres-
sion; proxies reported the presence of depression more often
Assessed on two days; understanding ofpain location good; poor for
pain intensity, quality and pattern; overestimated patient pain coping
strategies; proxies overestimated pain intensity in patients with low lev-
els of anxiety or internal locus of control and underestimated pain
intensity in patients with high levels of anxiety or external locus of con-
trol on day 1 but not day 2
No differences pain knowledge; patients were more likely to disagree
with the statement "pain medicines often interfere with breathing";
proxies reported higher levels of pain and greater distress for patients;
patients underestimated the carers own distress from pain
Proxies rated pain higher and overestimated patients functional impair-
ment; proxies knowledge and attitudes toward pain related to their pain
reports; proxies who expected pain with cancer reported more pain,
those who believed that the pain was manageable reported less pain
At entry: proxies and patients concordant for overall QL; lowest agree-
ment for perception of health and support; moderate to strong correla-
tion for physical activity, daily living and outlook on life; 4 weeks
follow up: similar findings; tendency for proxies ratings to improve
over time
Presence/absence of symptoms highest for fatigue, lowest for insomnia;
higher percentage agreement for all symptoms from female proxies;
agreement varied depending on symptom and proxy's age; proxies who
over-reported symptoms reported greater impact on their physical well-
being; proxies who under-reported symptoms were more optimistic and
patients more depressed
At entry: moderate correlation for QL; "worst pain" mean scores simi-
lar, moderate correlation; proxies mean scores on pain relief substan-
tially lower, weak correlation; 3 weeks flu: moderate correlation for
QL; "worst pain" mean scores similar to patients but weak correlation;
mean scores on pain relief substantially lower than patients, weak cor-
relation
No differences for physical, role, emotional, social QL subscales; high-
est for physical functioning; lowest for social functioning; moderate to
strong correlations for fatigue, QL, neurological symptoms and pain
At entry: agreement moderate for QL; 3 hours after entry: moderate
agreement for QL; reliability across the two time periods high for
patients and proxies
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Main findings from patient/proxy comparison
Percentage of severe distress similar; moderately agreement for fatigue,
appetite, pain frequency, cough, nausea frequency, insomnia and
breathing; more agreement for distressing symptoms, except appetite
and nausea frequency; agreement poor for insomnia, outlook and
appearance; global symptom distress correlated; time since diagnosis
associated with discrepancy
23 patient/proxy dyads C in assessing pain intensity; in non-congruent
NC dyads proxies underestimated (14) or overestimated (41); compar-
ing C and NC dyads, NC patients had higher least pain scores, more
days per week in significant pain, more anger and fatigue and lower
QL; NC proxies reported greater caregiver strain
At entry: agreement moderate to good for functioning scales, 11 symp-
toms, financial impact, communication deficits, future uncertainty;
agreement poor to fair for 6 symptoms (e.g. pain, nausea/vomiting) and
bother of hair loss; proxy's reported lower levels of functioning and
greater degree of fatigue and motor dysfunction, degree of bias small
except for fatigue; discrepancies varied depending on the patient's
physical and neurological condition; 1 week flu: test-retest reliability
moderate to good; 4 weeks flu: similar to entry; increase in discrepan-
cies in patients whose physical or neurological condition had deterio-
rated
At entry: moderate agreement for QL domains; proxies reported more
impaired functioning, lower levels of well-being, differences of small
magnitude; less agreement on feelings and social activities for more
impaired patients; more agreement for physical fitness and QL for more
impaired; At 3 month flu: agreement higher for feelings, social activi-
ties and QL; no differences for patients with good or poor performance
status; proxies as efficient as patients at detecting changes over time for
feeling, overall health and QL less efficient for pain, physical, daily and
social activities
Correlation between symptom distress scores; of those inaccurate 37%
overestimated and 2% underestimated; across the symptoms agreement
moderate to fair, lowest levels for outlook, nausea intensity; fatigue and
pain intensity; congruence related to marital status of the patient,
patient gender, age of proxy, carers relationship to the family and fam-
ily income; treatments related to some items of symptom distress
At entry: moderate to good agreement; proxies reported lower total QL,
physical, emotional, role and social functioning; proxies reported more
fatigue, nausea, vomiting, fatigue, insomnia and pain; degree of bias
small to moderate; most disagreement at moderate levels of QL; proxyl
patient characteristics accounted a small amount to the level of agree-
ment; 3 months follow up: similar to entry; patient and proxy respon-
sive to changes over time; proxies better at detecting changes in
physical and role functioning
At entry and 24 hours later; ratings ofpatient pain, anxiety, drowsiness,
appetite, well-being, shortness of breath, tiredness and nausea; ratings
generally consistent across symptoms and occasions; ratings from fam-
ily members and health professionals not reported separately
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Main findings from patient/proxy comparison
Moderate to good agreement for physical fitness, feelings, daily and
social activities, health and pain; agreement fair for overall QL; proxies
reported more pain, impaired levels of feelings, daily activities, poorer
overall health and QL, differences moderate to small, largest differ-
ences for emotional functioning; agreement better for patients with a
high or low performance status; more observable phenomenon
Proxies for breast cancer patients- mean agreement on 12 out of 16
domains good except for emotional functioning and pain; overesti-
mated pain, fatigue and degree of emotional disturbance; agreement
between pairs from 13-72%. Proxies for prostate cancer patients- mean
agreement on 14 out of 17 domains good; tended to rate more hot
flushes, lower mood and the perceived importance ability to have an
errection; agreement between pairs from 7-86%
Overall proxies better for more concrete, observable symptoms
No differences for pain ratings and interference; "least pain" rated
higher by proxies; NC dyads showed NC proxies older, less educated;
NC patients had more pain, pain interference, poorer performance sta-
tus and more concerned with pain and analgesics; patients age, disease
progression and beliefs were related to underlover estimations of pain
At entry and 24 hour test retest reliability good except for diarrhoea and
sexual satisfaction; no differences in mean QL scores; proxies rated
greater impairment for physical and role functioning, sleep disturbance
and weight loss; lower sexual satisfaction; magnitude of bias slight to
moderate except for sexual functioning and sexual satisfaction which
was moderate to high
High and low prevalent physical symptoms substantial to fair agree-
ment on prevalence, fair to substantial agreement on frequency, sever-
ity, symptom distress and symptom experience for high and low
prevalence physical symptoms except for dry mouth (underestimated),
magnitude ofbias small; psychological symptoms fair to moderate
agreement for presence, tendency to overestimate number of psycho-
logical symptoms; fair to moderate agreement for psychological symp-
toms, significant differences in mean score on symptoms except feeling
irritable, magnitude ofbias small to moderate; agreement for all symp-
toms better on symptom dimension rather than broad questions on
symptom prevalence; symptom distress over-reported compared to fre-
quency and severity
Pain intensity overestimated; accuracy of rating related to proxies who
perceived patient in a lot ofdistress from pain, associated greater efforts
at pain relief with more pain and were distressed at pain, were less
accurate; patient QL related to more disparity; experience of patient
pain related to accuracy; pain knowledge and patient and proxy demo-
graphics not associated
Key: f/u= follow up; ADL= activities of daily living; SO= significant other; QL= quality of
life; C= congruent; NC= non-congruent.
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Table 2.2: Prospective/retrospective studies comparing patients and their significant



































Retrospective: all symptoms in the last month rated non-significantly
higher except dysponea; poor agreement for mood; tendency for prox-
ies to rate mood items lower; non-significant tendency for proxies to
report that patients had more insight about their approaching death.
Congruence poor for 14 symptoms except for constipation; proxies
more critical of services and reported more symptoms (e.g. sleepless-
ness, depression); under/over-reporting equally divided for other symp-
toms (e.g. pain, trouble breathing)
Agreement good for practical aid, communication and wasted time;
poor for the other symptom and pain control, patient and family anxi-
ety; pain and symptom ratings polarised to extremes of the rating scale;
patient anxiety rated as less severe; family anxiety rated as more severe
Prospective: agreement moderate to good for all symptoms except ano-
rexia and confusion; Proxies prospective/retrospective: agreement mod-
erate to good for symptoms such as immobility confusion, dysponea
and vomiting! nausea; fair for weakness, constipation and depression;
Patients prospective/retrospective: agreement moderate to good for
mobility, dysponea, anxiety, illness awareness and acceptance; fair for
malaise/fever weakness, constipation,; Retrospective: agreement gener-
ally lower; pain rated more severe; weakness, malaise, depression and
carer's stress under-rated; anxiety closer to patient's rating
Key: f/u= follow up; ADL= activities of daily living; 80= significant other; QL= quality of
life; C=congruent; NC= non-congruent.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 Levels of agreement between the patient and proxy
In spite of the heterogeneity of the research assessing the validity of proxies' reports, some
consistencies do exist across the literature. The evidence suggests that information that relies
on concrete, observable phenomenon, such as service provision, service evaluation and fac-
tual information, tends to have good levels of agreement (O'Brien & Francis, 1988; Farrow &
Samet, 1990; Clipp & George, 1992; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Spiller & Alexander,
1993; Field et al., 1995). This is further evident in retrospective reports of the practical help
needed and the depth of information given to patients and their families from health profes-
sionals (Higginson et al., 1994). However, there are some exceptions with greater satisfaction
reported by proxies prospectively (Higginson et al., 1990). One explanation for this might be
relative's reluctance to criticise services (Glickman, 1997).
On the whole, agreement is better for those symptoms and aspects of the patient's func-
tioning that are more overt, for example immobility, activities of daily living, and for some
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symptoms such as fatigue, dysponea and vomiting (McCusker & Stoddard, 1984; Farrow &
Samet, 1990; Clipp & George, 1992; Spiller & Alexander, 1993; Higginson et al., 1994; B1a-
zeby, Williams et al., 1995; Field et al., 1995; Grassi et al., 1996; Hinton, 1996; Kurtz et al.,
1996; Sigurdardottir et al., 1996; Lobchuk, Kristjanson et al., 1997a; 1997b: Kristjanson et
al., 1998; Sneeuw et al., 1998; Sneeuw et al., 1999). This finding is mirrored in Hinton's
(1996) prospective and retrospective comparison. Here, proxies can draw on cues such as
non-verbal behaviour when judging the patients' experiences.
With few exceptions, agreement is poorest for aspects of the patient's experience that
are more subjective in nature like the patients' pain, feelings and thoughts (Ahmedzai et al.,
1988; Farrow & Samet, 1990; Higginson et al., 1990; C1ipp & George, 1992; Higginson &
McCarthy, 1993; Spiller & Alexander, 1993; Higginson et al., 1994; B1azeby et al., 1995;
Field et al., 1995; Hinton, 1996; Lobchuk et al., 1997; Sneeuw et al., 1997a; Wilson et al.,
2000; Lobchuk & Degner, 2002a). Comparing patient-proxy reports for these aspects at entry
to the study and three months later, has shown that agreement improves over time (Sneeuw et
al., 1997b). Examining proxies' responsiveness to changes in the patient's condition over
time, one study found that proxies were better at detecting changes in more objective aspects
of the patients' experiences such as physical and role functioning (Sneeuw et al., 1998). In
contrast, Sneeuw et a I. (1997b) found that proxies were less efficient for physical fitness,
daily activities and also for social activities and pain.
At the group level, systematic biases were evident for pain, with the majority of studies
finding that pain was viewed as more frequent and severe by proxies (O'Brien & Francis,
1988; Higginson et al., 1990; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Madison & Wilkie, 1995;
Yeager et al., 1995; Elliott et al., 1996; Sneeuw et al., 1998; 1999; Wilson et al., 2000; Red-
inbaugh et al., 2002). In studies where proxies underestimated patient's pain the proportions
of proxies underestimating were small (Miaskowski et al., 1997; Linn, 2001). This contrasts
to the findings of health professional who tend to underestimate patients' pain (Grossman et
al., 1991; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Au et al., 1994 Higginson & McCarthy, 1993;
Nekolaichuk et al., 1999a; Wilson et al., 2000). When asked prospectively to report on mood,
particularly anxiety and depression, proxies were also shown to overestimate the severity of
mood disturbance (Higginson et al., 1990; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Spiller & Alexan-
der, 1993; Field et al., 1995; Sneeuw et al., 1997b; 1999; Wilson et al., 2000; Lobchuk Deg-
ner, 2002a). Likewise, symptoms were rated as more distressing by proxies (Clipp & George,
1992; Madison & Wilkie, 1995; Yeager et al., 1995; Lobchuk et al., 1997; Redinbaugh et al..
2002). The evidence was less conclusive in finding a systematic bias for proxies' reports of
patients' levels of functioning. Some studies indicated that proxies overestimated patient's
impairment compared to the patient's own estimates (Elliott et al., 1996; Sneeuw et al..
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1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999), whereas others have found no such bias (Farrow & Samet, 1990;
Clipp & George, 1992; Field et al., 1995; Grassi et al., 1996; Sigurdardottir et al., 1996).
Studies that have calculated the magnitude of the bias have shown that it tends to be moderate
to small, with more substantial bias for feelings, emotions and fatigue (Sneeuw et al.. 1997a;
1997b; 1998; 1999; 2001; Lobchuk & Degner, 2002a).
Findings from studies that have assessed proxies' reports before and after the patient's
death vary from prospective studies. Overall, proxies' prospective ratings are more in agree-
ment with the patients' reports than their retrospective ratings. Higginson et al. (1994) found
that proxies' reports of pain diverged from their prospective reports, becoming polarised to
the extremes of the rating scale. Though, the study sample was small. This change in report
over the terminal and bereavement phases is supported to some extent by Hinton's (1996)
findings. Here, pain ratings were rated more severely retrospectively when compared to the
patients' and proxies' prospective ratings. In contrast, depression was under-rated retrospec-
tively by proxies (Ahmedzai et al., 1988; Hinton, 1996). This offers support to the assertion
that proxies' accounts may be a reflection of their own thoughts and feelings during bereave-
ment (Higginson et al., 1994). Yet, the findings for mood contrast to those in the prospective
validity literature. After death reports by proxies on patient's anxiety revealed that anxiety
was rated as less severe and, in some instances, was more in line with the patients' own rat-
ings than their own prospective reports (Ahmedzai et al., 1988; Higginson et al., 1994; Hin-
ton, 1996). This suggests that, for some aspects at least, proxies may be able to view the
patients' experiences more objectively from a distance after the events. Or in the case of
depression proxies may minimise the degree of patients' psychological distress retrospec-
tively. The following sections will explore factors associated with the validity of proxies'
reports and offer possible explanations for the findings.
2.4.2 Factors associated with the patient and proxy
Patient and proxy demographics
Evidence for a relationship between levels of agreement between patients and proxies, and
demographic information such as age, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status and educa-
tional level have been inconsistent. Of those studies that have found that demographics do
have a bearing on agreement, their influence appears to be mixed (O'Brien & Francis, 1988)
or a function of the symptom evaluated (Kristjanson et al., 1998). For example, older proxies
were less accurate in reporting pain frequency than younger proxies (Kristjanson et al., 1998).
Two studies indicate that female proxies may be more congruent in their reports than male
proxies, although the effect tends to be limited (Miaskowski et al., 1997: Kristjanson et al.,
1998). Only one study found that agreement was lower if the patient had a lower educational
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standard (McCusker & Stoddard, 1984). Few definitive conclusions can be drawn from the
array of findings.
Level ofpatient's impairment
It has been argued that the patient's caregiver may be more aware of events than patients in
cases where the patient is tired or confused, and so better able to report on the patient's expe-
rience (Cartwright & Seale, 1990). This could account for lack of agreement between the
patient and proxy. There is evidence to support this, Miaskowski et al. (1997) found that
patients in non-congruent patient-proxy dyads were more likely to have a lower quality of
life, more fatigue and increased levels of confusion and mood disturbance. Comparing reports
by chronically ill patients and their caregivers using the Sickness Impact Profile, McCusker
and Stoddard (1984) found that levels of agreement were lower if the patient had a terminal
illness. However, the influence of the patient's condition on levels of agreement does not
appear to be consistent. Patient's cognitive, neurological or psychiatric status has been shown
not to affect agreement (McCusker & Stoddard, 1984; Farrow & Samet, 1990). Discrepancies
across the studies may be due to differences in assessments and in the extent of the physical
and mental impairment in the patients studied. Further to this, the findings have been difficult
to explain in light of studies using repeated measures designs. Sneeuw et at. (1997 a) in a
study of patients with brain cancer found that agreement on quality of life was lower for
patients with poorer functioning, cognitive impairment, minor confusion at entry to the study
and at one month follow up. Similar results were found by Sneeuw et at. (1997b) where
agreement was lower for feelings and social activities, but agreement was better for physical
functioning and quality of life when patients were more impaired. However, these findings
did not persist over time. In other studies Sneeuw et at. (1998; 1999) have found a curvilinear
relationship with patients at moderate or mild levels of impairment with the greatest number
of discrepancies and lowest agreement at entry and at follow up.
The patient and proxy relationship
The spouse was predominately the significant other or caregiver in the studies reviewed (see
Table 2.1 and Table 2.2). Therefore, it is difficult to identify who is the most appropriate per-
son to act as the patient's proxy. Some studies found that agreement was not dependant on the
family member being the spouse (McCusker & Stoddard, 1984; Higginson et al., 1994), while
others found that spouses were more congruent than other family members (Miaskowski et
aI., 1997), or were better for some aspects of the patients' experiences such as health status,
life events and social network (Farrow & Samet, 1990; Kristjanson et al., 1998). These find-
ings are in line with those from health research and epidemiological surveys where spouses
are considered best able to report on the patient's experiences (Moore et al., 1970; Okamoto,
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2000; Novella, et al., 2001). Differences across the studies may be due to the number of
opportunities the proxy has to observe and interact with the patient during the illness. Indeed,
proxies living with the patient have been shown to have higher levels of agreement
(McCusker & Stoddard, 1984; O'Brien & Francis, 1988). Nearing death agreement is also
higher between proxies where the patient died at home (Higginson et al., 1994). Given these
findings, it is reasonable to assume that those closest to the patient, in many cases the spouse,
are better informed as they share their partner's experiences. Thus it is not the spouse per se,
but the relationship between the proxy and patient that is most important. Any factors that
affect the relationship, particularly ones that influence the ability of the patient and proxy to
share their thoughts and feelings may diminish the proxies' ability to accurately reflect the
patient's experience (Clipp & George, 1992).
Caregiver burden
McWhinney (1989) suggests that family caregivers and patients may have difficulties in shar-
ing their feelings. The perceived burden of caring does appear to influence proxy caregiver's
ability to accurately report on aspects of the patient's experience (Kurtz et al., 1996; Sneeuw
et al., 1998). The findings concur with assessment of quality of life in other groups (discussed
in Section 1.4.2). Sneeuw et al. (1998) found that the intensity of the caregiving role was
related to proxies' ratings of the patient's quality of life. Non-congruent patient-proxy dyads
reported greater caregiver strain than congruent dyads when assessing patient's pain
(Miaskowski et al., 1997). Clipp and George (1992) found that differences between patients
and proxies accounts of depression, pain, functioning and coping might be attributable to the
patient not sharing their feelings, as patients in the study tended to view their marriage more
negatively then did spouses. The burden of caring might influence proxies' perceptions of
events, as proxies' beliefs regarding the patient's suffering create an impression that things
are worse than they really are (Lobchuk et al., 1997). Thus, the views of caregivers may be
biased on account of their own concerns and expectations regarding their role. The actual bur-
den of caring occurs before the patient's death during the terminal phases of the illness. Pro-
spectively agreement on patients' quality of life is affected by the proxies' own health and
quality of life, with poorer levels predictive of the difference between the patient and proxy
(Sneeuw et al., 1998). What is not known is how caregiver burden effects proxies' responses
after the patient's death. The negative physical and psychological impact of the perceived bur-
den of caring for patients during advanced illness is well documented (Stez, 1987). It is likely
that the negative consequences of caring transcend into bereavement. Kelly et al. (1999), in a
longitudinal analysis, found that the level of psychological symptoms, lower levels of practi-
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cal assistance, the quality of the relationship and coping style in the terminal phase of the ill-
ness were among factors predictive of poorer bereavement outcomes.
However, all studies to date, that have examined the role of caregiving on levels of
patient/proxy agreement have focused on the negative effects of caring, conceptualising car-
ing as a negative experience. This has been to the detriment of fully exploring the multifac-
eted role of caring with respect to congruency. For example, whether the positive aspects of
caring, identified by researchers in the area of caregiving (Nolan et al., 1994; Grant et al.,
1998), influence the way in which proxies' perceive patients' symptoms. Future work would
benefit from a comprehensive exploration of this area, particularly in light of the numbers of
proxies providing end-of-life care.
Expectations and beliefs
The way in which events are perceived is based on the individual's frame of reference. That
is, the context within which they are embedded, their experiences, attitudes and beliefs (Ver-
non, 1970). Therefore, it is not surprising to find that there is incomplete agreement given that
the patient and the proxy have their own perspectives of events. For example, symptoms such
as depression, anxiety and pain may be interpreted as a normal part of the illness experience,
whereas for others these symptoms may be viewed as unacceptable and worth reporting. Dif-
ferences in reporting these symptoms may occur if there is a mismatch in the perceptions of
the patient and proxy. Elliott et at. (1996) demonstrated that family members' report of
patients' pain is strongly related to their attitudes and knowledge. Proxies, who expected pain
with cancer reported more pain, whereas those who believed cancer pain management had no
ceiling dose for opoids and were not concerned about addiction, reported that patients had less
pain. In addition to these considerations, proxies hold beliefs about the patient and how they
respond to the experience based on their shared experiences. These beliefs may influence the
perception of events or proxies may take into consideration particular beliefs they hold about
the patient when making judgements. For example, stoicism in patients was associated with
spouses' overestimation of pain (Dar et al., 1992). This is consistent with the literature in
social psychology where judgements by others are based on assumptions regarding the indi-
vidual's personality characteristics (Sudman et aI., 1996). Patients own beliefs can affect the
validity of their responses and in turn lead to poor agreement. Sneeuw et at. (1998) found that
patient's tendency toward socially desirable responses was a predictor of patient and proxy
agreement.
Coping
How patients cope with their illness prior to death and how proxies cope during the terminal
and bereavement phases could have implications for the validity of their responses. For exam-
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ple, discrepancies may result if patients conceal their feelings to protect their significant
other. Dar et at. (1992) found that 60% of patients admitted hiding their pain so as not to upset
their spouses. The reverse may be true for proxies as patients have been found to underesti-
mate the degree of distress caused to proxies (Dar et aI., 1992; Yeager et al., 1995). Disrup-
tions in communication are not uncommon as patients and their partners try to cope with the
patient's illness and approaching death (Baider & Sarell, 1984). Patients' feelings and less
visible symptoms, such as mood states, may be easier to conceal than more overt symptoms
such as vomiting and breathlessness. Coping strategies such as denial may inhibit the open
expression of feelings between the patient and proxy. As identified in Section lA, denial by
the patient has been shown to skew health professionals' reports when measuring affective
states (Jennings & Muhlenkamp, 1981). Spiller and Alexander (1993), after assessing eight-
een terminally ill patients and their family caregivers, found that patients had a more positive
outlook and emotional state than their proxies reported. The authors concluded that differ-
ences between the ratings might be due to denial or the proxy's projection of their own feel-
ings onto the patient. Evidence for this comes from Kurtz et at. (1996) who found that in
patient-proxy dyads where the patient identified a symptom but the proxy did not, that the
patients tended to be more depressed and the proxy more optimistic. They suggest that the
depressed patient may over-report symptoms or the proxy may minimise and under-report the
number of symptoms. Miaskowski et at. (1997) also found that proxies underestimated pain
intensity in more depressed patients. Therefore, lack of agreement may be a function of how
both the patient and proxy interact and how they cope with events. Once again, how the proxy
copes with events before the patient's death may carry over into bereavement and influence
their retrospective responses.
2.4.3 Factors associated with assessment
Assessment instrument
Responding to a question is a complex cognitive process, particularly if it requires making
judgements regarding other people's experiences. It consists not only of attending, perceiving
and encoding information pertaining to an event, but also recalling material and judging its
appropriateness in relation to the question and the response format. Errors in responding can
occur at any stage. Thus, some degree of inaccuracy in proxies' reports can be attributed to
the instrument itself. As Sudman and Brabum (1974) point out, variables associated with the
task itself are an important source of error. The cognitive psychology and survey literature is
abounding with potential biasing factors, amongst which are question length, ordering of
questions, mode of administration, response options and content (lobe et al., 1993). The find-
ings from the studies concur with this literature and have been identified in other studies
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examining the validity of proxies (Pickle et al., 1983; Magaziner et al., 1988; 1996; 1997).
Agreement between cancer patients and their next-of-kin proxies was found to deteriorate
when the questions became more complicated and the number of response options increased
(O'Brien & Francis, 1988). Further evidence comes from Sneeuw et al. (l997a), where the
level of exact patient and proxy agreement was a function of the response format, with high
agreement for dichotomous options and low agreement for two items with seven point scales.
Questions and response options that are vague and ambiguous may also compromise validity,
as the proxy may misinterpret the meaning of the question. If the task is too cognitively
demanding, proxies may simply choose an answer that appears satisfactory. This is known as
"satisficing" and can result in misleading information (Krosnick, 1991). One can postulate
that if the task is too emotionally demanding, then satisficing may also occur as individuals
seek to reduce the emotional strain of actively searching their memories. A mediating factor
that can improve recall is the participant's level of motivation. The higher it is, the more
likely they are to do a thorough search through memory thus improving accuracy of recall
(Sudman et al., 1996).
Content ofthe assessment
As identified earlier and consistent with the literature assessing proxies in other areas of
health care, proxies are better able to report on more objective and visible aspects of the
patients' experiences. It has been suggested that this occurs because the difficulty of a report-
ing task is determined by its content (Hughes & Preski, 1997). Thus, questions that assess
more abstract or subjective phenomenon are more likely to have recall errors because they
require inferences. Since the proxy is not experiencing the phenomenon themselves, they
have to rely on less visible cues. Confusion may occur when interpreting these cues because
some symptoms, such as depression, may overlap with other somatic symptoms (Brugha,
1993), or the proxy may be unable to identify the cues through lack of understanding of the
nature and cause of the symptom. In such instances, the experience may be misidentified.
Such arguments provide an explanation for the inconsistent findings for overall quality of life
where agreement ranges from fair to good (Grassi et al., 1996; McMillan, 1996; Sigurdardot-
tir et al., 1996; Sterkenburg et al., 1996; Sneeuw et al., 1997a: 1997b; 1998; 1999; Wilson et
al., 2000; Sneeuw et al., 2001; Redinbaugh et al., 2002). Since quality oflife is a multidimen-
sional construct incorporating subjective and objective elements. The same can be said for
pain assessment where affective components of pain are less congruent with the patient's
reports than physical components (Dar et al., 1992; Madison & Wilkie, 1995).
The content of the material being assessed is a significant factor in recall. For example,
the capacity to recall the specifics of regular, mundane activities, such as food intake, deterio-
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rates rapidly (Armstrong et al., 2000). By comparison, memory for infrequent exceptional
events, like health care visits and hospitalisation, declines less rapidly (Mathiowetz, 1988).
The frequency and saliency of an event is highly relevant to retrospective interviews because
proxies are likely to be asked to report on the frequency and severity of patients' symptoms.
Although not investigated in the studies (Table 2.1 & 2.2), research suggests that memory for
these aspects can be selectively biased. Events that are highly salient, that stand out, tend to be
remembered (Bower et al., 1979). In addition to this, salient events may be over-reported
(Huber & Power, 1985). This may account for the tendency of relatives to overestimate
patients' levels of pain, as pain relief is often ranked as their highest priority (Kristjanson,
1989). Less salient events may be prone to inaccuracies, as they become typical and less dis-
tinct. As a result more easily forgotten or merged in to a generic memory that is a summary of
events (Linton, 1982). In addition to this, research into eyewitness testimony, both in field
and laboratory settings, has demonstrated that highly emotional events are recalled better than
neutral ones (Christianson, 1992). Since the death of a significant other is an important and
rare event these findings suggest that memory should be better than for more usual life events.
However, recall of specific aspects of the patients' experiences may be inaccurate because of
their occurrence and significance.
Assessmentperiod
The actual period being assessed varies enormously across the validity studies from the past
few hours (Linn, 2001) up to the last year of life (Cartwright & Seale, 1990). This has made it
difficult to examine what influence the assessment period has on the validity of proxies'
responses even though it is likely to affect the strategy proxies use to recall information. For
example, it is unlikely that assessments over a year will result in a specific search for each
episode of an event. In these instances, individuals may resort to strategies that approximate
events rather than a precise recall of each episode (Linton, 1982). Although this may appear
problematic, it does not necessarily undermine the validity of proxies' reports, as retrospec-
tive surveys may not necessarily require specific information. Instead, a general idea about
the adequacy of care may be all that is required.
Timing ofthe assessment
From the research on memory it has been shown that one factor important in remembering is
the time interval between encoding and retrieval (Baddley, 1990). Consequently, the shorter
the intervening period, the easier it should be to recall information retrospectively. This may
explain why agreement between patients and proxies is better prospectively when compared
to retrospective reports (Hinton, 1996); the recall of events are in close temporal relation to
the actual event and the encoding of the material into memory. Thus, recall error is more
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likely to be problematic retrospectively where proxies are often expected to remember events
several months after the patient's death. Due to the sensitive nature of the information the,
timing of the interview also has ethical implications. It may be morally inappropriate to inter-
view too soon after the patient's death.
Differences in the timing of retrospective assessments have made it difficult to ascer-
tain the most appropriate time to interview proxies after the patient's death. Responses by
proxies to questions during bereavement have been shown to diverge from their earlier recol-
lections in the terminal phase of the patient's illness (Higginson et al. 1994; Hinton, 1996).
Similarly, responses regarding patients' symptoms, care received and need for help have been
shown to change between interviews at 3 and 9 months during bereavement (Cartwright et al.,
1973). More research is needed to investigate how proxies' reports change during bereave-
ment and whether these changes are significant enough to question the validity of proxies'
reports. The findings concur with the memory literature, which has found that later recollec-
tions may be inconsistent with earlier recollections and that informants may not realise that
their recollections have varied over time (Ross, 1989). This is also consistent with the notion
that memory is constructed and reconstructed (Conway, 1992). As these constructions are
embedded in the individuals general knowledge about a particular event, they may be influ-
enced by the proxies' own emotions.
Memory and emotions
Emotions are an integral part of attention, perception and retrieval of information, and yet the
effect of bereavement on the accuracy of proxies' memories for events has not been explored.
Notwithstanding the inherent challenges of this type of research, it is likely because it is diffi-
cult to identify which of the many factors associated with grief affect the memories of
bereaved relatives. A mixture of emotions often marks this period as they cope with the
impending loss and its associated challenges. This can produce noticeable levels of stress
(Keitel et al., 1999) and depressed mood (Shuchter & Zisook, 1993). Research into how emo-
tions influence memory has demonstrated that there is a mood congruent memory effect
(Bower, 1981; Bower, 1987). This is described as: "enhanced coding and/or retrieval of mate-
rial the affective valence of which is congruent with the ongoing mood" (Blaney, 1986,
p.229). A pervasive finding is that individuals with depression or depressed mood have been
found to recall more negative stimuli (information, events), which is consistent with their
mood-state (Matt et al., 1992; Eich, 1995). Although a similar effect has been identified for
individuals with anxiety, the findings have been less consistent (Mogg et al., 1987; Eysenck
& Mogg, 1992).
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Further to this, emotions can create attentional biases. Bower (1992) suggests that indi-
viduals pay more attention to information that is consistent with their mood state. In other
words, anxious individuals tend to focus on threatening information, whereas, those who are
depressed are likely to attend to sadness and loss (Mineka & Sutton, 1992). Evidence from
individuals with clinical anxiety (Burke & Matthews, 1992) and non-clinical anxiety (Broad-
bent & Broadbent, 1988) supports the proposition that anxious individuals selectively attend
to threat information. Attentional processes have also been given a central role in explaining
anxiety states in theories of anxiety (e.g. Eysenck, 1992). However, the results from studies
investigating attentional biases in depression have been mixed (McCabe & Gotlib, 1995; Bra-
dley et al., 1997; Williams et al., 2000)
The nature of the event itself can also influence attention. Research from cognitive
psychology suggests that emotional events that create physiological arousal are liable to
attentional biases. These biases are thought to narrow attention to the central details of the
event; reducing attention for peripheral aspects (Christianson, 1992). For highly emotional
events, it has also been found that recall for the central details are improved for several
months following the event (Christianson & Loftus, 1987). These findings may explain why
proxies' reports vary from those of patients, as they may be focusing on specific aspects that
they believe are significant.
Emotions can also influence the strategy that individual's adopt to recollect material.
These strategies vary depending on the task and the individual's cognitive abilities. As noted
earlier, a generic memory that is a summary of events may be recalled rather than a search
through episodic memory (Linton, 1982). This strategy can be controlled and a more specific
memory strategy employed as the need arises. However, depressed individuals (Williams &
Dritschel, 1988) and older people with reduced memory capacity (Winthorpe & Rabbit, 1988)
are two groups who have been found to have difficulty in doing this. Furthermore, reports on
other peoples' behaviour and attitudes are more likely to rely on estimation strategies as the
material is not as elaborately coded in memory and therefore as accessible to recall, compared
to self-reports (Sudman et al., 1996). Therefore some individuals may be more likely to use
estimation strategies.
The research has highlighted how fallible memory is for events and the complex rela-
tionship between memory and emotion. Judgements based on these memories are likely to be
biased (Kahneman et al., 1982). An example is the "availability heuristic ", which states that
the likelihood of an event is judged by the ease with which events can be recalled (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973). Moreover, emotions can influence judgement themselves (Schwarz &
Clore, 1989). Despite the significance the proxy's emotional state, few studies have investi-
gated the proxy's psychological health status directly. Where studies have investigated it,
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researchers found a non-significant tendency for proxies in non-congruent patient-proxy
dyads to have poorer mood states than congruent dyads (Miaskowski et al., 1997). Kurtz et al.
(1996) found caregiver depression was not a significant factor in levels of patient and proxy
concordance. Clearly, this is an area that requires further investigation.
2.4.4 Factors associated with the validity studies
The research presented so far has summarised the many factors that can potentially affect the
validity ofproxies' reports. This section deals with the quality of the studies that have investi-
gated this aspect.
Assessmentperiods
Some discrepancies between patients and their proxies may be the result of the research itself.
This is particularly striking in the retrospective/prospective studies, when investigators are
not comparing like with like. As Higginson et al. (1994) highlights, in a study conducted by
Ahmedzai et al. (1988), patient reports were recorded at different times before death,
whereas, relatives were asked to report on the last month of life. Under these circumstances it
is not surprising to find differences when patient and proxy views are compared. Cartwright
and Seale (1990) acknowledge that differences could be due to the fact that interviews were
conducted with patients at variable times before death. As a consequence differences might be
attributable to the differences in periods assessed. Moreover, the proxy might have reported
on experiences between the patient interview and death not covered by the patient interview.
Measures ofassociation
Problems have been identified with the statistics used to assess the measure of agreement. A
number of studies have used the Pearson r statistic, Spearman rho or Kendall's tau (Ahmed-
zai et al., 1988; Clipp & George, 1992; Dar et al., 1992; Grassi et al., 1996; Sigurdardottir et
al., 1996; Sneeuw et al., 1998). However, these type of correlations do not indicate that one
individual's rating reflects another: the relationship between two raters could be significant if
the ratings were consistently higher or lower than the patient's ratings (Nelson et aI., 1990).
An alternative statistic that measures the degree of agreement between sources of continuous
data, which accounts for systematic mean differences and chance is the interclass correlation
coefficient (ICC) (Landis and Koch, 1977). The equivalent for categorical or dichotomous
data, allowing for chance agreement is Cohen's kappa (Cohen, 1960). Comparing statistical
measures of agreement Linn (2001) found that using the ICC patient-proxy ratings of pain
agreement was high in contrast the kappa coefficent, though significant, indicated poor levels
of agreement. An explanation for this could have been because the kappa was unweighted,
that is its value was based on one-to-one agreement between the patient and proxy. Weighting
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the kappa allows for some degree of disagreement within acceptable clinical or theoretical
boundaries (Cohen, 1968). This is an important consideration when evaluating the validity
studies, as agreement will vary as a function of the standard chosen. For some investigators
strict one-to-one agreement is necessary (Higginson et al., 1990; Higginson & McCarthy,
1993; Spiller & Alexander, 1993; Hinton, 1996; Lobchuk et al., 1997; Kristjanson et a!',
1998), while for others, agreement can vary from the patient's response to a certain extent
(Higginson et al., 1994; Sneeuw et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999). Ofmore importance when
deciding on level of agreement, is the necessity for a strict agreement. Is it more important to
know that the patient was in a certain amount ofpain regardless of whether the response crite-
ria were accurately matched? In such instances, weighting the level of association to allow for
some level of disagreement would be more appropriate.
A related issue is that of systematic bias. Several studies have examined proxies ten-
dency to over- or underestimate patients' experiences. However, few have actually quantified
the amount of bias or attempted to explain the significance of their findings in clinically
meaningful ways (Sneeuw et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999; 2001; Lobchuk & Degner,
2002a). Yet for researchers who rely on proxy reports this is requisite when interpreting the
information given by proxies. Furthermore, it allows meaningful comparisons across studies
(Lobchuk & Degner 2002b). One approach put forward by Sneeuw and colleagues (1998) is
to standardise the mean difference by relating the scores to their standard deviations. Using
Cohen's (1988) standardised differences (effect size d) to interpret the size of the differences;
d=.2 (small difference), d=.5 (moderate difference) and d=.8 (large difference). At best this
provides some means by which to interpret differences in the absence of guidelines as to what
degree of difference is clinically meaningful (Sneeuw et al., 1999).
Sample
The sample size of some of the validity research is relatively small (Spiller & Alexander,
1993; Higginson et al., 1994; Field et al., 1995). For example, in a study by Higginson et al.
(1994) only six patients and seven family members were interviewed within three weeks of
the death. Comparisons of prospective and retrospective ratings on such small samples are
questionable and require further investigation to substantiate their conclusions. The problem
of sample size has been addressed by Sneeuw and colleagues (1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999)
where sample sizes range between 90 and 307 patients. Much of the evidence is based on con-
venient samples with patients who are willing and able to complete measures because of the
difficulty in obtaining information from less able patients. This does limit the generalisability
of their findings. As a means to overcome this problem Sneeuw et al. (1998) proposed exam-
ining trends as a function of the patients condition. Though insightful the results have been
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inconclusive and have still relied on patients who are able to complete measures. This will
remain an area of contention because of the inherent difficulties in assessing patients who are
so ill.
Outcome measures
Within palliative care there are an increasing number of tools for measuring aspects of the
patients experiences, relating to symptoms, and services. Whatever, the method a necessity
for agreement between patient and proxy is reliable and valid measures. In a substantial pro-
portion of studies there is a lack ofevidence to suggest that this criteria has been met (Ahmed-
zai et al., 1988; Cartwright & Seale, 1990). In Hinton's (1996) study the open-ended
interview style may have been prone to subjective biases. Almost all the validity studies have
used some form of interview schedule to assess palliative care outcomes, although few studies
have used the same instruments. Added to this, Lobchuk and Degner (2002b) point out that
lack of definition of conceptually related terms makes it difficult to interpret the findings.
Examples include, nervousness, worrying and anxiety (e.g. Higginson et al., 1994; Lobchuk
& Degner, 2002a; Madison & Wilkie, 1995). Lack of consistency and clear definitions
impedes cross study comparisons. In spite of this, some consistencies do emerge, particularly
in relation to the content of the assessment. Where the same measures have been used, for
example the European Organisation for Research and Treatment of Cancer quality of life
instrument (EORTC QLQ-C30) comparisons are difficult because two of the studies were
with disease specific patients with either oesophageal or brain cancer (Blazeby et al., 1995;
Sneeuw et al., 1997a).
2.4.5 Summary and conclusions
This review provides encouraging evidence for the use ofproxies at the end of life, and shows
that they can be relied upon to represent certain aspects of the patient's experience, most nota-
bly for service provision and evaluation, and for symptoms that are more observable in
nature. However, care must be taken when using proxies to report on aspects of the patient's
experience that are more subjective, such as pain and affective states. As this review has iden-
tified, these reports are prone to biases for various reasons (summary in Appendix A). The
findings and conclusions are consistent with Sprangers and Aaronson's (1992) review and a
recent review conducted by Lobchuk and Degner (2002b). The present review differs from
these reviews as Sprangers and Aaronson (1992) examined both significant others and health
professionals as proxies for patients with chronic disease, while Lobchuk and Degner (2002b)
focused on symptoms in patients with cancer and was not specific to proxies for patients at
the end of life. The focus of this paper is specifically the validity of the proxy in relation to
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care at the end of life. This includes both prospective and retrospective reports and is not lim-
ited to cancer patients.
To a large extent inferences regarding the validity of retrospective proxy reports have
had to be made from prospective studies due to the paucity of research on the validity of retro-
spective reports. It should be noted that there is evidence that there may be differences
between prospective and retrospective studies. The review adds to previous work, by incorpo-
rating knowledge from other areas to help explain the research evidence and factors likely to
effect validity. Most notably, from the work by psychologists and survey researchers. which
has advanced our understanding of the complexities associated with responding to a question.
These include the stages of attending, perceiving an event, encoding the information, and
recalling the appropriate material according to response criteria. Further to this, are the differ-
ences between self-report and proxy responding. However, the research investigating the
validity of proxies has primarily focused on levels of agreement to the detriment of further
understanding why proxy views differ and whether and how greater agreement is possible.
Further research is needed into this issue. Such investigations may help researchers under-
stand and design measures to increase the validity of proxies' reports. Based on this review
one approach would be to design measures that tap into more objective aspects of the
patients' experiences.
The lack of agreement observed in the validity literature adds weight to the argument
that the patient is best able to report on their experiences (Schipper & Levitt, 1985). This issue
is not in contention here. The retrospective approach in palliative care does not distract from
the prospective studies and the important contribution they make to research at the end of life.
Instead, the retrospective approach and the use of proxies to evaluate patient's care can be
seen as one solution to overcome obstacles that researcher's face when evaluating care of the
dying. It therefore, has an important contribution as it provides a means to evaluate the care of
patients who would otherwise not be represented. Furthermore, the research can be useful in
identifying reasons for discrepancies and to develop strategies to improve congruence. With
reliance on the patient's family as the main caregivers and more patients dying at home this
will have important implications for the appropriate management of patients at the end of life.
2.5 Research aims
Through this review an array of factors that can affect the validity of proxies' responses were
identified. So far there has been little attention to investigate proxies' responses through into
the bereavement phase. As the review highlighted there are significant gaps in the knowledge
surrounding the effects of bereavement on proxy reports. Among these are the effects of prox-
ies, emotions on judgments, the reliability of proxies' reports over time and the basis for judg-
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ments on subjective aspects of the patient's experiences. Another notable omission, is the lack
of reliable and valid instruments with which to assess palliative care retrospectively. In view
of these findings, the aims of this thesis are to investigate these aspects more fully. More spe-
cifically the research sets out to investigate how proxies judge the patients' experiences after
the patients' death and the effects of bereavement on their reports. The focus of the work is
primarily on the more subjective symptoms such as pain, anxiety and depression. These are
important symptoms to evaluate in the care of patients with terminal illnesses. In this congru-
ency between the patient and proxy is known to be poorest. Therefore it is important to under-
stand more about how these questions are answered so that improvements can be made. The
following research questions are proposed:
2.5.1 Research question one
What do proxies understand by the pain, anxiety and depression frequency and severity
descriptors used in retrospective questionnaires that are used to assess palliative care?
Rationale
VOICES (Views of Informal Carers- Evaluation of Services) (Addington-Hall et aI., 1998) is
a retrospective semi-structured postal questionnaire used to assess palliative care. The ques-
tionnaire is a shortened version of the measure used in the Regional Study of the Care of the
Dying (Addington-Hall & McCarthy, 1995a) which is based on earlier surveys (Cartwright et
aI., 1973; Cartwright & Seale, 1990; Seale & Cartwright, 1994). It covers the last year of life
and includes items on sources of informal and formal care; service utilisation and evaluation;
information and communication with health care professionals; patients symptoms and
restrictions, and the proxy's experience of bereavement and bereavement care. To date, there
is no information on the reliability and validity of the measure. This is currently under inves-
tigation by the Department of Palliative Care and Policy at King's College, London. The aim
is to compare and contrast what proxies understand by the pain, anxiety and depression fre-
quency and severity descriptors used in VOICES (Addington-Hall et al., 1998). This is a way
of identifying ambiguous quantifiers in the questionnaires and as a means of improving the
validity.
2.5.2 Research question two
What are proxies recalling when they report on patients' levels of pain, depression and anxi-
ety retrospectively and what cues they are using?
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Rationale
Awareness of how proxies judge symptoms and what cues they use to reach decisions on
patients' levels of pain, anxiety and depression will be useful in understanding possible
biases. In addition to this, it will assist in the development of measures to assess end-of-life
care retrospectively.
2.5.3 Research question three
Do proxies' own emotions have a bearing on their reports of patient's pain, anxiety and
depression?
Rationale
Proxies' responses will be interpreted in the light of their self-reported depression, anxiety
and caregiver strain. This will help to establish whether their own emotions are reflected in
their responses.
2.5.4 Research question four
How do proxies' perceptions of patient's pain, anxiety and depression change during the
bereavement period?
Rationale
By investigating the differences and similarities of the accounts given by proxies it will be
possible to examine whether and how perceptions change over time. This may have a bearing
on the use of retrospective measures, such as VOICES, during the bereavement period. If
there are significant changes in the reports between different time periods then this suggests
that the approach might not reflect events. It will also be a first stage to investigating the reli-
ability of the VOICES instrument.
2.5.5 Summary
This thesis therefore addresses the question of whether and how the congruence between the
patient and proxy, on important questions of pain, anxiety and depression, can be improved.
From the following investigations it will not be possible to assess the accuracy of proxies'
responses in relation to patients' accounts, as there is no assessment from the patient during
the terminal stage of their illness. Instead the methods proposed might help unravel some of
the potentially biasing factors that can influence proxies' reports. For example, it might iden-
tify difficulties proxies' experience with particular questions and reasons for this. Further-
more, it will increase entertaining regarding how proxies' evaluate patients' care, what cues
to use to base their judgments. These will provide a better understanding of the limitations of
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using proxies and facilitate the design of retrospective surveys used for assessing care for
patients at the end of life.
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CHAPTER 3: Methods and procedures
3.1 Introduction
Previous investigations of the retrospective approach have used comparisons between the
patient and proxy as a measure of validity. In so doing, they have identified particular areas
wherein significant differences occur between the two accounts. However, studies such as
these, which rely on quantitative methods and emphasise outcomes, have not been able to
fully explain these discrepancies. A better understanding of how and why proxies' accounts
of patients' experiences diverge is critical, not only for identifying the limitations of proxies,
but also for facilitating the design of retrospective surveys used for assessing care for patients
at the end of life. Since the investigations are exploratory and are aimed at the proxies' sub-
jective meanings of the survey questions, a qualitative approach is best suited. Qualitative
methods, as Miles and Huberman (1994) point out, can be particularly useful in the develop-
ment of quantitative measures and to explain findings in quantitative research. Such methods
have now become more widely accepted (Punch, 1998; Barbour, 1999). This chapter will dis-
cuss the methods used to address the research aims. Consideration is given to the theoretical
and epistemology of the approach taken to make clear the position of the investigator. The
design and procedure will then be detailed.
The research sets out to investigate how proxies judge the patients' experiences retro-
spectively. This entails an analysis of how proxies interpret and answer questions used in ret-
rospective surveys. Furthermore, it aims to explore the effects of time and the proxies' own
feelings on their reports of patient's pain, anxiety and depression. One method that is particu-
larly well suited to these types of investigations is the cognitive interview. This will be dis-
cussed along with the method used to analyse the interviews.
3.2 Cognitive interviews
The cognitive interview consists of an in-depth face-to-face interaction between the investiga-
tor and the participant. Since they are intensive and sometimes lengthy, the number of partici-
pants can be quite small. Within these interviews, a number of techniques are used singularly
or in combination to make inferences about the underlying cognitive processes used by partic-
ipants. These include verbal protocols, probing, sorting tasks, rating tasks, paraphrasing,
response latency and vignettes. The most commonly used technique is the verbal protocol or
think aloud protocol (Ericsson and Simon, 1980; 1984). As the primary cognitive interview
technique used in these investigations is the verbal protocol, the focus will be on this tech-
nique. Before discussing this in more detail, it is fundamental to understand the background to
the method chosen.
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The cognitive interview draws on work from several different fields, including cogni-
tive and social psychology, and survey methodology. Its purpose is to improve the under-
standing of the underlying mental processes involved in answering survey questions and to
provide insight when designing questionnaires (Jabine et al., 1984). The theoretical underpin-
nings can be found within cognitive psychology in the information processing paradigm (Jobe
& Loftus, 1991; Jobe & Mingay, 1991) and social psychology in attitude structure (Tou-
rangeau, 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988) and social information processing (Hippler et
al., 1987). These fields have provided a means by which to understand how participants'
think when they are asked questions. This understanding is based on both theory and empiri-
cal evidence and has formed the basis for several models of the cognitive processes used in
answering a survey questions (Oksenberg & Cannell, 1977; Tourangeau, 1984; Tourangeau
& Rasinski, 1988; Willis et al., 1991). These models tend to be sequential, but as Sudman et
al. (1996) point out, participants may move back and forward between the different stages.
The models generally follow a similar format as Willis (1991) describes:
1. The first stage involves comprehension of the question that guides retrieval of
information from memory.
2. Decision/judgment processes guide the search through and extraction from
memory. This includes decisions about the search process and the adequacy
of the information retrieved.
3. Information relevant to the question at hand is retrieved from memory. This
information may be all of the required information to answer the question, or
may consist of estimations based on partial or incomplete information.
4. The information is recoded into the desired response format, or as in Tou-
rangeau's (1984) model, the response is a selection between response alterna-
tives.
As the models highlight, the cognitive interview is particularly useful for investigating
cognitive issues such as comprehension, memory and decision making. This is important for
detecting potential sources of error that can affect proxies' responses and for assessing the
quality of the data provided. It can also be used to discern questions that are interpreted differ-
ently by different participants, identify ambiguities, rate task difficulty, and provide insight
into how well participants are able to provide certain types of information.
3.3 Verbal protocols
The verbal protocol is one technique used in cognitive interviews that has been applied in the
design of a number of surveys (Belson, 1981; Royston, 1989; Blair et al., 1991; Menon 1993;
Bickart ct al. 1994). The majority of this work has concentrated on market research investi-
gating the behaviour of consumers. The technique requires participants to verbalise their
stream of consciousness and thoughts, while answering a question (concurrent verbal proto-
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col) or after they have finished answering a question (retrospective verbal protocol). Verbal
probing can also be used to extract information about particular terms used in the question.
Like many other cognitive techniques, there is the underlying assumption that:
"The psychological significance ofan individual's thoughts andfeelings, as well
as the underlying cognitive processes, can be examined by content analyzing the
individual's reported thoughts, ideas, images andfeelings. "
Cacioppo et al., 1997, p.929
Thus, verbal reports can be used to infer the processes underlying responses (Ericsson &
Simon, 1984). This is particularly useful when the participants are proxies, because it can be
applied to examine the foundations upon which proxies base their judgments. In other words,
verbal protocols can be used to establish the extent to which proxies' accounts are based on
their own feelings and beliefs (with respect to the events surrounding the death of their signif-
icant other). The cues proxies' use when making decisions and how these are reached based
on the available information. This goes some way to identifying what information they are
able to give and under what circumstances they are able to give it.
3.3.1 Verbal protocol procedure
It is disputed whether concurrent or retrospective verbal protocols are most appropriate (Blair
& Burton, 1987; Bolton, 1991). Concurrent protocols are closely related to question answer-
ing and it is thought that verbalising thoughts may alter the conditions under which the ques-
tion would normally be asked. By comparison, retrospective verbal protocols require the
participant to recall what they were thinking, which may be prone to memory errors. Accord-
ing to Ericsson and Simon (1993), as long as the period between question and retrospective
verbalisation is kept short, this should not affect memory for processing, as retrieval cues
remain in short-term memory allow effective retrieval of the sequence of thoughts. Taking
into account these recommendations, a retrospective verbal protocol was used for the present
investigation. Proxies were asked to verbalise what they were thinking immediately following
their response to a question. The retrospective verbalisation was kept in close temporal prox-
imity to the actual survey question in order to aid recall of the thought processes involved. An
additional consideration was the length of the task. Ericsson and Simon (1993) suggest that
the actual sequence of thoughts in completing a short task, .5 - 10 seconds, is likely to be
recalled with a high degree of accuracy and completeness. Given that the task of answering a
question in the present study was brief, it is likely that proxies were able to recall their
thoughts accurately.
Ericsson and Simon (1993) have devised standard guidelines for verbal protocols. The
instructions are important, because they have implications for the type of responses obtained.
To avoid changing the sequence of thoughts and to minimise socially motivated verbalisa-
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tions, participants are not asked for justifications, rationalisations, descriptions or explana-
tions. Instead, participants are asked to verbalise only those thoughts they were aware of
when performing the task. Thus, the instructions to proxies followed those proposed by Erics-
son and Simon (1993). For example, "What were you thinking about as you answered that
question? " However, in conjunction with this, some verbal probing asking why questions can
be effective in making explicit the particular cognitive processes used by the proxy during
their verbalisations, such as, "why did you choose severe to describe their pain?" Other
investigators attest to this technique (Willis et al., 1991; DeMaio & Rothgeb, 1996). In addi-
tion to this, verbal probing is useful for focusing the participant on particular terms in the
questions. In this study for examining the frequency descriptors (most of the time, often,
sometimes, rarely), and severity descriptors (severe, significant, moderate, mild) available for
proxies to describe the patient's symptoms. For example, proxies were asked "In your own
words what comes to mind when you think ofsevere depression? " Both types of verbal probes
were used during the interviews. Although they were kept to a minimum, so as not to cause
too much distress to proxies, and because extensive probing can make comparisons across
interviews difficult (Willis et al., 1991).
3.3.2 The validity of verbal protocols
Verbal protocols are based on the assumption that individuals actually have conscious access
to relevant cognitive processes. Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have challenged this assumption.
They provide evidence to suggest that individuals' cannot be relied upon to provide direct
verbal reports to some types of cognitions. Willis et al. (1991) question the relevance of the
research upon which this challenge is founded. They state that the focus of Nisbett and Wil-
son's (1977) research was on why cognitive processes were carried out. In this they asked
participants to identify the reasons for performing a behaviour. This contrasts with the empha-
sis of verbal protocols in survey methodology, where the focus is on what processes have
occurred. Further refuting Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) claim; Ericsson and Simon (1980,
1984) cite several studies where individuals have been very adept at verbalising cognitive
processes. They suggest that verbal reports will be accurate under particular conditions. This
is when: (1) the length of time between the task and verba1ising the thought processes is kept
short; (2) the information requested is descriptive rather than interpretative; (3) the informa-
tion is normally available in short-term memory; (4) the information is specific.
The first two conditions have already been mentioned and addressed. It is difficult to
say whether the information requested would normally be available in short-term memory
without making assumptions about what people are thinking and have reasonable access to.
Specific problems that might be expected given the context of the study are those pertaining
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to the thoughts and feelings of recently bereaved participants. It is possible that coping mech-
anisms such as denial or distress may prevent proxies' accessing particular thoughts. This
mayor may not become apparent through the interviews. Anticipating this, codes were devel-
oped to help identify these issues. For instance, proxies' references to not wanting to think
about the issue may be an indicator. This raises ethical concerns regarding the use of cogni-
tive interviews with bereaved relatives. Therefore, ethical issues will be discussed more fully
in Section 3.5.3. In response to the type of information, the fourth condition, this was kept
specific to the question asked.
Other critics of verbal protocols question the extent to which individuals are able to
access certain aspects of their thought processes. As Glass and Arnkoff (1982) propose,
thought processes are not solely based on language and may be based on imagery. Accepting
this, Ericsson and Simon (1980, 1984) affirm that individuals may not have access to all the
processes involved, but they state that what individuals are saying has meaning and impor-
tance to them and is likely to be relevant when making decisions. To support this, they present
empirical evidence to show that the kinds of thoughts verbalised are sufficient to account for
the cognitive mechanisms when performing a task (Ericsson and Simon, 1993)
Despite these criticisms, there is evidence to suggest that the approach has validity.
Using multivariate analysis, Bolton (1991; 1993) identified four underlying dimensions to
individuals' responses. These dimensions represent the cognitive difficulties of comprehen-
sion, retrieval, judgment and response. The stability of these across different domains attests
to the validity of the approach in identifying cognitive difficulties. Bickart and Felcher's
(1994) findings add support for a four stage model of question answering for behaviour fre-
quency questions. Evidence of validity also comes from studies that have used verbal proto-
cols to identify defective questions and to modify questions. Bolton (1991; 1993) compared
versions of a questionnaire and was able to test and identify where participants experienced
difficulty. From this different versions were compared to improve the survey. Similarly,
DeMaio et al. (1993) demonstrated that changes to questions as a result of cognitive inter-
viewing improved the recall of dietary intake.
3.3.3 Limitations of verbal protocols
One criticism of verbal protocols is that individuals may intentionally report their thoughts
inaccurately because of presentational biases (e.g. to be seen in a positive light) (Cacioppo et
al., 1997). One way to minimise this is to reduce demand characteristics in the interview. In
the present study it is unlikely that participants would need to distort the processes they used
to report on patients' symptoms. However, in order to reduce self-presentational biases the
instructions to proxies will stress that there were no right or wrong answers. Proxies will be
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instructed to verbalise their thoughts even if they seemed muddled and not to try to sort their
thoughts into any order.
Another limitation of verbal protocols is that they rely on the individual's ability to ver-
balise their thoughts. Those with poor verbal skills or cognitive limitations may have diffi-
culty conceptualising and verbalising their thoughts. There is some evidence to suggest that
older people are less able to verbalise their thinking than younger people (lobe & Mingay,
1990). However, in this study the use of verbal probes was useful in older participants for
identifying problems with questions (lobe & Mingay, 1990). Age related problems were not
specifically addressed in these investigations. However, difficulties with responses will be
observed and noted.
The focus of cognitive interviews is on information processing; within palliative care
research there is a need to think about emotional aspects of question answering. In an attempt
to address this, reference to proxies' own feelings will be explicitly coded. This issue will also
be directly addressed by research question 3, where the extent to which proxies' own emo-
tions had a bearing on their reports is investigated.
3.4 Analysis of verbal protocols
The analysis of verbal protocols varies according to the researcher's theoretical background
and the research objectives. In most cases, investigators have performed content analysis as a
means of interpreting the transcripts of cognitive interviews. They have also quantified the
codings to reveal underlying difficulties that individuals have encountered when answering a
question (Bolton, 1993; Bolton & Bronkhorst, 1996) or to reveal the strategies individuals
adopt when reaching a decision (Blair & Burton, 1987; Bickart et al., 1990). These codes are
often based on a theoretical scheme that incorporates comprehension, retrieval, judgment, and
response difficulties (Bolton 1993; Willis et al., 1991; Sudman et al., 1996). The coding
scheme is used as a framework to deductively assign codes to the transcripts. Before discuss-
ing the analysis in detail, it is important to highlight the coding scheme used in verbal proto-
cols. This is very important because it has implications for the type of analysis chosen.
3.4.1 Coding verbal protocols
Typically, the standard unit of analysis is the entire verbalisation (Willis et al. 1991). How-
ever, segments or words can be coded individually if required. To enable the identification of
macroprocessess, the speech burst or segment was chosen as the unit of analysis for these
investigations. Since there is no published research to date using verbal protocols in palliative
care research, the analysis of the transcripts and development of the codes will be both induc-
tive and deductive. This is very similar to ethnographic content analysis, where some code
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categories are fixed, while others emerge through the study (Altheide, 1987). This is impor-
tant because restricting the analysis to just fixed categories might exclude information that
may be particularly relevant to palliative care research. Since this an entirely new investiga-
tion, wherein not all of the parameters are known in advance, it is important to maintain some
flexibility within an otherwise structured coding scheme.
3.4.2 Coding scheme
The coding scheme is used to capture information about the processes involved in answering
a question, such as how participants arrived at a response. However, content-based informa-
tion can also be coded. Content-based information, as Bickart and Felcher (1996) highlight,
can be valuable in understanding response processes as it can facilitate in the identification of
information the participant uses to base their decision. This can be normative behaviour (what
is deemed normal), trait knowledge (knowledge based on the person's characteristics/person-
ality) and general knowledge. For example, proxies might centre their assessment of the
patient's level of depression on the patient's usual character. The types of information
described are more likely to occur when participants are asked to report about others (Blair et
al., 1991; Menon et al., 1995). Therefore, content-based information was incorporated into
the coding scheme in these investigations.
In addition to this, content-based information can also be used to identify response dif-
ficulties. For instance, certain words expressed by the participant, such as "define" and "not
familiar" may be indicative of uncertainty or comprehension problems (Bolton, 1993). Cod-
ing response difficulties is important in this study as a means of identifying defective ques-
tions and for identifying the limitations of using proxies; so this was included in the coding
scheme.
The coding scheme developed for these investigations was based on one developed by
Sudman et al. (1996), which was used to assess behavioural and attitudinal questions with
participants and their spouses. Categories represent comprehension, retrieval and judgment
problems. It relies on the coder(s) to interpret the text and make inferences about the thought
processes involved. This was chosen because it allows for the diagnosis of potential problems
both with the questionnaire and with answering the questions. The coding scheme will be
reviewed in more detail in Chapter 5 with the analysis of the verbal protocols.
3.4.3 Reliability of the coding
The analysis can be automated to improve reliability and to reduce the time and costs (Bolton
& Bronkhorst, 1991). This takes the form of content analysis where the computer finds words
or phrases predetermined and programmed by the researcher (Stone et al. 1966; Bolton &
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Bronkhorst, 1991). However, for these investigations manual coding was chosen because
inductive and deductive coding development was used. Furthermore, manual coding captures
the richness of the verbal report that cannot be captured using automatic coding. In previous
investigations the percentage of matches between coders have been calculated with average
percentages across questions as high as .77 (Bickart & Felcher, 1994). This does not account
for chance agreement between coders so the kappa statistic was chosen as a reliability esti-
mate here. Kappa has been used to examine the level of agreement on behavioural frequen-
cies, where estimates of .75 to .90 have been reported (Fowler & Cannell, 1996). The
reliabilities of the coding will be reported in the relevant chapters following the analysis.
3.5 Content analysis
Analysis of cognitive interviews follows the traditional content analysis where large volumes
of information are reduced in to a smaller number of categories with similar meanings
(Weber, 1985). Predominantly, the codes have been quantitatively analysed. Here the empha-
sis is on counts and frequencies where greater frequency is equated to greater significance.
Statistical techniques such as factor analysis have also been applied to the codes to reveal
underlying themes (Bolton, 1991; 1993). However, verbal protocols also lend themselves to a
more qualitative approach. Content analysis can be used in this way as Weber, (1985) states
"the best content analytic studies utilize both qualitative and quantitative operations on text"
(p.IO).
3.5.1 Quantitative analysis of content
Examining the frequency of words and phrases can be useful for discovering shared
meanings. For example in surveys it is important that terms used are understood in a similar
way to allow for interpretation of the findings (Willis et al., 1990). Divergent interpretations
may indicate that the question or terms are not suitable because in effect participants are
addressing different questions. Consequently, this was used to investigate proxies' under-
standing of the pain, anxiety and depression frequency and severity descriptors. Content anal-
ysis is also useful for making comparisons between groups based on characteristics, for
example codes can be compared between males and females. Research question 3 sets out to
investigate whether proxies' own feelings have a bearing on their accounts. Here the groups
can be subdivided based on their self-reported anxiety, depression and caregiver strain. A
content analysis would enable a comparison of codes between those with high and low levels
on these measures.
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3.5.2 Qualitative content analysis
In contrast to traditional content analysis there is more flexibility for codes to be modified or
new ones added during the analysis. In this analysis codes are developed from the coding
scheme and inductively from the text. Furthermore, the analysis goes beyond quantification
of the text to interpretation of the meaning behind what individuals are saying. Or as Morgan
(1993) posits, from questions about what and how many during coding and counting, to why
and how during qualitative content analysis. Content analysis was used in this way in these
investigations because both approaches can contribute to understanding the text more fully.
From a epistemological standpoint content analysis comes from a realist perspective,
where it is assumed that there is some fit between the outcome of the data analysis and reality.
However, it is considered more of a method that resembles quantitative approaches when ana-
lysing frequencies. Whereas, when used qualitatively it leans toward more interpretative
approaches such as grounded theory (Morgan, 1993). Although it should be noted that it has
more in common with classic grounded theory (e.g. Glasser & Strauss, 1967; Glasser, 1978)
where realism is reflected in participants' accounts and can be approximated from them
(Chamberlain, 1999). Later versions of grounded theory (e.g. Charmaz, 1995; Strauss &
Corbin, 1994), as Chamberlain (1999) identifies have moved away from realism into a con-
structivist epistemology. From a social constructivist perspective the true meaning of a phe-
nomenon is thought not to exist. Instead, it is believed that there are many versions of reality.
Thus, the qualitative inquiry is interested in how the phenomenon is constructed rather than a
search for a reality (Potter & Wetherall, 1987; Parker, 1992).
3.5.3 Ethics of cognitive interviews.
This section does not deal with procedural matters such as ethical approval or support, as this
is covered in the procedures section (Section 3.6.1). Instead it is specific to the methods
employed and the ethics of using cognitive interviews with bereaved relatives. Morally there
is a limit to the amount of verbal probing that can be used, which limits the use of the cogni-
tive interview in the field of palliative care. However, the method is particularly well-suited to
the research questions. As a researcher and a nurse practitioner my experience and judgment
was used to guide when it was no longer appropriate to continue a particular line of question-
ing, even if this compromised the research aims. An added concern was the focus on particu-
lar aspects of the proxies' experiences based on the researcher's framework. Given the
structured nature of the interviewing, this could have excluded a fuller understanding of the
experiences from the proxies' point of view. Therefore proxies were not discouraged from
expressing their views and relevant field notes were kept and used in the interpretation of
events. Further still was the concern about asking the proxy to think about issues that they
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may not want to think about or had not thought about before. For example, the extent of the
patient's suffering with regard to pain, anxiety and depression. In line with ethical guidelines
for research with human subjects proxies were reminded of their rights regarding participa-
tion in research studies (British Psychological Society, 2000). Alternatives to bereaved rela-
tives were also considered, amongst these were the use of other groups such as proxies for
older individuals. Despite the similarities in the patient-proxy literature, the specific circum-
stances and populations studied may not generalise to the retrospective approach for patients
at the end-of-life. Hence, the use of bereaved relatives was deemed essential.
3.6 Design and procedures
Since the research questions are addressed within one study, the design and procedures for all
the investigations are detailed in this section.
3.6.1 Ethics of interviewing bereaved relatives
Ethical concerns have been raised regarding the use of bereaved relatives in research and eth-
ical guidelines proposed for conducting such research (Parkes, 1995; Robertson et al., 1997).
These concerns were taken into consideration when designing the present set of investigations
since the participants are being asked to recall potentially distressing information at a very
sensitive time. Before seeking ethical approval, a number of ethical safe guards were put into
effect. This included clinical supervision and social work support from the hospice involved
in the care of the patient and the proxy. In anticipation of potential distress caused by the
interview, an ethical protocol was devised after negotiations with the hospice. A summary of
the ethics protocol is contained in Appendix B.
Ethical approval was then sought and obtained from three Local Research Ethics Com-
mittees. With the agreement with the hospice's internal ethics group and the hospice social
work department, it was decided that the social worker responsible for the area in which the
patient resided, would screen out those individuals that were unsuitable to take part. In total,
four individuals were excluded from the investigation; the reasons for exclusion included
another bereavement, illness in the family or overwhelming distress. Although this does raise
questions concerning sample bias, moral concerns for the welfare of distressed individuals
took precedence.
An invitation letter was sent to the next of kin of those identified. This letter included
information about the study and the rights of participants, along with a consent form (Appen-
dix C). An opt-in approach was adopted, which meant that only those wishing to take part
needed to reply to the letter. A telephone number was given if participants required further
information or clarification. Participants who agreed to take part were then contacted by tele-
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phone to arrange an interview. Participants were given the choice to be interviewed in their
own homes or in a quiet place of their choosing. All of the participants chose to be inter-
viewed in their homes. Prior to being interviewed, participants were reminded of their rights
as set out in the British Psychological Society's Ethical Guidelines for research on human
subjects (2000). Written and verbal consent was obtained to audiotape the interview. Partici-
pants were assured that the tapes would be destroyed after transcription.
3.6.2 Sample
The sample included all the next of kin of patients who were known to one hospice in south-
east London. The hospice covers a wide geographical area and takes in both urban and semi-
rural locations. Participants were identified through a database held in the hospice's Social
Work Department and included all the next of kin of patients who had died between February
2000 and April 2000. The inclusion criterion was: bereavement in the last three months; cog-
nitively intact; contact with the patient in the last month and week before the patient's death.
Participants also had to live within greater London, Surrey or Kent because of travel to and
from interviews.
3.6.3 Measures and procedure
Demographics and characteristics associated with the patient and proxy relationship were col-
lected initially. These included details regarding the amount of contact they had with the
patient, their relationship to the patient, the patient's cause of death, place of care and where
they had died (Appendix D). Following this, participants were asked to complete three self-
report instruments; Caregiver Strain Index (Robinson, 1983), State Anxiety Inventory (Speil-
berger et al., 1983) and the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1996). These assessments
were included as part of the investigation of research question 3 in which proxies' emotions
are examined in relation to their reports of patient's pain, anxiety and depression.
The instruments were self-administered to 28 participants and orally to two because of
visual impairment and illiteracy. The measures were presented in the same order to all partic-
ipants and all were administered before the interview. This avoids possible carry-over effects
from the interview that might affect the proxies' responses. This is particularly important for
the anxiety instrument because it is context dependent.
Caregiver Strain Index
The Caregiver Strain Index (CSI) developed by Robinson (1983) was used to evaluate the
negative effect of caring for the patient (Appendix E). The instrument is short and easy to
administer, with thirteen items assessing areas associated with the burden of caring. Summing
all the positive responses from the dichotomous response options scores the scale. The maxi-
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mum possible score is 13. Scores of7 or above indicate greater strain. Evidence for the instru-
ments construct validity comes from three areas: caregivers' subjective perceptions of caring,
ex-patient characteristics and the caregiver's emotional health. Robinson (1983) has shown
that the instrument has high internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha of .86 reported. Prox-
ies took less than 5 minutes to complete the instrument.
State Anxiety Inventory©
From the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form STAI Y-1) (Spielberger et al., 1983), only the
State Anxiety Inventory (SAl) was used to measure the severity of proxy's anxiety. The SAl
assesses how the participant feels at that particular moment and thus is assessing transitory
context dependent anxiety. Thus, the test-retest reliability for SAl is understandably low (.16-
.62). The instrument consists of 20 items scored on a four-point scale from not at all, some-
what, moderately so to very much so. Ten items assess the presence of anxiety, for instance,
"I feel frightened" and "I feel indecisive". For these items, a rating of 4 indicates the pres-
ence of high levels of anxiety. The other 10 items indicate the absence of anxiety, for exam-
ple, "I feel satisfied" and "I feel steady". These items are reversed prior to scoring. Overall,
scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores signifying greater anxiety.
There is good support for the reliability and validity of the instrument in clinical and
non-clinical populations. Internal consistency rates of .93 attest to its reliability. Spielberger
et al. (1983) has demonstrated both the discriminative and construct validity of the STAI.
Norms are available for the instrument. The instrument took participants 6-10 minutes to
complete.
Beck Depression Inventory©
The latest edition of the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the BDl-II was used to assess the
presence and level of depressive symptoms over the last two weeks (Beck et al., 1996). The
instrument consists of 21 items that cover symptoms of depression, for example, mood, pessi-
mism, suicidal thoughts and feelings of guilt. This latest version brings the instrument in line
with the current depression criteria of the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-lV, 1994). Each item is graded in intensity on a
four-point scale with scores ranging from 0 to 3. The reliability and validity of earlier versions
of the BDI have been widely reported in clinical and non-clinical populations (Beck et al.,
1988). However, the developers state that "the BDI-II constitutes a substantial revision ofthe
original BDI" (Beck et al., 1996, p.I). The psychometric properties of the BDl-II have been
evaluated in a number of studies conducted by the developers. They report internal consist-
ency rates of .92 in clinical and .93 in non-clinical populations have been reported, along with
test-retest reliability of.93. This implies that the instrument has good reliability over time
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(Beck et al., 1996). The developers have also confirmed that the instrument has good conver-
gent and discriminative validity. In this study the instrument took between 5-10 minutes to
complete.
Proxy Semi-structured Cognitive Interview
The Proxy Semi-structured Cognitive Interview (PSCI) was developed by the investigator as
a means of organising the gathering of information from proxies (Appendix F). It is a flexible
design that allows the recall of as much information as possible from the proxy's perspective.
As the name suggests, the PSCI contains components that are both structured and unstruc-
tured. The structured component asks participants to respond to questions regarding patient's
pain, anxiety and depression in the last week and month before death. These questions are
drawn from VOICES, although it should be noted that there are differences. These are
detailed in Appendix G. The unstructured components of the PSCI leave cognitive questions
deliberately open-ended so that participants have the opportunity to express themselves fully.
The thrust of the cognitive questions is to ascertain how they arrived at their answer, by
encouraging participants to introspect and verbalise their thoughts (discussed in Section
3.3.1). It is hoped that some insight will be gained into how individuals represent memories
for events and how they arrive at their responses.
Interviews took between 35-75 minutes. Intervention by the interviewer was kept to a
minimum in order to avoid "cueing" the participant. Appendix H contains information on the
prompts used. The interviews were taped recorded and transcribed verbatim. Following each
interview, the interviewer noted their own thoughts and feelings. This was a way of distin-
guishing between those of the participant and those of the interviewer.
3.6.4 Pilot study
A pilot study was conducted with four participants. The purpose of the exercise was to check
the comprehensibility and appropriateness of the questions, the procedure and the length of
the interview. Few modifications were needed. Appendix I contains a list of the modifications
and the reasons why they were made.
3.6.5 Follow up study
Initially, participants were interviewed 3-5 months (mean 3.9 months) following the patient's
death (Time 1). In order to investigate changes over time some participants were also inter-
viewed a second time (Time 2). Interviews were conducted 3-5 months (mean 4.6 months)
after Time I, approximately 7-9 months (mean 8.5 months) after the patient's death. To
reduce any carry over effects from the interview at Time I, participants were not aware that
they would be invited for a second interview. As for the first interview, the relevant Local
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Research Ethics Committee gave ethical approval. An invitation letter was sent to those who
participated at Time I, this is contained in Appendix 1. To keep the interview to a reasonable
length for participants, the PSCI was shortened by taking out questions that related to the
pain, anxiety and depression frequency and severity descriptors. A shortened version of the
PSCI is in Appendix K. Participants also completed the CSI, SAl, and BDI. There was also no
need to gather demographic information as this was already obtained at Time 1. Otherwise,
the procedure and measures were the same as for the interviews at Time 1. Interviews took
between 20-40 minutes. Figure 3.1 gives an overview of the entire research design.






. , Carer Strain Index ~....-
... State Anxiety Inventory ~....-
... Beck Depression Inventory -...-
Shortened version of the Proxy
semi-structure interview.






- Carer Strain Index,.
~ State Anxiety Inventory.,.
~ Beck Depression Inventory~
Proxy semi-structured interview
using VOICES (pain anxiety &
~ depression questions),.
V











































CHAPTER 4: Frequency and severity descriptors
4.1 Introduction
A major objective of palliative care is to address quality of life issues affecting terminally ill
patients. Control of pain and other symptoms experienced by the dying patient, including psy-
chological, social and spiritual aspects are paramount (WHO, 1990). The management of
acute and/or chronic symptoms prevalent among patients at the end of life is very challenging
(Conill et al., 1997; Curtis et al., 1991; Donnelly & Walsh, 1995). This is particularly true for
patients with advanced cancer, where as many as 70% experience some level of pain (Brescia
et al., 1992). Based on studies of hospice patients suffering from terminal cancer, up to half
experience moderate to severe pain (Vainio & Auvinen, 1996). Of the psychological symp-
toms, severe anxiety and depression are two of the most common to occur in the advanced
stages of the disease (Derogatis et al., 1983; Roth & Breibart, 1996). Prevalence rates for
depression as high as 580/0 have been reported in terminally ill patients (Hinton, 1972),
although others have reported lower levels of a quarter of all patients (Massie, 1989). There is
no doubt that for some patients' feelings of fear are typical and can reach significant intensity
(McDonnell, 1989; Hardman et aI., 1989). Levels of anxiety have been found to vary between
21%, and as high as 43% in terminally ill cancer patients (Coyle et al., 1990; Addington-Hall
et al., 1992).
Appropriate management of symptoms in patients at the end of life has moral implica-
tions because it can ease suffering and limit their effects on quality of life. This is true not
only for the patient, but for their family as well. It has been shown that those closest to the
patient, significant others, share the patients' experiences (Ferrell et al., 1991). Finding and
applying the most appropriate measures for managing the symptoms of terminally ill patients
can be very difficult, because many symptoms are interrelated and affect different patients in
a variety of ways. For example, it is well recognised that there is an interrelationship between
anxiety and depression (Clark, 1989; Gotlib & Cane, 1989). Moreover, these psychological
indicators can often be related to levels of pain. There is substantial evidence to show that
depression and chronic pain are closely interlinked (Rudy et al., 1988). This relationship is
recognised in some assessments of pain where mood is included in the measures. A good
example is the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) where the affective component ofMPQ has
been shown to correlate with depression scores in a cancer population (Kremer & Atkinson,
1981). Anxiety and depression may also be a consequence of uncontrolled pain (Zimmerman
ct aI., 1996). Then again, pain may be an expression of psychological problem. Depression
can manifest as irretracteable pain, while anxiety can manifest as nausea or dysponea (Barra-
clough, 1997). Thus any comprehensive evaluation of palliative care should include an
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assessment of pain, anxiety and depression. However, as this thesis has identified agreement
between patients and their significant other proxies is poorest for these symptoms.
One of the aims of this Ph.D. is to investigate the frequency and severity descriptors
used in the VOICES retrospective survey (Addington-Hall et al., 1998). It is important to
establish what proxies understand regarding the terms used in interviews and questionnaires.
The instrument must also provide a framework in which participants can accurately report
patients' experiences and obviate situations where divergent interpretations or ambiguities
can arise. Asking participants what phrases or terminology means can help in identifying dif-
ficulties with terms and can also identify common alternative wording used by participants
(DeMaio & Rothgeb, 1996). Being aware of these potential problems and reducing them is an
important first step to improving reliability and validity of the information provided by prox-
ies. Before detailing the research in this study it is important to locate the present study in the
wider context ofpain, anxiety and depression assessment at the end of life.
4.1.1 Pain
Pain is more than an aversive sensation. It is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon incor-
porating psychological, physical and sociocultural aspects (Ahles et al., 1983; Ahles & Mar-
tin, 1992; Melzack, 1983). It is commonly experienced at the end of life for a variety of
reasons. These include physical aspects of the disease such as cerebral metastases, or as a
consequence of the disease on functioning (Breitbart & Holland, 1988; Breitbart et al., 1995).
Assessment of pain, such as its frequency and intensity, is central to pain control. Numerous
instruments have been developed to assess pain. Those used for patients at the end of life
include the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Me1zack, 1975; Melzack, 1987), Memorial Pain
Assessment Card (Fishman, 1987), The Edmonton Symptom Assessment System (Bruera,
1991), and The Wisconsin Brief Pain Questionnaire (Daut, et al., 1983).
Assessment of pain can be multidimensional or undimensional. A multidimensional
pain instrument widely used in palliative care is the McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack,
1975; Melzack, 1987). The MPQ contains seventy-eight pain descriptors that are categorised
into twenty subcategories. These subcategories reflect different dimensions of pain; sensory,
affective and evaluative. The sensory dimension includes words that reflect the sensory nature
of the pain, such as "dullness" or "temporal". Emotions, such as anxiety, are encapsulated in
the affective component. The third dimension includes words that describe the intensity of the
pain such as "excruciating". Unidimensional pain instruments tend to focus on one aspect of
the pain, for example, pain intensity or frequency. For example, The Edmonton Symptom
Assessment System (Bruera, 1991) only evaluates pain severity. Whatever type of assessment
is used, the advantages and disadvantages of each instrument have to be balanced against the
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ability of the individual to complete the measure and the goals of the research. In some
instances, multidimensional scales may not be appropriate as they are time consuming and
require good verbal skills (Briggs & Closs, 1999).
In retrospective studies of terminally ill patients, the VOICES survey is unidimen-
sional. Since proxies may not have the necessary knowledge to report on the specifics of the
pain experience, using unidimensional instruments is more common. VOICES assesses pain
frequency and intensity using a five point verbal rating scale (VRS). Frequency is rated from
"most ofthe time" to "never" and intensity is rated from "severe" to "none". Other types of
scales include visual analogue scales (VAS) and numerical scales. Typically, VAS indicates
pain intensity by marking along a line 100 mm or 10 em from no pain to the worst possible
pain (Huskisson, 1974). Numerical scales are rated from 0-10 or from 0-100 along a contin-
uum from "no pain" to "most severe pain" (Karoly & Jensen, 1987). A concern with VRS is
their psychometric properties, as the intervals between each category cannot be assumed to be
equal. Instead they are considered ranks (Heft & Parker, 1984; Littman, et al., 1985). VRS
also require an interpretation of the categories to assess whether the experience can be repre-
sented in the scale. Therefore, language is an essential feature of VRS and an understanding
of how these descriptors are interpreted is paramount.
4.1.2 Anxiety and depression
Psychological symptoms such as anxiety and depression can occur because of physical
aspects connected with the disease such as metabolic imbalances or medications (Breitbart &
Holland, 1988; Breitbart et al., 1995). They can also occur as a result of loss associated with
the illness and its course. Fears about the future, uncontrollable symptoms and a decrease in
functional abilities are recognised as important features in the development of psychological
problems (Silverfarb et al. 1980; Breitbart & Jacobsen, 1996). The Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition (DSM-IV, 1994) classifies a number of symptoms
that characterise anxiety, and mood disorders such as depression. Features common to both
conditions are sleep disturbance, fatigue, difficulty concentrating and significant distress or
impairment of social, occupational or other areas of functioning. This overlap highlights the
difficulty proxies may encounter when deciding whether the patient was anxious or
depressed. Moreover, the symptoms of fatigue, weight loss and poor concentration are com-
mon in patients with cancer (Chochinov, 2000). Thus, identifying depression and anxiety may
be difficult.
Differentiating features of anxiety and depression, as the DSM-IV (1994) illustrates,
are based on few observable aspects. The individual's thoughts and feelings best characterise
anxiety from depression. Suicidal ideation, worthlessness and sadness are specific to depres-
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sion, whereas worry, apprehension and expectation are particular to anxiety. This can make
assessment of the symptoms by others difficult and may account for under treatment (Craig,
1989). Further to this, these reactions may be considered a normal part of adapting to a life-
threatening illness.
Assessment of anxiety and depression in palliative care usually relies on patients' self-
report using measures such as the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961), General
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg, 1972), Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond &
Snaith, 1983) and the Profile of Moods (Cella et al., 1987). Similar to pain assessment, vari-
ous scales have been used to assess psychological symptoms. The instruments themselves
vary; some assess anxiety and depression using symptoms set out in the DSM-IV to evaluate
the level of anxiety or depression. A good example is the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et
al., 1961). The instrument consists of 21 items that covers symptoms of depression, namely
mood, pessimism, suicidal thoughts and feelings of guilt. This assessment contrasts to instru-
ments that assess multiple symptoms where mood is assessed on a single item scale such as
intensity. For instance, the Support Team Assessment Schedule (Higginson & McCarthy,
1992) where patient anxiety is rated on a four-point scale. These rely on the patients' interpre-
tation of the term anxiety.
Retrospective assessment instruments like VOICES ask the proxy to assess the pres-
ence, intensity and severity of anxiety and depression. For example VOICES asks "How
severe was their level ofanxiety during the last week of life?" This is rated on a five-point
scale from "severe anxiety" to "none ", as is depression. However, little is known about how
proxies interpret these descriptors and the language used. Another approach has been to use
the POMS anxiety and depression subscales (Lynn et al., 1997; Somogyi-Zauld, 2000).
POMS ask the participant to rate statements of adjectives pertaining to mood state, such as
"unhappy", "discouraged" on a five-point scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (extremely). Here
knowledge of the symptoms of anxiety and depression is not required although the instrument
is more time consuming to complete. One criticism of this type ofmeasure is its ability to cap-
ture the range of symptoms that accompany a psychological state (Snaith, 1981). This might
be a particular concern when scales are shortened. There is evidence to suggest that single
item scales such as VAS are comparable to POMS for detecting depression (Kilgore, 1999).
In retrospective surveys of palliative care proxies are required to report on various aspects of
the care; sources of informal and formal care; service utilisation and evaluation; information
and communication with health care professionals; patients symptoms and restrictions, and
the proxy's experience of bereavement and bereavement care (VOICES, Addington-Hall et
al., 1998). In order to keep this to a manageable length single-item scales are preferred. How-
ever, this should not compromise the accuracy of the information from proxies. Conse-
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quently, it is necessary to investigate proxies understanding of the terms used in single item
scales such as VOICES. As Leff (1978) identifies, words like depression may mean different
things to different people.
4.2 Aims
The aim of this investigation is to examine the pain, anxiety and depression frequency and
severity descriptors used in the VOICES retrospective palliative care survey (Addington-Hall
et al., 1998). This is a way of identifying ambiguous quantifiers in the questionnaire and as a
means of improving the validity ofVOICES. This is important because "symptom assessment
and measurement is dependant on the clarity ofmeanings attached to symptom descriptors"
(Ingham & Portney, 1999, p.203).
Research question one
What do proxies understand by the pain, anxiety and depression frequency and severity
descriptors used in retrospective questionnaires that are used to assess palliative care?
4.3 Methods
The methods and procedures are described in Chapter 3. This section will detail those ques-
tions specific to these investigations. As part of the proxy semi-structured cognitive interview
(PSCI), proxies were asked a number of open-ended questions designed to explore their
understanding of the pain, anxiety and depression frequency and severity descriptors. Each of
the scales was divided into five levels. These are severe, significant, moderate, mild, none for
the intensity scale and most of the time, often, sometimes, rarely, never, for the frequency
scalc/. As an example, participants were asked, "In your own words, what do you think to
experience anxiety often means?" and "In your own words what comes to mind when you
think ofsevere anxiety?" In addition to this, participants' rated descriptors on a numerical
intensity scale from 0 (none) to 10 (severe). This type of magnitude estimation allows the
researcher to examine the calibration of the scale. That is, do participants quantify the symp-
tom in a similar way? What are the intervals between the descriptors on the scale? The ques-
tions analysed in this section are contained in Appendix L (questions 2c-2e, 3c-3i, 12c-12e,
13c-13i, 20c-20e, 21c-2li).
4.4 Analysis and findings
During a three-month period from May to July 2000, 121 cases were identified from records
at the hospice. Of these, four were thought to be too distressed by their social workers to be
2. These descriptors are from an earlier version of VOICES. Later versions have changed the
intensity descriptors significant and severe to severe and very severe.
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contacted to take part. A further twenty-four were not contacted as they did not live in the area
or had moved out of the area. Seven had no relative or contact addresses for a relative. This
left eighty-six potential participants. From this, thirty-eight responded to the letter. Six replied
stating that they did not wish to take part as their relative had been well cared for and did not
have any pain, anxiety or depression. Two replied and consented to take part in the study, but
could not be contacted for interview. Thirty participants were interviewed, thirty five percent
of those contacted. Time from the patient's death to the proxy interview was 3.9 months (SD
.77) (range 2.43-5.17 months). Information on those who participated in the study and those
who did not were examined for differences. Limited information was available for individuals
who decided not to take part. No differences were found for patient age (t=-.097, p=.92),
patient sex (X 2 =.40, p=.53), proxy sex (X2 =.35,p=.55), relationship between the patient and
proxy (X 2 =.49, p=.48) and place of death (X 2 =3.85, p=.15) (full analysis contained in
Appendix M).
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics ofpatient and proxy characteristics were produced using SPSSlWin 10.1
and summarised in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. There were more female (19/30) than male (11/30)
proxies in the sample interviewed. In contrast, there were equal numbers of female and male
patients. The average age of the proxies was 59 years, younger than the patient's average age
of 71 years. There was a wide age range in both due to one patient/proxy dyad being a lot
younger, 25 and 27 years respectively. Most of the patients and proxies were of caucasian
western European ethnicity. They originated from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds cover-
ing all six social classifications (National Statistics Socio-economic Classification, 2000). All
the proxies were close family members. Sixty percent (18/30) were partners. The amount of
contact between the patient and proxy in the last week of life was high due to the fact that the
majority lived with the patient (24/30) and cared for them during their last week (21/30).
Despite the finding that half (15/30) the patients died in the hospice, many (6/14) of these
spent less than 24 hours in the hospice prior to their death, with a further four patients in the
hospice less than 72 hours. Prior to admission to the hospice they had been cared for at home.
The predominant cause of death was cancer, with only one non-cancer death from coronary
heart failure. Table 4.1 details the cancer types.
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N (%)
Table 4.1: Patient demographics and characteristics.
Category Criteria N (%)
Gender Males 15 (50)
Females 15 (50)
Ethnic group European 27 (90)
Hispanic 2 (6)
Afro-Caribbean (3)
Socio-economic status Class 1 4 (13)
Class II 3 (10)
Class III 6 (20)




Class VI 4 (13) ~
Cause ofdeath Lung 12 (40)
Colorectal 4 (13) r
"
Upper gastro-intestinal 4 (13) 0,....
~
Breast 3 (10) (:
"0





Coronary heart failure (3)
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4.5 Numerical data analysis of the severity and frequency descriptors
Proxies were asked to give a numerical rating from 0 (none) to 10 (severe pain) for the
VOICES severity adjectives (mild, moderate, significant). This was to examine whether par-
ticipants quantified the adjectives in a similar way.
Table 4.3 shows some consistency in the mean rating across the symptoms, with partic-
ipants rating "mild" as 2, "moderate" as 5 and "significant" between 7-8. The quantities (0-
10) assigned to the descriptors showed that moderate levels were approximated to the mid
range of the scale. However, the standard deviations and range reveal that there was wide var-
iability in the ratings particularly for significant and moderate pain and for significant depres-
sion. Furthermore, there was not always an equal interval between the points on the scale. For
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example, on a 0-10 scale the average ratings for anxiety are not even. This is also evident in
the overlap of the range of scores for all three symptoms.
Table 4.3: Numerical ratings of severity adjectives for symptom severity in VOICES.
Symptom Pain Anxiety Depression
Quantifier Sig. Mod Mild Sig. Mod Mild Sig. Mod Mild
Mean 7.4 4.9 2.3 7.8 5.0 1.9 7.6 5.1 2.3
S.D. 1.2 1.4 .89 .79 .87 .61 1.0 .92 .81
Range 4-10 2-8 1-4 7-9 3-7 1-4 4-9 4-8 1-4
4.6 Qualitative analysis of the severity and frequency descriptors
Further to the numerical analysis of severity adjectives, participants were ask to describe what
they understood by the severity and frequency adjectives in VOICES. A content analysis on
these short answer responses would enable comparison of similarities and differences in
understanding. This was also a way of identifying ambiguous quantifiers in the questionnaire.
All the texts were transcribed verbatim and entered into winMAX 98Pro, a qualitative compu-
ter analysis program.
An inductive content analysis was used to identify themes that emerged from the data.
This involved coding the data. Codes, as Miles and Huberman (1994) describe, are "tags or
labels for assigning units ofmeaning to the descriptive or inferential information" (p.56).
Codes were attached to the response, segments or words. The codes were grouped into cate-
gories representing particular themes. In order to evaluate the comprehensiveness and appro-
priateness of the analysis, the codes and themes were discussed with another researcher.
Furthermore, the data was independently coded to examine the reliability of the analysis.
Cohen's kappa was used to calculate the agreement between coders.
4.6.1 Findings from the pain severity descriptors
Analysis of the pain descriptors (severe, significant, moderate and mild) revealed 224 codes.
These codes formed eight categories. Figure 4.1 details the frequency of each of the catego-
ries. The reliability of the codes was high with the strength of agreement ranging from K=.94
(p=.OOI) to K=.98 (p=.OOI).
Behaviour incorporated overt expressions of pain such as shouting and moaning. These
were more likely at higher levels of intensity, as Figure 4.1 illustrates. This category included
descriptions such as "calling out in pain" (ID 26) or "in a really bad way moaning with it"
(to 12). At moderate and mild levels behaviour was seldom described. Here the experience
was less overt and experienced more internally as awareness of the experience. Although a
person's functioning can be described as an overt expression this was separated in this study
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Behaviour Function Feel/cog Level Type Control Help Timeline
as functioning described more than a change in functioning. Here it was used to indicate
lower levels of pain, as one proxy described mild pain, "Not that painful, it doesn't stop you
carrying on with things" (ID 6).
Feelings/cognitions included affective indicators of pain. This category was used at all
levels of pain intensity. "Distressing" or "disturbing" was used to describe severe and signifi-
cant pain (N=6) . An awareness of the pain across the levels was evident, from "you definitely
know it's there" (ID 15) at severe and significant levels of pain to "moderate pain would be
there you know it would be there " (ID 3) at moderate levels. While at mild levels there was
less awareness of the pain "you forget you've got it after a while" (ID 18).
Tolerance was the category most frequently referred to, especially at high levels of
pain intensity (Figure 4.1). Tolerance referred to control or lack of control over the pain. This
was subdivided into control which included coping with the pain, and help , the need for help
with the pain or help received. Lack of control over the pain was evident at severe and signif-
icant pain levels with descriptions such as "overwhelming" and "unbearable" being used by a
number of participants (N=8). At the other end of the pain scale, control over the pain was to
the extent that the pain was tolerable or bearable without the need for intervention. In con-
trast, help to control the pain was stressed as a need for intense levels of pain as many stressed
that the pain would be difficult to cope with for any period of time (N=8). Most interventions
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mentioned were pharmacological, especially at intense pain levels. Whereas, a change in
position or distraction from the pain were sufficient for mild pain.
Intensity level were markers or references used by participants to describe the level of
the pain. Words such as "excruciating" and "intense" characterised the strength of severe
pain (N= 13). Participants had more difficulty characterising significant pain. Here severe
pain was used as a marker, with participants often (N=10) stating that it was less intense than
severe. For example, "not so intense" (ID 1) or "it's similar to severe but not quite as bad"
(ID 12). At mild and moderate levels of pain participants made less reference to the level.
Instead, the level of pain was more often characterised as an intensity type. These included
descriptions of the pain such as a "bruising" or "aching" (N=25). Several participants stated
that at mild levels it was not really pain (N=9). They characterised it as "feeling uncomforta-
ble" (ID 25). In contrast, adjectives such as "stabbing" or "sharp" were used to characterise
severe and intense pain (N=7).
Timeline included the frequency of the pain like the chronicity, persistence or episodic
nature of the pain. The category highlighted the overlap between symptom severity and fre-
quency. At severe and significant levels pain was referred to as "ongoing" or "constant
(N=7). Whereas, at lower levels of intensity it was often described as periodic or infrequent
(N=18).
4.6.2 Findings from the anxiety severity descriptors
One hundred and ninety nine codes were identified in the anxiety descriptors (severe, signifi-
cant, moderate and mild). These codes formed eight categories similar to the pain codes. Fig-
ure 4.2 contains the frequency of the categories. Examining the reliability of the codes,
agreement was found to be near perfect ranging from 1(=.82 (p=.001) to K=.88 (p=.001).
Given the nature of anxiety references to thoughts and feelings in the category feelings/
cognitions predominated in this analysis, as Figure 4.2 illustrates. Fears and overwhelming
distress were most often mentioned at severe and significant anxiety levels with little abate-
ment from these thoughts, "you just can't focus on anything else" (ID 15). At moderate levels
the anxiety was still considered a problem but the focus had moved from the extreme fears
associated with severe anxiety to a level where anxiety was seen to "play on your mind" (ID
24) and "still very troubling" (ID 10). While at mild levels many considered that the symp-
tom was not a problem (N= 10).
Less reference was made to behaviour and functioning at all levels of intensity.
Behavioural manifestations varied including "agitation", "panic attacks" and as one partici-
pant stated "generally low physical well-being" (ID 21). These descriptions were evident at
all levels. Codes relating to functioning were found in only ten instances. There was no men-
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Figure 4.2 Category frequencies for the anxiety intensity descriptors.















Behaviour Function Feel/cog Level Type Control Help Timeline
tion of functioning with mild anxiety. At moderate levels of anxi ety participants varied, "let's
say worry that doesn't stop you getting on with your life " (lD 18) while another thought of it
"affec ting your everyday life " (ID 29). At significant levels it was seen to impact on life .
Whereas, severe anxiety was seen to greatly impact on functioning to the level of "incapaci-
toting " (ID 25) and "almost disabling " (lD 30).
Intensity level was an important indicator of anxiety severity for signifi cant, moderate
and mild anxiety. Here severe anxiety was used as a anchor to reference the level of anx iety,
"less than severe but still upsetting " (lD 1), "almost as bad as severe" (lD 21) and "in a sim-
ilar league to with severe anxiety but to a lesser extent " (ID 13). Intensity type was less often
used to characterise anxiety. Adjectives such as "jumpy " and "panicky" were used. At mild
levels many participants used types to specify that the symptom was worry rather than anxiety
(N= I0), as one participant said, "Just minor worries that most ofus deal with. Noth ing like
what I'd call anxiety " (lD 21)
In contrast to pain, the category tolerance did not feature in many of the participants '
replies. Control, that referred to control or lack of control over anxiety, at seve re anxiety was
viewed as insurmountable. Here "You'd have difficulty cop ing with it " (lD 14) and "at the
limit of wha t y ou could take " (ID 18) characterised the intensity. Sign ific ant anxiety was
viewed as still overwhelming but more bearable than severe anxiety. Whereas, mo derate anx -
iety was a tolerable level , "more manageable " (lD 17). At mild levels parti cipants felt that
76
there was control over the anx iety (N =8). Help, the need for help or he lp received tended to
focus on the need for help rather than an intervention to alleviate anxiety. This might reflect a
lack of knowledge of interventions.
Timeline, frequency of the an xiety overlapped with intensity. Se vere an xie ty was
viewed as a persistent symptom "constantly affecting you" (ID 17). The time liness of the
anxiety varied at significant levels from having the symptom constantly or almost con stantly
to periodic episodes of intense anxiety. At moderate and mild level s the symptom was
described as variable from times of feeling better to episodes of anxiety. A difference between
moderate and mild anxiety was that several participants commented that mild anx iety was a
reaction to an event, for example, an appointment or a letter (N=7 ).
4.6.3 Findings from the depression severity descriptors
From an analysis of the depression descriptors (severe, significant, moderate and mild), 218
codes were revealed. The codes formed eight categories similar to those for pain and anxiety.
The frequency of the categories is contained in Figure 4.3. The reliability of the codes was
more than substantial with agreement ranging from K=.81 (p=.OOl) to K=.85 (p=.OOl).
















Behaviour Function Feel/cog Level Type Control Help Timeline
Again, as expected feelings/cognitions were a category most often mentioned by par-
ticipants. Almost half the references to severe depression in this category related to suicidal
ideation. For example, "life isn 't worth living " (ID 5) and "wanting to die " (ID 8). Others
included feelings of worthlessness, isolation and extreme distress. Significant depression was
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viewed less hopeless, although thoughts and feelings were still described as "a severe mood
negativity" (ID 4) and "you would be really sad and down" (ID 1). "Feeling a bit down" (lD
12) and "feeling frustrated" (ID 18) were evident at both moderate and mild levels of depres-
sion.
Intensity level, markers or references used by participants to describe the level of the
depression were often used at significant and moderate levels. Participants used the extremes
of the scale (severe, mild) to anchor their judgments. For example, "not quite as bad be as
severe" (ID 21) and "It's not significant but it's more than mild" (ID 5). There was a clear
definition between types. In some instances severe and significant depression was described
as a clinical or medical depression (N=4). Whereas moderate depression was viewed as non-
clinical or a mild clinical depression. Mild depression was not considered substantial enough
to be depression (N=8). It was described as "feeling blue" (ID 4) or "feeling down not
depression" (ID 25).
An important indicator of severe depression was behaviour and functioning as indi-
cated in Figure 4.3. Several signs of depression were mentioned, such as withdrawal,
decreased appetite, fatigue, lack of care over appearance or as one participant summarised it,
"non-functioning" (ID 4). Even at significant levels of depression there were overt indicators
like tearfulness and a lack of interest in activities. Irritability and tearfulness were evident at
moderate and mild levels.
As moderate depression was perceived to be controllable, control was a feature in par-
ticipants descriptions, "essentially manageable" (ID 1) and "able to cope and lift themselves
out ofit" (lD 10). In contrast, inability to cope and the need for help to manage the symptom
at severe and significant levels was an important feature. Most interventions were pharmaco-
logical but others were mentioned, such as "talking to someone" (ID 21) or hospital treat-
ment. Essentially, significant depression was seen as more treatable than severe depression.
None of the participants mentioned help with mild depression. This like anxiety was because
many viewed the symptom as not depression (N=8) or not a problem (N=6) at that level.
All participants who made reference to timeline stated that this was a transient feeling
of short duration at mild levels of depression. The frequency of moderate depression was
more mixed with it characterised as "just be now and again" (ID 14) and "a lot ofthe time"
(lD 26). Depression at severe and significant levels was viewed more as a bout of depression
that was there all the time with no abatement (N= 11).
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4.6.4 Findings from the frequency descriptors
The VOICES frequency scale ranges from most ofthe time, often, sometimes, rarely, to never.
Participants were asked what the midpoints in the scale meant (often, sometimes, rarely).
These descriptions were coded in to one of seven codes:
1. All the time or almost all the time (chronic)
2. Everyday episodes (suggests frequent episodes)
3. Less than everyday but several episodes in a week
4. Once a week or less (occasional episodes)
5. Absence or near absence
6. Don't know
7. Not enough information to classify (too vague, does not answer the question).
Two researchers independently coded the transcripts. The reliability of the codes for the pain,
anxiety and depression frequency descriptors was high with the strength of agreement ranging
from substantial (K =.79, p=.OOl) to almost perfect agreement (K =.95, p=.OOl).
Code 1 (all the time or almost all the time) was the most frequent code for often: pain
(13/27), anxiety (17/24) and depression (19/23). Although almost as many rated pain as code
2 (everyday episodes or frequent episodes). This suggests little differentiation between the
most frequent category "most of time" and "often". More participants found difficulty
describing "sometimes" as 19 out of 75 replies were "don 't know" or were too vague. Vague
answers were usually a repeat of the question or did not answer the question. For example,
"sometimes is difficult judge. 1 expect it means different things to people" (ID 17) or "some-
times is 1 would say is just feeling sad" (ID 25). Again, this quote illustrates an overlap with
severity. Ambiguity with the descriptor "sometimes" was also demonstrated by the large var-
iation in codes used. This was particularly evident for anxiety where codes ranged from code
2 (5/24), code 3 (7/24) to code 4 (4/24). For pain (13/28) and depression sometimes (17/23)
most thought this was less than every day but several episodes in a week. Although a fair
number (6/28) of participants thought "sometimes" was to have everyday episodes of pain.
"Rarely" was described differently depending on the symptom. For example, the
majority (16/28) thought pain was once a week or less (occasional episodes), followed by
absence or near absence for pain (6/28). Whereas the reverse was found for anxiety and
depression, with more participants believing "rarely" was absence or near absence of anxiety
(11/24) or depression (11/22). This was closely followed by depression (9/22) or anxiety (9/
24) once a week or less (occasional episodes). Significantly, a number of participants thought
that "rarely" was so infrequent as to not constitute anxiety (5/24) or depression (5/22). This is
an important observation if the scale is a measure of these symptoms.
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4.7 Discussion
This study revealed the complex multidimensional nature of pain, anxiety and depression.
Each of the symptoms were described in terms of their psychological, social and physical
impact. Participants had multiple understandings of the different terms based on their knowl-
edge and experience. Since the interviews were conducted within the context of bereavement,
these experiences were sometimes drawn upon to illustrate their descriptions. This was exem-
plified in one participant's reply "after he'd gone I had these panic attacks, my legs used to
go from under me ... it felt like I was going to die. I would say that was severe anxiety" (ID 7)
Others used what they had observed while caring for their dying relative to explain their
thoughts, "Like my father screaming with agony I would say" (ID 10). Despite the diversity
of responses, there were clearly shared interpretations of terms. For example, in the main,
severe and significant depression was considered to be a clinical level. Moderate depression
was viewed as subclinical and mild, not depression at all. Similarly, mild anxiety was not con-
sidered anxiety. For pain assessment there appeared to be no problems with the descriptor
"rarely" most proxies applying the term to pain once a week or less. A notable observation
was the overlap of symptom frequency and intensity for all symptoms.
Another problematic descriptor was "significant"; this was for all the symptoms. Par-
ticipants appeared to have difficulty expressing and/or conceptualising the term. This was evi-
dent in the number that admitted not knowing and those stating the difficulty they had
describing it. The diversity of interpretations also indicated ambiguity with the descriptor. In
line with several research studies, proxies were found to differ in their interpretations of
vague quantifiers used to assess frequency, like "sometimes" and ''fairly often" (Hammerton,
1976; Schaeffer, 1991). "Sometimes" had varying magnitudes; it was described as everyday
episodes (suggests frequent episodes), less than everyday, but several episodes in a week or
once a week or less (occasional episodes). This finding is important because terms need to be
understood in a similar way if the measures are going to be used to audit care. Furthermore, it
can make comparisons between ratings for the same question difficult.
An additional problem for proxies was differentiating between "most ofthe time" and
"often". Many participants actually described "often" as being most of the time. This indi-
cates that the descriptors need to be modified in order to ensure that they each have distinctive
interpretations. There is evidence to suggest that individuals do not have a problem ranking
the magnitude of vague quantifiers such as "fairly often", "sometimes" and "hardly ever"
(Hammerton, 1976). This was not examined here, because proxies were already given the
scale. This effectively mimics the context within which the research would be conducted.
Instead, proxies were asked to quantify the pain, anxiety and depression intensity descriptors
on a 0 (none) to 10 (severe) scale. Although there was some consistency in the quantities
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assigned to the descriptors there were unequal intervals between the descriptors. This is con-
sistent with the findings from Collins et al. (1997) who compared VAS scales with VRS in
pain. They concluded that numerical indicators might be interpreted differently from VRS.
4.7.1 Descriptions of the pain descriptors
The descriptions of pain encompassed dimensions well recognised in pain research. These
included sensory, affective and sensory components identified by Melzack and Torgerson
(1971). The type category included sensory words such as "stabbing" and "aching". It was
found that participants had a tendency to describe lower levels ofpain as an ache rather than a
pain. This is consistent with cross-cultural research where the word "ache" has been found to
denote lower intensity of pain (Gaston-Johansson et al., 1990). There were also commonali-
ties between the evaluative component and the categories intensity level and tolerance. This
incorporated words such as "excruciating", "intense" and "unbearable". Tolerance, which
refers to control or lack of control over the pain, was a significant category in these investiga-
tions. It was informative in distinguishing uncontrollable pain at high levels to more manage-
able levels of moderate and mild pain. However, perception of controllability of pain unless
expressed may be difficult to assess in someone else. This may also be true for the category
feelings/cognitions. Chapter 5 will examine the cues proxies use when actually assessing
patients' symptoms.
There was a definite affective component in proxies' descriptions ofpain at all levels in
the category feelings/cognitions. Awareness of the pain was an important aspect of this.
Affective distress from pain has been found to be an important variable in patients' descrip-
tions of their pain more than the sensory phenomenon (Leavitt et al., 1978). Here, references
to the sensory component were more frequent, probably because the participants were
describing rather than actually experiencing pain. Behaviourally, this was expressed verbally
or non-verbally through moaning or crying. Functioning was seen as greatly affected with a
restriction in mobility and activities at significant levels. Only one participant mentioned any
functioning at severe levels, which suggested that it might have been implicit that functioning
was affected.
4.7.2 Descriptions of the anxiety and depression descriptors
Like pain, emotions such as anxiety and depression are multidimensional. The number of
these dimensions varies across different models (Scherer, 1984; Lang, 1985). However, the
most widely accepted is Lang's (1985) three system model, which incorporates behavioural,
physiological and cognitive dimensions. These dimensions were evident in proxies' descrip-
tions of the intensity of anxiety and depression. For anxiety, there were the physical manifes-
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tations such as "panicky" and feelings of weakness associated with the physiological
dimension of intense anxiety. There was some evidence of behavioural manifestations like
irritability and outward expressions of emotions such as anger at high anxiety levels. How-
ever, this was not frequently referred to. Neither was functioning, even though anxiety can
seriously disrupt activities. By contrast, these dimensions were significant at intense levels of
depression, particularly for severe depression, where overt expressions of distress, in the cate-
gories functioning and behaviour, were mentioned.
As expected, the category feelings/cognitions, which in essence fits with Lang's (1985)
cognitive dimension, predominated in proxies' interpretations at all levels of anxiety and
depression. In the present study, a sense of control and help were separated out into the cate-
gory tolerance. However, this is an arbitrary separation as tolerance is fundamentally cogni-
tive. This was illustrated in one proxy's perception of severe depression, "things really get
you down and you can't see a way out" (ID 21). One reason for separating out the categories
feelings/cognitions and tolerance was that perception of control is only one aspect of the
thoughts associated with anxiety and depression. Thus, it was possible to identify different
aspects, such as attention. At intense levels of anxiety, there was an inability to focus attention
on anything but fear. Whereas, at moderate and mild levels proxies believed that there was a
capacity to put these thoughts out of mind. A major feature of depression was mood this was
characterised by feelings of extreme sadness and negativity at intense levels. Despite these
differences, there was definite overlap in proxies' descriptions of anxiety and depression,
these included irritability, crying, loss of appetite, impaired functioning and loss of concentra-
tion. This might make identifying anxiety from depression problematic especially for proxies
who might not have access to the thoughts and feelings of the patient. Furthermore, overlap
between anxiety and depression and the physical symptoms of the disease compound this
problem (Chochinov, 2000).
Interpretation of the terms anxiety and depression can lead to variations in the reported
frequency of these symptoms. Ingham and Portney (1999) point to a study where the preva-
lence of anxiety and nervousness varied depending on the instrument (Chang & Hwang,
unpublished). In this study, many of the descriptions of intense levels of anxiety and depres-
sion were identifiable symptoms in the DSM-IV (1994) criteria for anxiety and mood disor-
ders. Whether these would constitute clinical levels or subclinical levels is not known. Of
importance when auditing the care of terminally ill patients retrospectively, is the level of
symptoms associated with anxiety and depression even if they are subclinical levels. These
symptoms or borderline cases of anxiety and depression are common and can have a negative
impact on the patient's quality of life (Barraclough, 1997). So, although moderate and mild
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levels were not considered to be clinical anxiety or depression, they are nonetheless important
in monitoring symptomology.
4.7.3 Limitations
The generalisability of the study must be considered. Firstly, the participants consisted of a
small group of recently bereaved relatives known to the hospice services. The majority of par-
ticipants had cared for their dying relative in the last week of life, although almost half of the
patients had died in hospital. Their experiences may have shaped their understanding of the
symptoms investigated. These experiences may not be shared by all bereaved relatives and
may therefore not be representative. Secondly, culture and language are inextricably linked;
the descriptors were developed by, and in this study interpreted predominantly by, individuals
of caucasian western European ethnicity. The meanings attributed to the terms may be under-
stood differently in different cultures. There is evidence to suggest that there may be differ-
ences in the types of language used to express pain in different cultural groups (Lipton &
Marbach, 1984). Clearly this is an area that requires further examination.
Data from this study was coded inductively into categories so that the words, segments
or paragraphs could be assigned only one code. However, in a small number of instances
some words could be understood in more than one way. A good example of this was the word
"niggling" when referred to pain, this implies a temporal element (timeline) but it may also
be interpreted as sensory element (type). Similar findings have been identified with other ver-
bal pain measures. In the MPQ several words were found to have multiple meanings. Reading
et al. (1982) showed that "heavy" was in the category pressure rather than the MPQ category
of"dullness". Ideally, one method to overcome the ambiguity in the present study would be to
ask the participant what they meant by the word. Given the context of the study and the prac-
ticality, this was rejected. Instead, where these instances arose the word was interpreted
within the context of the sentence by two independent coders. Agreement was reached on
whether the word was coded as timeline or type.
4.8 Conclusion
To date, there is no information on the reliability and validity of VOICES. This is currently
under investigation by the Department of Palliative Care and Policy at King's College, Lon-
don. The main objective here was to elicit proxies' interpretations of descriptors used in
VOICES as a means to improving the instrument. From the findings, it is clear that some
terms need to be modified to ease clarity for proxies. Further testing would be necessary to
examine whether these modifications reduced ambiguity. These types of investigations have
an important role in survey design, as the designer's meaning may not be consistent with the
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participants. For example, "significant" is a clinical term, it is possible that participants had
no understanding of the term in this context to explain symptoms. Despite the fact that
VOICES is a undimensional scale participants' perceptions revealed that the symptoms of
pain, anxiety and depression could be understood within this in mulitimensional ways. A
problem with this is that there is no way of disentangling particular aspects of the symptom,
for example, affective components from sensory components of pain. However, these types of
undimensional scales may be more appropriate retrospectively as they are less burdening for
proxies than multidimensional scales. Moreover, undimensional scales might be all that is
required to identify where patients' needs are not met and for informing health care providers
on the quality of service. In Chapter 5, proxies will use VOICES to assess their relative's care.
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CHAPTER 5: Proxies' symptom judgments
5.1 Introduction
To date, research on the validity of proxies for patients at the end of life has focused on com-
paring patients' accounts with those of their proxy. The review (Chapter 2) showed there are
definitely inconsistencies in proxies' perception of particular aspects of the patient's experi-
ence. Further still it highlighted the need to go beyond comparisons between the patient and
proxy. An understanding of how proxies answer questions regarding the patient's care in a
retrospective context might expose difficulties and possible limitations of their use in pallia-
tive care research. This includes an investigation of proxies comprehension of the questions
being asked, how they retrieve information and make judgments. It is also useful to be aware
of the cognitive processes used by proxies as it may help reduce errors when designing ques-
tionnaires. This chapter investigates what proxies are recalling when they report on patients'
levels of pain, anxiety and depression. This is a particularly important issue because aware-
ness of the possible biases and errors will allow investigators to identify cues used by proxies
and to interpret the basis of their judgments. Although the research presented here is based on
the VOICES survey, the results are applicable to the retrospective approach in general and
may be useful in identifying ways to improve existing survey designs.
5.2 The cognitive model of question answering and proxies
Survey questions rely heavily on cognitive processes and memory. In order to understand the
position of the proxy in the context of retrospective palliative care studies, the emphasis of the
present investigation is on the cognitive model of question answering (detailed in Section
3.2). Errors can occur at any stage in this process. As discussed in Chapter 3, using the cogni-
tive interview as a technique to assess proxies' comprehension, memory and decision-mak-
ing, it is possible to analyse the quality of the data provided (discussed in Chapter 3). Areas of
interest are response difficulties, cues to the symptom, frequency judgments, and the refer-
ence periods assessed. Before describing the study, it is necessary to outline research from
survey methodology and cognitive psychology as it applies to these investigations.
5.2.1 Response difficulties
Coding response difficulties are an important process in survey design, as a means of pre-test-
ing questions and evaluating procedures. In Chapter 4, an investigation of the symptom
descriptors from VOICES helped reveal proxies' interpretations of terms and symptoms. This
was an important step because it exposed ambiguities and divergent interpretations of terms,
both ofwhich can impede attempts to obtain valid responses. Proxies may also encounter dif-
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ficulties answering questions during bereavement, another critical issue requiring some prior
exploration. Within survey methodology, this process usually involves monitoring the partic-
ipant and the interviewer to identify problems with questions, a technique known as behavior
coding (Fowler & Cannell, 1996). Examples include inadequate answers, "don't know"
responses, requests for clarification and uncertainty about the accuracy of a response. In pre-
vious research, behaviour codes such as these have been useful in diagnosing problems with
questions (Oksenberg et al., 1991; Cannell et al., 1992). Cannell et al. (1992), in an analysis
of response difficulties across seven surveys, identified common problems associated with
specific codes. For example, questions that needed clarification are those that often require
means or information that are outside the participants' experiences or frame of reference.
Inadequate responses, on the other hand, are indicative of a level of detail that the participant
is not able to provide.
5.2.2 Memory for events
Following comprehension of a question, the participant has to retrieve the relevant informa-
tion from memory. As discussed in Chapter 2, errors can occur for a number of reasons. The
time interval between encoding and retrieval is one of the main factors affecting the recollec-
tion of events accurately. The greater the interval the more likely it is that an error will occur
(Baddley, 1990). The exact relationship itself is not straightforward and varies according to
the frequency and saliency of the events in question and what occurs in the intervening
period. Salient events are those that are unique, emotional and mark a transition in the partici-
pant's life (Linton, 1982). Such events can be more easily and precisely recalled (Bower et
al., 1979; Bower, 1981). However, the salience of an event can lead to over-reporting (Huber
& Power, 1985) because the ease of recall may lead the participant to believe that event has
occurred more often or more recently in time (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Brown et al.,
1986). This may cause more frequent, yet less salient events to diminish in importance. They
may become less distinguishable and forgotten or merged into a generic memory that repre-
sents a summary of events (Linton, 1982). There exist a substantial body of research on the
effects of the individual's emotions on memory at the time of the event and at recall. This is
an area that will be discussed in greater detail in a Chapter 6.
5.2.3 Cues and judgments
In these investigations, knowledge of what cues proxies use to devise their responses is useful
for understanding the validity of their responses and for the management of symptoms. For
example, are proxy judgments based on observations, communication with the patient, or on
assumptions about the patient's experiences? In Chapter 4, proxies understanding of the
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symptom descriptors was explored. This is a useful framework within which to examine how
proxies' arrive at their answer. There is a paucity of literature in this area, and what has been
conducted suggests that cues have different effects on symptom reporting. In some instances,
reliance on verbal cues may lead to inaccuracies because of denial or a need to protect signif-
icant others (Lobchuk & Kristjanson, 1997). This may be particularly marked for symptoms
that are less visible where there is a lack of overt behavioural cues. Whereas, other more overt
manifestations may provide proxies with reliable cues to patients' experiences, and could
explain congruence between patients and their proxies.
It is important to consider judgments within a social context. Responses are liable to be
based on the proxy's general knowledge, beliefs and expectations. For this, it is necessary to
tum to the literature on self-knowledge as a means of understanding the basis of responses
(Klein & Loftus, 1993; Srull & Wyer, 1989). Although much of the work has centred on self-
knowledge, several experiments have been conducted on knowledge of others to examine
whether there is a difference (Klein & Loftus, 1993). The findings indicate that trait knowl-
edge (knowledge based on the person's characteristics/personality) of others, founded on past
behaviours, is likely to be accessed by participants when answering questions (Schwarz &
Sudman, 1996). Evidence to support this comes from Blair et al. (1991) who found that prox-
ies were more likely to rely on knowledge about the person they were reporting for than when
self-reporting. In the present study, it might be that proxies use trait knowledge to judge the
patients coping with symptoms. Thus, trait knowledge may form the basis for judgments
about symptom presence and severity.
Normative behaviour and general knowledge (including trait knowledge) are two
sources of knowledge used by participants identified in the literature (Schwarz, 1990). Nor-
mative behaviour within the context of palliative care might include a comparison of the
patient's symptoms with other patients or expectations about what is experienced during ter-
minal illness. General knowledge might include comparisons with self or over time, or as
already mentioned, it may be based on patients' traits. When proxies do not have all the rele-
vant knowledge to make a judgment, they may rely on heuristics (e.g. rule-of-thumb methods)
to reach a decision (Kahneman & Tversky, 1971; 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). For
instance, they may anchor their judgment on norms or general knowledge and adjust their
response accordingly; the anchor and adjustment heuristic. Alternatively, they may choose a
response that appears representative of the population being studied; the representativeness
heuristic. These heuristics may bias judgments and lead to inaccuracies in reporting (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974; Kahneman et aI., 1982).
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5.2.4 Frequency judgments
As Willis and colleagues' (1991) model shows (Section 3.2), information is retrieved from
memory and the adequacy of the information is assessed in relation to the question. Much of
the work in survey methodology has focused on frequency judgments and error as a result of
the strategies individuals use. This type of analysis is pertinent to the present investigations,
as proxies are asked to gauge the frequency and severity of symptoms. There are a number of
well-recognised strategies in the cognitive and survey methodology literature, among the
most commonly identified are episode enumeration, rate-based estimation and heuristic-based
estimation (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Sudman & Bradburn, 1974; Kahneman et al., 1982;
Blair et al., 1991; Bickart et al., 1994). Episode enumeration is the recall and count of each
episode within a specified period and is considered generally more accurate than estimation
(Clark & Schober, 1994). Although recall and counts are liable to errors of omission due to
forgetting, or commission where events outside the reference period are recalled (Sudman &
Bradburn (1973), the accuracy and use of this method has been found to vary as a function of
the length of period being assessed and the frequency of the occurrence (Burton & Blair,
1991). For example, episode enumeration is unlikely over periods of months, due to recall
errors and the degree of cognitive effort required. In these instances participants may use
strategies to estimate frequency instead.
Rate-based estimations are a strategy whereby the participant assesses the frequency
over a shorter period and multiplies the frequency over the period being assessed (Bradburn et
al., 1987). Precision relies on the regularity of occurrence. For example, "I visit the doctor
every month, so that is twelve times in a year". This may improve accuracy for regular events
but is likely to be less accurate for invariable occurrences. There is less emphasis in the sur-
vey methodology literature on heuristic-based estimations. However, as mentioned earlier,
there is considerable literature in cognitive psychology dedicated to the strategies individuals
use in reaching decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman et al., 1982). A notable
example is the availability heuristic, which states that the likelihood of an event having hap-
pened is judged by the ease with which events can be recalled (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
As Bradburn et al. (1987) points out, this is the cause of many errors in a number of surveys.
Based on the availability heuristic, Eisenhower et al. (1991) predict that the direction of bias
should be an overestimation of salient events and an underestimation of frequent events.
Although the present study will not test this hypothesis, an exploration of proxies' cognitive
processing will nonetheless increase awareness of how inferences are made.
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5.2.5 Reference periods and event cues
Surveys usually require proxies to recall events within a specified reference period. There is
no doubt that the death of a significant other is a vivid and emotional event that is easily
brought to mind because of its importance. However, periods leading up to the death may be
more memorable than others because of their salience, and as a result of their timing in the
sequence of events. For example, cues such as social occasions, events of personal signifi-
cance and calendar dates can prompt recall and improve accuracy (Bradburn et al., 1979).
This is because memory is organised into sequences of events within a personal time frame
(Brown et al., 1986). Based on these findings, it might be easier for proxies to recall what
happened when, for instance, the patient was admitted to the hospice, rather than what hap-
pened over the last year or month. Another common problem with arbitrary reference periods
(week, month, year) is forward telescoping. This is when events outside the reference period
are imported into it; as a consequence frequencies are overestimated (Sudman & Bradburn,
1973). One explanation for this is that the clarity or saliency of an event is thought to lead the
individual to the belief that the event occurred more recently than it actually did (Brown et al.,
1986). The significance of the information sought in the present investigations may be partic-
ularly prone to this problem. To some extent, forward telescoping may be responsible for
proxies' overestimations of patients' pain, anxiety and depression observed in several studies
(O'Brien & Francis, 1988; Higginson et al., 1990; Higginson & McCarthy, 1993; Spiller &
Alexander, 1993; Field et al., 1995; Yeager et al., 1995; Elliott et al., 1996; Sneeuw et al.,
1997b; 1998; 1999).
The length of the reference period and the content of the material being assessed are
important factors in the strategies used by participants. By way of illustration, VOICES has a
twelve month reference period (Addinton-Hall et al., 1998). For the evaluation of some
aspects of care at the end of life, such as services received, this may be appropriate. However,
for symptoms with variable frequencies and intensities, this period may be too long and is
likely to result in inaccuracies. This is because the recall of episodes over such an extended
period is improbable and requires enormous cognitive effort (Blair & Burton, 1987). The var-
iable nature of symptoms does not lend itself to rate-based estimations, thus proxies are more
likely to rely on estimation heuristics. Estimations may be biased due to the limitations of
memory. For example, events nearing the patient's death may take precedence because they
are more recent and accessible in memory. A consequence of this is that proxies may be
reporting on a small interval within the actual twelve month reference period. Thus, what




The study carried out in this Ph.D. investigates what proxies are recalling when they report on
patients' levels of pain, anxiety and depression. The aim of this study is to identify how prox-
ies decide what answer to give when asked about the patient's pain, anxiety and depression.
The objectives are to identify (1) response difficulties (2) strategies upon which decisions are
made, (3) cues used to form the basis for symptom judgments (4) reference periods. Greater
knowledge of these processes will help in understanding possible biases and errors when
using proxies for patients at the end of life.
Research question two
What are proxies recalling when they report on patients' levels of pain, depression and anxi-
ety retrospectively and what cues they are using?
5.4 Methods
As detailed in Section 3.2, the methods and procedures included cognitive interviewing using
retrospective verbal protocol. Following questions about the presence, frequency and severity
of patient's pain, anxiety and depression proxies were asked open-ended questions requesting
them to verbalise their thought processes. For example, after answering a question regarding
patient's pain in the last week, proxies are asked, "Can you tell me what were you thinking
about when you answered that question?". The cognitive questions directly followed the
VOICES question and are a means to is to discover how proxies arrived at their answer. The
Proxy Semi-structured Cognitive Interview (PSCI) was developed by the investigator as a
framework within which to organise and obtain this information from proxies (Appendix F).
A coding scheme was used as a framework to deductively assign codes to the tran-
scripts. This framework was based on a coding scheme developed by Sudman et al. (1996),
with a theoretical scheme incorporating comprehension, retrieval and judgment. The codes
used for identifying response difficulties were based on a protocol devised by Fowler and
Cannell (1996). As the analysis also incorporated codes that emerged from the data through
an inductive content analysis, the PSCI coding scheme will be discussed along with the anal-
ysis in the next section.
For the reasons identified in Section 5.2.5, and because patients are more likely to rely
on proxies as their health deteriorates near death, the last week and month of life were chosen
as reference periods for the present investigations.
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5.5 Findings and discussion
Descriptive statistics of patient and proxy characteri stics are summarised in Tables 4 .1 and
4.2. Proxies ' responses to the VOICES questions and numerical response data were analysed
using SPSS/Win 10.1. Content analy sis of the PSCI was performed through winMAX 98Pro,
a qualitative analysis program and Microsoft Excel spread sheets. The first part of this section
of the chapter contains descriptive statistics of proxies ratings of patients symptoms using
VOICES. This is followed by analysis of the PSCI.
5.5.1 Proxies' responses to VOICES
Pain
Proxies ' ratings of patients ' levels of pain severity and frequency (Figure 5.1 & 5.2) revealed
that they perceived their relative to be in a considerable amount of pain in both the month and
week before their relative's death. Three quarters of the sample stated that the patient's pain
was moderate or greater during both times. The tendency was for the degree of pain to be
rated more severely during the last week of life. Almost half of the sample rated the severity
of pain as severe in the last week suggesting that they believed the pain was particularly acute
during this period. The frequency of pain was also rated as more frequent during the last week
oflife with 14/30 stating that their relative was in pain most of the time compared with 8/30 in
the last month.










Severity in the last week
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mild none not known
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I~ Frequ ency in the last month
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Twenty-eight patients were reportedly taking analgesia for pain. Of these, nineteen
patients got some or partial relief from the analgesia. A further 6/28 believed that the analge-
sia was totally effective in relieving their relative's pain. Two proxies were unable to deter-
mine the analgesic effectiveness, while one proxy stated that the analgesia was not effective at
all. In the vast majority of cases, the hospice (13/28) provided patient's pain relief. Followed
by their GP (6/28), hospital (4/28) or a combination of sources.
Anxiety
Proxies ' ratings of patient's anxiety (Figures 5.3 & 5.4) suggested that many believed that
anxiety was not present. Despite this finding, a substantial proportion thought that their rela-
tive's anxiety was moderate or greater in the last week (15/30) and month (15/30) before
death. Few proxies reported that their relative had received any help to cope with their anxiety
(3/30). Medication in the form of tranquillisers (2/30) or counselling (1/30) were the types of
help given. These were thought to alleviate the anxiety temporarily in two patients.
Depression
A notable observation from proxies' ratings of patients' depression (Figure 5.5 & 5.6) was
that almost half of the sample reported no depression in either the last week or last month of
life. Furthermore, there were more patients rated as having levels of depression that were of
moderate or greater severity in the month (14/30) than in the week ( 12/30) before death . A
possible reason for this might have been that proxies app eared to have grea ter difficulty
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Figure 5.3 Proxies ' ratings of patients' anxiety severity in the last week and month of lif
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deciding whether their relative had depression in the last week (4/30 ) than in the last month
(1 /30). Six patients were reportedly receiving help to cope with their depression. Five were
taking medication and one patient was receiving counselling. The counselling was thou ght to
be effective sometimes, while proxies' viewed the medication interventions as either ineffec-
tive or providing minimal relief.
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5.5.2 Analysis of the PSCI
Here, the emphasis was on what proxies were recalling when they reported on pati ents' levels
of pain, depression and anxiety retrospectively. An inductive and deductive content analysis
of proxies ' verbalisations was performed. A framework to deductivel y ass ign codes to the
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transcripts was based on previous coding schemes (Fowler & Cannell, 1996; Sudman et al.,
1996) An inductive content analysis was also used to identify themes that emerged from the
data. Table 5.1 contains the PSCI coding scheme. Codes identified by the investigator and
specific to these investigations are indicated in the coding scheme with an asterix (*).
The process began by coding the first three transcripts. The unit of analysis was the
response or segments of the response. This involved identifying key words and themes within
the text. For example, response difficulties, cues to symptoms, strategies for estimating symp-
tom frequency and severity, reference periods and event cues. As new theme emerged, these
were integrated into the coding system and used as a framework for further analysis of the
transcripts. Codes varied depending on the type of question asked. A case in point was the
symptom frequency codes. These were designed specifically to examine how proxies reached
a decision on the frequency of a symptom, so were not applied to other questions.
Table 5.1: Coding scheme for PSCI.
Code description
Response difficulties
No verbalisation of strategy
No apparent strategy (e.g. guess)
Don't know
Incoherent response
Explicitly states that the question is difficult to answer no reason given why
* States that the question is difficult to answer because ofpatient's level of consciousness
(e.g. due to medication or confusion)
* States that the question is difficult to answer because of lack of communication between
proxy and patient (not due to patient's condition)
* States that the question is difficult to answer because of overlap with pain, anxiety and
depression
* Unable to give a response (e.g. too distressed or makes reference to the fact that they do not
want to think about it)
Inadequate response (e.g. response does not answer the question, talks about another symp-
tom)
Expresses uncertainty (e.g. words such as "probably" or "doubt", or asks for clarification)
* Response changed during reply (e.g. says "severe" then changes to "significant", or says
"no" to symptom then changes to 'yes" during response)
Symptom frequency judgments only
• Symptom constant/almost constant (no frequency estimation)
Episode enumeration
Here the proxy will recall particular episodes within the period ofassessment. Their judg-
ment will be based on a count each ofthe episodes (e.g. "He had pain on the Wednesday
and on the Friday in the week before he died")
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Table 5.1: Coding scheme for PSCI.
Code description
Rate-based estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the regularity ofthe occurrence of the symptom
(e.g. "She normally got the pain every night ")
Enumeration estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the variable number ofoccurrences ofthe symp-
tom. This would include strategies such as averaging over the assessment period or other
strategies excluding rated-based estimation and counting/recall episodes (e.g. "It wasn t




Anchor on norm what would be expected (e.g. "I would think most people would be
depressed ifthey knew they were going to die ')
Anchor on self or another (e.g. "he was better at coping with it than me ')














Anchor on what they were like previously during the illness (e.g. "he was worse in the last
week than in the month ")
Anchor on another response option and adjust (e.g. "It wasn t severe it wasn t as bad as
that so I would say significant" or "It was more often than sometimes so I would say
often")
Intensity rating questions only
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most frequent rating
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most severe rating
Variable symptom severity with no explanation for choice of rating
Intensity rating based on average of variable pain intensity (e.g. "it was severe in the last
week, but the week before it was mild, so I would say overall it was moderate ')
Frequency used as an indicator of symptom severity
Basis ofsymptom judgment
Reference to verbal communication between patient and proxy
Reference to non-verbal communication, behaviours or cues to symptom such as the
patient's appearance
Reference to verbal communication with a third party (e.g. nurses, family members)
Reference to patient's thoughts and feelings (e.g.frustration, concentration, anger)
Reference to patient's functioning (e.g. activities ofdaily living, social functioning)
Reference to patient's coping/control (e.g. references to control or lack ofcontrol, coping)
Reference to medication/help (e.g. explicit references indicating help with the symptom)
Event cues
Person mentioned (e.g. nurses.family)
Place mentioned (e.g. hospice, home)
Characteristic of event mentioned (e.g. last rites. dressing changes. etc.s
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Anchor on a significant event (e.g. illness, hospital admission)
Anchor on a date (e.g. wedding, holiday)
Anchor on a season of the year (e.g. summer, spring)
Mentions reference period being assessed (e.g. week or month)
Reference to period outside the specified period (last month or week)
Proxies' emotionst
Proxy's emotional reaction to event mentioned
Affect-basedjudgmentst
Explicit inferences about how the patient was feeling or thinking based on proxies own
feelings about events
t Proxies' emotions and affect-based judgement are analysed and discussed in Chapter 6.
5.5.3 Reliability/validity
Since the overall validity of the methodology was discussed in Section 3.3.2, the focus now
moves to the reliability and validity of the interpretations of the individual transcripts. To
ensure that the analysis provided a valid interpretation of what proxies were saying, the com-
prehensiveness and appropriateness of the analysis was discussed with another researcher.
The codes were then applied and compared across transcripts during the analysis in order to
assess the validity and consistency of their interpretation. To fully capture the meanings in
what proxies were saying, additional codes were added to the framework as they emerged
from the transcripts.
Reliability was evaluated through consistency across the transcripts and between raters.
Two coders independently coded the transcripts in order to examine the reliability of the anal-
ysis. Cohen's kappa was used to evaluate the level of agreement. This is a more comprehen-
sive measure of inter-rater agreement because, unlike percentage agreement, it takes into
account chance agreement. Kappa ranged from .80 (p< .01) to .93 (p< .01). Mean kappa val-
ues for each of the twenty-one questions was .88 (p< .01) (s.d..03). According to Landis &
Koch (1977) these estimates suggest substantial to almost perfect agreement between coders.
Where differences between the two raters emerged, the divergent interpretations of the code
or response in question were discussed and agreement was reached. Although it might appear
attractive to compare kappa values across studies, the measure itself is only meaningful if the
number of categories used to estimate agreement is constant (McClure & Willett, 1987).
However, Sudman et al. (1996) using a similar framework report inter-rater reliability levels
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of more than .80 for broad categories and lower levels for finer categories. Code frequencies
and kappa values for all the questions are contained in Appendix N.
5.5.4 Response difficulties
Since few of these codes were applied to the transcripts (see Appendix N), it would appear
that proxies encountered few of these types of response difficulties. Amongst these were inad-
equate responses, no apparent strategy and incoherent responses. One reason for this might
have been that response difficulties were specific to the area of investigation. As Table 5.1
shows, proxies had trouble answering questions relating to patients' symptoms for a number
of reasons. These included a lack of communication between the patient and proxy, an over-
lap in symptoms, or because of the patient's decreased level of consciousness. This was par-
ticularly true when the proxy was asked to identify the presence of anxiety (6/30), depression
(5/30) and pain presence (3/30) and severity (4/25) in the last week of life. As one participant
remarked,
"She was unconscious so it was difficult to tell at that stage. She might have
been in pain but not able to communicate. "
(ID 1; 3b)
Estimates suggest that sedation of patients nearing death, through narcotics or psychotropic
drugs is not uncommon in controlling some symptoms, such as pain. Levels ranging from
16% to 52.5% have been reported (Ventafridda et al., 1990; Fainsinger et aI., 1991). This
poses considerable difficulties for proxies when assessing patients and present a challenge for
researchers using the retrospective approach.
A further difficulty in assessing patients' symptoms was a lack of communication
between the patient and proxy. This was a notable problem when detecting the presence of
depression (4/30) and anxiety (3/30) in the month reference period, and anxiety in the week
reference period (3/30). This was evidenced in a response about the presence of anxiety,
"1 can't be completely certain .. there were no verbal signs nothing to indicate
that. "
(ID 18; lIb)
These problems were often associated with uncertainty regarding the severity of these symp-
toms; particularly for depression. Disruptions in communication between patients and their
partners are not unusual as they try to cope with the patient's illness and impending death
(Baider & Sarell, 1984). Furthermore, coping strategies such as denial may inhibit the open
expression of feelings between the patient and proxy. Unless these symptoms are communi-
cated to the patient via verbal or non-verbal means, the proxy will have no way of knowing
how the patient is feeling. References were also made to the effect that patients might have
been concealing their feelings so as not to upset or burden significant others. There is some
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evidence to support this finding. Dar et al. (1992) found that 60% of patients admitted hiding
their pain in order to avoid upsetting their spouses. Psychological symptoms, like anxiety and
depression, may be easier to conceal than more overt symptoms such as breathlessness. This
could lead to an underestimation of patients' symptoms. A finding observed in Hinton (1996)
and Higginson et al., (1994) retrospective observations, where anxiety and depression were
rated less severely. However, it was noted that some proxies bear this in mind and infer from
the patient's character and the situation when estimating anxiety and depression, as one par-
ticipant stated of his wife's depression,
"Although she was good at hiding the anxiety and that, she did want to talk to us
to say her goodbyes and that in the last week. And so, you know, that obviously
must have been sadfor her. "
(ID 6; 20b)
Consequently, some proxies may actually be more in line with the patient's rating, as Hinton
(1996) found for anxiety rated retrospectively. On the other hand they may overestimate anx-
iety and depression, a bias consistently observed in prospective studies comparing patients
and proxies estimations of patients' psychological status (Higginson et al., 1990; Higginson
& McCarthy, 1993; Spiller & Alexander, 1993; Field et al., 1995; Sneeuw et aI., 1997 b:
1999).
A small number of proxies (3/30) were not able to decide whether the patient had
depression or anxiety in the week that they died because of the overlap between the symptoms
of depression, the patient's physical condition, and anxiety. The problems were summed up in
a response about the presence of depression,
"I couldn't say he had depression. It was difficult to tell because it was. Well it
seemed to be mixed in with the anxiety to some extent. "
(ID 4; 24b)
As mentioned in Section 4.1.2, symptoms such as fatigue, weight loss and poor concentration
are common in patients with cancer (Chochinov, 2000). In addition, performance status is
known to decline near death (Vigano et al., 2000). Altogether, these features often overlap
with the symptoms of depression and anxiety. These include sleep disturbance, fatigue, diffi-
culty concentrating and significant distress or impairment of social, occupational or other
areas of functioning (American Psychiatric Association, DSM-IV, 1994). Since proxies rely
on these types of overt expressions when deciding whether the patient is anxious or
depressed, any overlap with their physical condition can lead to significant problems identify-
ing depression and anxiety.
Of those proxies who reported pain in the last week (25/30) and month (26/30), more
difficulties were experienced when deciding on the frequency and severity of pain in the week
rather than in the month. By contrast, a similar number of problems were encountered with
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anxiety and depression severity and frequency in the last week and month of life. For all
symptoms though, more response difficulties were evident for symptom severity than for fre-
quency. There were almost double the numbers of problems for depression severity compared
with depression frequency. It is not known why this occurs, although it may be possible to
conjecture that the frequency of a symptom can be to some extent observed, whereas the
intensity of the symptom is largely a perceptual experience, thus less discernible to the
onlooker.
5.5.5 Symptom frequency judgments
Symptom frequency judgments require the proxy to retrieve information from memory, eval-
uate this material and formulate a response that meets the requirements of the question. As
stated, errors can occur at any time in this process. In these investigations few stated that they
could not recall the information requested. This was probably due to the length of the refer-
ence periods and the saliency of the memories surrounding the death of their significant other.
Pain
In this study, proxies used a range of strategies to judge the frequency of patients' symptoms.
This varied according to the symptom and the period being assessed. Of those who reported
pain a number stated that the patient had pain all the time during the last month (8/24) and
week of life (8/25), implying that there was no estimation of frequency in these cases. Few
used episode enumeration in either the week (4/25) or the month (4/24) assessment periods. In
the last week, episode enumeration was used for episodes of pain that were less frequent;
"rarely" or "sometimes". This is consistent with the literature where the strategy is more
likely to be used when there is a short assessment period and infrequent episodes (Blair &
Burton, 1987). However, during the month assessment period, recall and count of episodes
was used for pain reported as "often. "In both of these cases, the participant recalled each epi-
sode when they had visited the patient and remembered the patient being in pain on each of
these occasions. In general, for frequent episodes of pain, almost equal numbers used either
rate-based estimation or heuristic based estimations. Rate-based estimations tended to be used
when there was some regularity in the analgesic regime or the pain was more salient at partic-
ular times (such as during the night). Heuristic based estimations characterised the variability
of the pain experienced. This was exemplified in one participant's reply,
"It got worse you know progressively worse over that month .. He was getting
about then and even getting in and out ofbed at one point, but then it got worse




Of the proxies who reported anxiety, almost half (8/16) recalled and counted actual episodes
during the last week of the patient's life and six out of twenty proxies in the month. This strat-
egy was evident for frequent and infrequent episodes of anxiety. One reason for this might
have been where anxiety was reported as "often" or "most ofthe time", the episodes were not
discrete short periods of anxiety but over prolonged periods. This contrasts with other survey
appraisals of frequency where there are discrete episodes such as doctor's visits, or alcohol
and food consumption (Blair et al., 1991; Armstrong et al., 2000). In the present investiga-
tions an event where the patient became anxious such as during the last rites or a dressing
change, could lead to a prolonged episode of anxiety that could last days. Rate-based estima-
tions were seldom used in either the month or week. This might have been due to the variable
nature of anxiety. In the last month, over half (11/20) used heuristic based estimations, for
example,
"Um .. well in thejirst two weeks uh she wasn't really with it. and in the last two




Similar to anxiety, rate based estimations were seldom used in reporting depression fre-
quency. A fair proportion of proxies reported that the patient was depressed "all of the time"
in the last week (5/13) and month (5/17) of life. Thus, there were few (8/13) reported strate-
gies used to recall the patient's condition in the last week. Of these, half recalled and counted
episodes. Again, episodes were recalled for frequent and infrequent episodes. Where episode
enumeration was used for persistent depression, like anxiety this tended to be associated with
a prolonged episode such as a reaction to an event or observed during visits to see the patient.
This was illustrated in one response,
"Every time you went in there [hospice] she was constantly saying oh I am going
to die. So especially after the doctor told her on the Tuesday. So yeah every day
most ofthe time. "
(ID 15; 20b)
Reporting on patients' last month, six of the nine proxies who reported strategies, used heuris-
tic based estimations. For example,
"It [depression] was now and again .. it changed and became worse over that
month but overall it was sometimes"
(ID 2; 25b)
For pain, anxiety and depression there was evidence of averaging over the reference period
and judgments based on the proxies innate sense of frequency. However, without extensive
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probing it was not possible to distinguish the actual heuristics used. The findings from proxies
reported frequency strategies are consistent with other studies in showing that participants use
a variety of strategies rather than just a recall of each episode (Bickart et al., 1994; Blair et aI.,
1991). Factors such as frequency were associated with a particular strategy but because of the
nature of the symptom and the longevity of an episode in some instances proxies recalled spe-
cific episodes.
5.5.6 Symptom cues and judgments
Pain
In the last week of life, overt expressions of pain were the most frequently used indicators of
pain presence, frequency and severity. These included medications (N=34), verbal (N=25)
and non-verbal behaviour (N=29) such as agitation, posture and facial expressions (wincing,
grimacing) The code "medications" was an important cue to the level of pain both in the
week and month before death. This consisted of increases in analgesics, the taking of medica-
tion or the need for stronger analgesics. Disruption to the patient's functioning and normal
daily activities was commonly referred to in the week and month reference periods for identi-
fying pain presence and severity. Restricted mobility and reduced participation in their usual
activities were observed, from not walking the dog or gardening, to the extent of not wanting
to get out of bed. Surprisingly, none of the proxies stated that the patients' level of conscious-
ness was affected in the month, even though there was more emphasis on non-verbal behav-
iour (N=32) than verbal behaviour (N=16). A possible explanation for this finding might be
that the patient's level of consciousness was less affected in the month than in the week, giv-
ing the proxies access to more overt behavioural indicators. Alternatively, patients might not
have wanted to bother their significant other by talking about pain. Consequently, proxies
relied on non-verbal indicators.
Despite the findings in Chapter 4 where control was important in determining levels of
pain intensity, little reference was made to it in these investigations. Control was only men-
tioned in the month and in relation to the presence (N=7) and frequency (N=5) of pain. One
reason for this might be that control is an individual perception experienced by those with the
symptom. Since the proxy is an observer, it might be harder for them to infer how effective
the control is. This was supported by the finding that control tended to be inferred when the
patients ability to cope with the pain was expressed overtly. This applied equally if it was
expressed through verbal communication, specific behaviours or medications usage.
Fifteen proxies mentioned the affective components of the pain experience. With two
exceptions, these were expressed in patients with significant and severe pain. Manifestation
included aggression, anger, frustration, agitation, tearfulness, quietness and distress. These
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were seen as a change in the usual character of the patient, as one proxy recalled her hus-
band's behaviour,
"Then he became aggressive with it, that made me think it must have been severe
[pain] for him, for him to be like that because he wasn't normally like that. "
(ID 22; 3b)
Another proxy told how his father had changed as a result of the pain,
"It [pain] was very distressing because toward the end he started swearing and
he never swore.. um .. I didn't think it was my Dad. ... He don't swear usually. He
was frustrated. "
(ID 24; 8b)
Trait knowledge (knowledge based on the person's characteristics/personality) was important
in forming judgments. Knowing what the patient was able to endure and their character was
often mentioned when deciding on the presence (N=7) and severity (N=6) of pain. This is in
line with previous findings where participants are asked to report about others (Blair et al.,
1991; Menon et al., 1995). Norms were sometimes used "She didn't get the pain that some
cancer patients get" (ID 30; lb), but lack of knowledge and experience to base their judgment
on norms may have limited this as a basis for judgments. Instead, most proxies anchored their
judgments on the presence of pain in the week (N=5) and month (N= 11) on what the patient
had been like previously during their illness. In the previous months or weeks.
"She suffered from escalating pain right the way through. .. I think it was a bit
more controlled in that week because I think in the last week she was really out
ofit on morphine, but the pain was still there. "
(ID 5; lb)
Analysis of the severity of pain ratings showed the variable nature of the pain experi-
ence during the reference periods. When asked about how proxies decided on the intensity
level, proxies used various strategies. Most based their responses on the most severe pain
experienced, even if this was infrequent. The most frequently experienced level of intensity
followed this, while others were unable to give an explanation for their choice. This high-
lights the need to be more explicit when asking about symptoms such as pain because of
changeability over the reference period.
Anxiety
Seventeen participants reported the presence of anxiety in the week and twenty in the month.
Overwhelmingly, references to patients' feelings such as anger, frustration and the need for
reassurance were repeatedly used in the week (N=28) and month (N=30). This was particu-
larly true for the presence and severity of anxiety in the reference periods. One proxy recol-
lected his wife's anxieties.
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"There was a point when she lost the sight ofone ofher eyes, like, you know. She
thought she would lose the sight of the other and her hair began to fall out. And
she was always very conscious ofher hair, like you know. She was embarrassed
and humiliated. "
(ID 13; llb)
These feelings were expressed in a number ofways. Verbal communication was the predomi-
nant cue to the presence, frequency and severity of anxiety in the week (N=25) and month
(N=21). Few patients spoke directly about being anxious. Instead, anxiety was inferred from
their communications, both in its content and frequency. For example, proxies spoke of
patients concerns about ensuring matters were in order and that the family was provided for
after their death. Others raised issues about suffering with symptoms, in particular pain, loss
of functioning, wanting to be at home, losses associated with life events that they would miss,
such as children and grandchildren, and uncertainty about the future. The frequency of these
communications and the need for reassurance were indicative of anxiety severity and fre-
quency. This is illustrated in the following response,
"He kept saying there was no hope and saying things like that. We used to say
don't be silly and he used to say I'm dying...l can remember the night before he
died, he kept saying he was dying and that was it umm he became very anxious it
was obviously playing on his mind. "
(ID 26; lIb)
In only a minority of instances functioning (N=3), medication/help (N=5) and coping
(N=3) were mentioned in the week reference period. This might have been because of the
patient's deterioration in condition and the stage of the illness. In contrast, functioning
(N= 12), medication/help (N= 12), and control (N=9) particularly for anxiety presence and
severity were evident in the last month. Functioning was used more in terms of the ability to
function in spite of the illness and its consequences. This was closely associated with coping
and medication/help, and was apparent at lower levels, infrequent episodes or no anxiety.
However, not sleeping and poor appetite were suggestive of anxiety for three proxies.
Non-verbal behaviours and changes in the patient's demeanour were other cues to their
feelings of anxiety in the week (N= 16) and month (N= 11). These included "crying", "jumpi-
ness", "withdrawing ", "agitation" and "hostility". As well as small gestures that were signif-
icant to the proxies in suggesting that the patient was anxious.
"I was sat with him one day at the hospital and he grabbed hold of my hand,
which wasn't like him 'cause we're not that type offamily, and he had hold ofmy
hand and he gripped it real tight. Like he was scared. That 50 what made me think
he was anxious like. "
(ID 21; 16b)
This example is also illustrative of anchoring the judgment on the patient's usual character.
This type of trait knowledge was used by a considerable number of the proxies in the month
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(10/20) to decide whether the patient was anxious or not, and in the week to judge the pres-
ence (5/17) and severity (6/17) of anxiety. In the month reference period several proxies
anchored there judgments on what the patient had been like previously during their illness in
making a decision on the presence (5/20) and severity (5/20) of anxiety. There was less varia-
bility in anxiety and depression intensity than for pain intensity. Where variability was men-
tioned, there was no clear strategy used to reach a decision on the intensity of anxiety and
depression. Both the most frequent level and the most intense level were chosen, but many
were unable to say why they had decided on a particular response.
Depression
Thirteen proxies reported depression in the last week and slightly more in the month (17/30).
Again references to the patients' feelings in the week (N=27) and month (N=35) were most
often used as indicators for presence, frequency and severity of depression. Amongst these
were sadness, anger, flatness of mood and boredom. In contrast to anxiety non-verbal com-
munication (N= 18) was frequently mentioned in the week of the patient's death. The patient's
appearance of unhappiness was a significant cue. Others were "clinging", "lack of interest",
"inability to concentrate", "tearfulness", "irritability", "tiredness" and "withdrawal".
These feelings were seen to affect patients' ability to fully function in usual activities and to
disrupt activities of daily living such as sleep patterns. Conversely the disruption to function-
ing as a result of their illness was a major causal factor mentioned in the patient's depression.
Thus functioning was a prominent indication of depression.
While in the month reference period verbal communication was mentioned (N= 19)
slightly more than non-verbal communication (N= 15). Of the thirteen proxies who verbally
communicated with the patient, in four of these cases the proxy said that the patient was not
depressed. Only two proxies explicitly talked with the patient about feelings of depression.
Similarly, to anxiety most judged the symptom on what the patient talked about. For example,
fears about dying and unhappiness with their circumstances. One proxy recalled her mother's
depression, "Well, she kept saying she wanted to die" (ID 5; 24). Two patients were being
treated for depression with antidepressants prior to month.
Again, judgments regarding the presence of depression were often anchored on trait
knowledge about the patient's personality and characteristics in the week (11/30) and last
month (11/30) reference periods. An actual change in personality was observed in a few
instances. For example,
"Anyway, we managed quite well but the pain became progressively worse and
over the last few months she had a lot ofpain. I.. well me and my sisters, they




As was depression severity in the month (5/17). Following this, anchors such as what
the patient had been like previously during their illness also signified depression severity and
presence in both reference periods. Notably judgments were also based on norms a finding
not observed for pain or anxiety. As the following example illustrates,
"It s [depression] a natural thing really, because you've got cancer"
(ID 15; 26b)
The focus of the Chapter 6 is to examine proxies emotions and whether they have a bearing
on their responses with regard to patients' pain, anxiety and depression.
5.5.7 Event cues
Pain
Event cues tended to be used to signify the presence of pain, anxiety and depression rather
than its intensity and frequency. Places were usually mentioned particularly in the month ref-
erence period (10/25). These consisted of references to periods before or after admission or
input from a hospital or the hospice. For example, HI would say that most ofthe pain was just
before she went into hospital" (ID 13; 8b). This is in line with the memory literature where
event cues prompt recall of events (Brown et al., 1986). Several proxies talked of escalating
pain and the hospice's involvement in controlling the patient's pain. This was not surprising
given that uncontrollable pain and difficulty coping were the main reasons for admission to
the hospice in the last week of the patient's life (10/30). Changes of dressing or other treat-
ments were characteristic of events associated with pain. As was the patient's condition,
where pain was seen to intensify nearing death. This is confirmed in the numbers with severe
pain in the last week of life (12/30) compared to the month before death (7130).
Anxiety
In the week (7/13) and month (2/20) presence of anxiety was associated with a significant
event in the lives of the patient and proxy. A major event was admission to the hospice in four
cases this was viewed as an extremely stressful experience. As one proxy's response indi-
cates, when talking about her mother's transfer to the hospice,
"She didn't know what was happening at that stage she was too ill to under-
stand, ifshe'd gone in earlier we could have explained it to her, it would have
been planned instead she was transferred in the night, that terrified her.. "
(ID 30; llb)
The patient being told their diagnosis and characteristics of events (N= 11) such as a change
and deterioration in the patient's condition and symptoms, a fall, managing symptoms, dress-
ing changes and the last rites.
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Depression
To a lesser degree than anxiety, major events featured as event cues for depression in the
week (5/13) and month (3/17). Being in hospital was an event mentioned as time of depres-
sion for three patients. Family gatherings were events where some patients were seen to "put
on a brave face" to conceal their feelings from other family members. A significant character-
istic event associated with depression was deterioration in the patient's condition and loss of
functioning. There was some overlap with anxiety in the cues used. For example, three partic-
ipants who had mentioned specific events such as a fall, dressing changes and the last rites
also used these cues to indicate depression.
5.5.8 Reference periods
There was a tendency for some proxies to report on periods extending the reference periods
asked about, for the presence of a symptom. The numbers were relatively small for pain (3/25,
week; 2/26, month) and anxiety in the week (3/17). However, for anxiety in the month (5/20)
and depression in the week and month several proxies, five and six respectively, spoke of
periods from weeks up to several months outside the reference period. This is what Sudman
and Bradburn (1973) refer to as forward telescoping, which can lead to an increase in esti-
mates ofparticular occurrences. The clarity or saliency of an event is thought to lead the indi-
vidual to the belief that the event occurred more recently than it actually did (Brown et aI.,
1986). Where forward telescoping appeared it coincided with a salient and emotional event
such as the patients' diagnosis or deterioration in the patient's condition or treatments,
"I think he had about six lots of treatment. He had loads and loads of treatment
and every time .. I think the most anxious or the most when he decided that things
weren't going to go his way was when he was diagnosed as having secondar-
ies. "
(ID 29; 16b)
In this example, the proxy later adds that this is in the six or seven months before the patient
died. This example was typical of the responses where forward telescoping was observed.
Most of the proxies who discussed periods beyond the reference periods, spoke of when the
symptom started. In two incidences patients had a pre-existing diagnosis of depression. What
is not known is whether this information extended beyond the period is used to form a judg-
ment on the frequency and severity of the symptom in the period being assessed. Pain, anxiety
and depression are all highly emotional and salient events therefore it was surprising to find
little evidence of forward telescoping for anxiety in the last week and pain. A possible expla-
nation might be that the verbal protocols did not reveal all instances where forward telescop-
ing occurred. Unless the proxy explicitly mentioned that the period was outside the week or
month, or the response indicated that the proxy was talking about other time periods and this
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was verified through follow up questioning, there may have been other instances forward tel-
escoping occurred but were not detected. An alternative explanation might be that pain in the
week and month was highly memorable particularly as almost three quarters of the patients
suffered with severe or significant pain. Thus, the memorability of events might have resulted
in proxies keeping their responses within the parameters.
5.6 Conclusion
The findings presented in this chapter suggest that the patient's level of consciousness and
ability to communicate create significant difficulties for the proxies who represent them at the
end of life. This was most evident in the last week of life and for detecting the presence of
depression and anxiety. By comparison, proxies were better able to make judgments regard-
ing the presence of pain as this could be communicated even when the patient was not fully
conscious. This was through cues such as moaning, grimacing and agitation. However, the
patient's level of consciousness did impede proxies' ability to assess the severity of patients'
pam.
The present investigation was exploratory, as there exists no published research to
compare the findings with. Examination of the cues proxies use to judge patients' pain, anxi-
ety and depression revealed a wide variety of indicators. These included signs commonly
associated with the symptom such as analgesic use, facial expressions and verbalisations of
pain; expressions of fear and agitation signifying anxiety; to sadness and a reduction in func-
tioning indicating depression. This suggests that proxies are drawing on different sources of
knowledge some of which may be reliable indicators. Although non-verbal behaviour pro-
vided important cues to symptoms, proxies also relied to a large extent on verbal behaviour,
both in the last week and month of the patient's life. One reason for this might have been the
lack of concrete observable phenomenon with the symptoms studied. A notable observation
was the use of idiosyncratic expressions familiar to both the patient and proxy. This could be
a look or expression, or behaviour out of the ordinary, such as holding hands. Such observa-
tions were meaningful to the patient and proxy. However, their indication of an actual symp-
tom is not known. Comparisons between patient and proxies expression and understanding of
symptoms would help elucidate this.
Interpretation of proxies' verbalisations revealed that proxies do not rely entirely on
overt expressions of symptoms, despite the fact that these often viewed by proxies as the most
important indicators. Their judgments are anchored within the context oftheir general knowl-
edge. This agrees with findings in the cognitive psychology and survey methodology litera-
ture (Schwarz, 1990; Blair et al.. 1991; Menon et al., 1995; Schwarz & Sudman, 1996).
Among the most commonly used general knowledge was trait knowledge based on patients'
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characteristics/personality. This guided proxies' decisions on pain, anxiety and depression to
a large extent. Of particular importance were changes in the patient's character and behaviour
from before their illness. Whilst norms have been observed as a basis for judgments in other
surveys (Bradburn et al., 1987), they were seldom referred to in these investigations, probably
because of proxies' limited experience and knowledge of terminal illness. Instead, proxies
depend on their experiences of what the patient was like previously during their illness to
anchor their symptom judgments. This is important because only significant others in close
contact with the patient would have access to this information. From this it is possible to sur-
mise that significant others may be better proxies for some aspects of the patients experiences
than health professionals who have limited contact with, and information about the patient.
A mixture of strategies were used to judge the frequency of symptoms. In assessing
pain and consistent with the survey methodology literature, infrequent episodes of pain were
recalled and counted (Blair & Burton, 1987), whereas, for frequent pain episodes the strategy
depended on the regularity of the pain. Rate-based strategies tended to be used where the pain
showed some degree of regularity, such as at night or four-hourly. Under these circumstances,
these estimates may be accurate. In contrast, rate-based strategies were rarely used for depres-
sion or anxiety. This might be due to the variable nature of these symptoms. Episode enumer-
ation and heuristics were used almost equally. Recall of episodes coincided with particular
events and was recalled with a great amount of detail, suggesting their salience to the proxy.
As a result, recall might have been enhanced and accurate.
There was evidence of forward telescoping for all symptoms, especially for depression
and anxiety. This might be due to the nature of the symptoms as several proxies spoke of
when the symptom began. As Sudman and Bradburn (1973) identify this can result in an
increase in estimates. Despite the fact that the reference period was given in each question
participants still went outside the period. This highlights the need to clearly define the period
and continually remind participants. Several methods have been suggested to overcome this
problem although the practicality of some may make them unsuitable within the context of
palliative care. For example, bounded recall where participants are repeatedly interviewed
and reminded of the events reported would not be feasible (Neter & Waksberg, 1964). A more
appropriate method would be to encourage participants to recall events within a personally
significant time frame. Here, proxies could report on events such as the patient's experiences
following admission to a hospice or hospital, a common event cue used by proxies in this
study. This would give variable reference periods, but would be useful for evaluating care
within a particular setting. Alternatively, using their personal framework, proxies could first
be asked to recall events within context and then asked to place events within the reference
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periods. Evidence to support the use of these methods comes from Means et al. (1989), where
a fifteen percent increase in accuracy of dating doctors' visits was shown.
As an aid to recall, the last month and week of the patient's life were used as reference
periods. These periods were chosen based on the cognitive and survey methodology litera-
ture. The present research suggests that the period needs to be long enough to assess the phe-
nomenon of interest, but short enough to prevent decay of memory for events. The findings
from this study suggest that, because of the variable nature of the symptoms, the reference
periods should be kept fairly short. However, the number of difficulties experienced over the
week, particular for anxiety and depression, suggest a longer period such as the last month of
the patient's life. A recommendation here would be to assess symptoms over a shorter period
than the last year of life, which is used in VOICES.
5.6.1 Limitations
The limitations of the methods chosen have been discussed in Chapter 3. In this section, the
limitations of the study in relation to the aims are discussed. The aim of the study was to
investigate what proxies are recalling when they report on patients' levels of pain, anxiety and
depression, as means to understanding possible biases and errors. Although the study identi-
fied areas where these occurred, such as forward telescoping and heuristic strategies, it is not
possible to state from this study that these actually biased proxies' responses. It is only possi-
ble to infer their likely effects. In addition to this, relations between the cues used to judge
symptoms and the validity of proxies' reports cannot be established, as there is no comparison
with the patients whom they are representing.
Proxies varied in their verbalisations of their thought processes. Some proxies were
eloquent in their responses, while others experienced difficulties. One reason for this was the
amount of contact the proxy had with the patient, reinforcing the need to choose a proxy who
has access to the required information. Exploration of the heuristic strategies used by proxies
was inhibited by the necessity to avoid distressing proxies. Making these heuristics the sub-
ject of investigation in their own right would have been insightful, but this has to be balanced
against moral and ethical concerns (discussed in Section 3.5.3). A further limitation was that
many of the proxies reported that the patient had depression "most of the time"; only eight
proxies reported strategies in the last week of the patient's life. Therefore, interpretation
needs to be cautious given the numbers.
5.6.2 Summary
The present study provided insightful findings on the processes underlying proxies' judg-
ments of patients' pain, anxiety and depression. It also raises awareness of the complexities of
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the mental processes used by proxies and the importance of social processes in human deci-
sion-making. Furthermore, within the context of studies comparing patients and proxies, it
helps elucidate possible reasons for biases. Of importance for the retrospective approach it
shows that proxies amass information about patients symptoms from a variety of sources
questioning Higginson et al. 's (1994) claim that proxies accounts are based on their own feel-
ings. However, further research is needed before this can be disputed. Hence the next chapter
examines proxies' emotions in relation to their responses. Throughout the present investiga-
tions, areas for future study have been mentioned and recommendations are made to improve
the design of the VOICES questionnaire. However, the study presents researchers using the
retrospective approach with practical points that are useful at the design stage of survey
development.
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CHAPTER 6: Proxies' emotions and judgments
6.1 Introduction
The death of a loved one evokes a variety of feelings, emotions and thoughts, which are char-
acterised as grief. Since the retrospective approach relies on collecting information during this
process, it has been asserted that the proxies' responses may be a reflection of their own feel-
ings rather than the experiences of the patient (Higginson et al., 1994). To date, there has been
little attention given to the effects of bereavement on proxies' responses. As noted in Chapter
2, this may be because of the difficulties in conducting this type of research. Only one study
has investigated proxies' emotions in relation to their retrospective responses. Here Cart-
wright and Seale (1990) analysed data from Cartwright et al. 's (1973) study to examine
whether proxies' experiencing anger responded differently from those who were not. Infor-
mation regarding the patient's death, such as cause of death, age and place of death, symp-
toms, care and help received were collected. No significant differences were identified. Given
the lack of empirical evidence, the aim of the present investigation is to explore whether prox-
ies own emotions are reflected in their reports of patients' pain, anxiety and depression. In
addition to this, caregiver strain is included as a number of studies, highlighted in Chapters 1
and 2, suggests that the level of strain is related to the level of congruency between patients
and proxies' reports of patients' symptoms. The proposed investigations may shed light on
this relationship. Furthermore, the negative consequences of caring include emotional distress
and psychiatric morbidity (Schulz et al., 1990; Siegal et aI., 1991). Relevant background liter-
ature drawn from fields such as palliative care, cognitive, social and clinical psychology is
discussed in relation to this issue.
6.1.1 Grief
Grief is a natural and complex multidimensional response to loss that can continue for several
years. However, most researchers agree that typically there is improvement within the first
one to two years (Stroebe, et al., 1993, for discussion). Multiple variables have been found to
influence the manifestation of grief. These include the timing of the loss, degree of attach-
ment, relationship with the deceased, cultural background, personality, social network, gen-
der, religiosity and socioeconomic status (Parkes, 1975; Rubin, 1985; Parkes, 1988; Vachon
& Stylianos, 1988; Rosenblatt, 1993; Stroebe & Stroebe, 1993). The process of grieving has
been characterised in various ways depending on the theoretical position of the researchers
(see Shakleton, 1984; Hogan et al., 1996 for reviews). However, two stage theories have pre-
dominated; Bowlby's (1969) attachment theory where grief has been conceptualised as a gen-
eral response to separation in an attachment bond (Parkes, 1965; Bowlby & Parkes. 1970:
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Bowlby 1980), and Kubler-Ross' (1969) stages of dying that has been applied to grief. Both
theories conceptualise grief responses in a series of stages or phases but differ on the number
and content of some of the stages. For instance Bowlby (1980) put forward four phases,
numbness/disbelief (distress and/or anger), protest (anger and anxiety), despair (depression),
and acceptance. Whereas, denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance form Kubler-
Ross' (1969) five stage account. Although the stage theories of grief have been valuable in
informing experiences during bereavement, they have criticised for being static and linear
(Wortman & Silver, 1992; Shuchter & Zisook, 1993). Furthermore, empirical evidence does
not always support the stages proposed (Silver & Wortman, 1980). Instead, after the initial
shock of the loss, the process of grief is viewed as much more changeable with a mixture of
responses which vary from individual to individual (Shutcher and Zisook, 1993).
Anxiety and depression in grief
Anxiety and depressive symptomology are common in bereavement. These can occur in the
recently bereaved and last for varying lengths after the patient's death (Parkes, 1965). Com-
pared to non-bereaved controls anxiety symptoms have been found to be higher during the
first six to seven months of bereavement (Bartrop et aI., 1992; Zisook, et al., 1990). Similarly,
depressive symptoms have been shown to be higher in the month after death, after which lev-
els decline over six to twelve months (Parkes, 1965; Vachon et al., 1982; Parkes & Weiss,
1983). However, other researchers have identified elevated levels of anxiety and depressive
symptoms approximately a year following the death of a significant other (Zisook et al.,
1990; Zisook & Schucter, 1991). Even though anxiety and depression symptoms are preva-
lent, they are not always at clinical levels. In a study of 350 bereaved spouses, responses char-
acteristic of anxiety and depression, such as fearfulness, crying, apathy, difficulty
concentrating and feeling overwhelmed, were frequently endorsed by participants (Shuchter
& Zisook, 1993). Due to the overlap with these types of responses and depression it can be
difficult to differentiate depression from grief reactions. Nonetheless, a substantial number of
bereaved individuals' symptoms reach clinical levels for the diagnosis of a psychiatric disor-
der (Jacobs et al., 1989; Jacobs et al., 1990; Jacobs & Kim, 1990). Jacobs et at. (1990) found
that, in the first year of bereavement, 300/0 met the criteria for generalised anxiety disorders
and 10% for panic disorders. Depression levels were as high as 320/0 in the first six months,
and 27% at 12 months post bereavement for spouses (Jacobs et aI., 1989). At these intense
levels, grief is likely to be considered atypical (StroebeStroebe et al., 1993).
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6.1.2 Cognition and emotions
Having discussed grief, the focus now turns to how emotions can influence the way individ-
ual's process information about events. From the psychological literature there are differing
theories about the relationship between cognition and emotion, which centre on whether they
are part of the same system or independent systems (Bower, 1981; Wyer et al., 1999). How-
ever, there is consensus based on the empirical evidence that the relationship is bi-directional
and complex (Wyer, et al., 1999, for discussion). One conceptualisation of the relationship is
that emotions themselves are elicited and linked to the evaluation of goals and their outcomes
(Lazarus, 1990; 1991; Stein & Levine, 1990). As Stein and Trabasso (1992) point out, anger
may be expressed when there is failure to attain a goal and the focus is on the cause, whereas
sadness may result from focusing on the consequences of goal failure. These evaluations
occur within a social context, and as such, are likely to be influenced by the individual's cul-
ture, expectations and beliefs. There are also strong links between emotion and information
processing, where memory and judgments have influenced the encoding, retrieval and evalua-
tion of information (Bower, 1981; Beck et al., 1985; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Since the evi-
dence is pertinent to the present investigations, relevant aspects will be discussed in more
detail.
Emotions and memory
Emotions are an integral part of attention, perception and retrieval of information. As dis-
cussed in Section 2.4.2, attention is drawn to central aspects of highly emotional events,
which remain poignant for several months after the event (Christianson & Loftus, 1987;
Christianson, 1992). Evidence from non-clinical and clinical populations also suggests that
the emotional state of the individual can bias attention to stimuli (information, events) con-
sistent with their mood-state (Beck, et al., 1985; Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; Burke &
Matthews, 1992). Important links between emotion and cognition are proposed in Bower's
network theory (1981; 1987), which is used to explain and predict mood congruency. Blaney
(1986) defines this as "enhanced coding and/or retrieval ofmaterial the affective valence of
which is congruent with the ongoing mood" (p.229). Within Bower's (1981; 1987) theory,
emotions are part of the retrieval of events increasing accessibility to memories of a similar
affective tone. There is considerable evidence to support mood congruency effects (e.g.
Bower, 1981; Gilligan & Bower, 1984; Watkins et al., 1992). However, the findings are
sometimes inconsistent and have been shown to vary depending on the conditions (Blaney,
1986; Parrott & Sabini, 1990).
114
Emotions and judgments
In Chapter 5, the processes underlying judgments were discussed. For example, the basis for
judgments (e.g. normative behaviour and general knowledge), cues and estimations strategies
(e.g. heuristics, enumeration) were explained. Since the basis for judgments are embedded in
individuals' general knowledge about a particular event, they may be influenced by the prox-
ies' own emotions. This may be particularly evident when other criteria are not available or
difficult to apply, for example when the information cannot be retrieved from memory or the
judgments are difficult or ambiguous (Schwarz & Clore, 1988), and in depressed individuals
(Williams & Dritschel, 1988). Under these circumstances, individuals may rely on heuristics
(e.g. rule-of-thumb methods). One of which is the how-do-l-feel-about-it? heuristic proposed
by Schwarz and Clore (1988). Here emotions are used as a source of information for making
judgments about the self, other people, objects or events (Forgas, 1991). These affect-based
evaluations, as Wyer et al. (1999) points out are almost exclusively based on the individual's
feelings about events. These contrast with judgments based on general knowledge where
evaluations are based on knowledge about the person, symptoms being judged and observa-
tions. There is some evidence to support this heuristic within the research into self-report,
where assessment of mood states and pain are biased toward present beliefs (Bryant, 1993).
Cognitive theories of emotional disorders have highlighted the distortion of perception,
memory and appraisal in patients with anxiety and depression (Beck et al., 1979; 1985). Here,
perception of new information is organised within a particular internal representation (sche-
mata). As Williams et al. (1997) points out, the key schemata in patients with anxiety are
threat and vulnerability, whereas negativity is prominent in the schemata of patients with
depression. Correction of these biases or faulty thinking has been the impetus of much of the
cognitive therapy techniques used to treat patients (Beck, 1963; 1979; Beck, et al., 1985).
Despite the fact that much of the work has been conducted outside the field of palliative
research, the findings provide valuable insights and may have implications for the use of
proxies in retrospective surveys during bereavement.
6.2 Aims
Proxies' responses to the PSCI and ratings of patients' pain, anxiety and depression will be
interpreted in the light of their self-reported depression, anxiety and caregiver strain. This will
help to establish whether proxies own emotions are reflected in their responses or are used as
a basis for judgments.
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Research question three
Do proxies' own emotions have a bearing on their reports of patients' pain, anxiety and
depression?
6.3 Methods
The methods and procedures are detailed in Chapter 3 and Section 504. This involved analysis
ofproxies' responses to the PSCI. The codes used are shown in Table 6.1 and are based on the
literature regarding affect-based judgments (Schwarz & Clore, 1988; 1989; Wyer et al.,
1999). Affect-based judgments were instances where proxies' responses were based on their
feelings about events or the patient, rather than other indicators such as observations, commu-
nication and behaviours. In addition to this, proxies' verbalisation of their emotional
responses were also coded. Criterion sampling was used based on proxies' scores on the Car-
egiver Strain Index (CSI) (Robinson, 1983), State Anxiety Inventory (SAl) (Spielberger et al.,
1983) and Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II) (Beck et al., 1996). The sampling criterion
will be discussed along with the analysis in Section 604.2.
Table 6.1: Content analysis codes for proxies' emotional reactions and affect-based
judgments.
Proxies' emotions
Proxy's emotional reactions to event mentioned
Affect-basedjudgments
Explicit inferences about how the patient was feeling or thinking based on proxies own feelings about events
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Descriptive statistics
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 contain summaries of patient and proxy characteristics and demographics.
Proxyse~reportnteasures
Scores on the CSI were out of a possible maximum of thirteen. Half of the sample scored ~7
indicating moderate to high levels of perceived caregiver strain. The mean score was 6.7 (SD
204), with a range of 3-12. Self-reported anxiety using the State Anxiety Inventory (SAl) was
above average (mean 41, SD 1204) compared with adult populations of males (mean 35.72,
SD lOA) and females (mean 35.20, SD 10.61). Scores ranged from 22-69. Thirty percent (9/
30) of proxies scored higher than the normative range for males (46.21) and females (45.81).
Proxies' reports of their levels of depression using the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI)
ranged from 0-31 (mean 10.1, SD 6.8). The majority (26/30) had scores showing normal or
mild levels of depression. Two proxies' scores indicated mild to moderate depression (BDI
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scores 16-19), one proxy scored twenty-seven indicating moderate to severe depression and
only one proxy had a score (31) denoting severe depression.
Bivariate correlations
As expected, there was a significantly high correlation (r=.82,p<.Ol) between scores on the
SAl and BDI. A relationship was observed between the proxy's age and their scores on the
SAl and BDl, with younger proxies scoring higher on the SAl (r=-.57,p<.05) and the BDl
(r=.37, p<.05). Proxies' CSl ratings were found to be unrelated to SAl or BDl ratings. In
addition, they were not associated with any of the patient or proxy demographics or character-
istics.
6.4.2 Analysis procedure
Content analysis of the PSCl and the reliability and validity of the coding are reported in Sec-
tions 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. Qualitative description of the content analysis is reported below. Quanti-
tative analysis of the data involved a comparison of proxies' self-reported caregiver strain,
anxiety and depression with; (i) the frequencies of the codes (proxies' emotions and affect-
based judgments) in their responses, (ii) proxies ratings of patients' pain, anxiety and depres-
sion using VOICES. This analysis was conducted to investigate whether there was a relation-
ship between their responses/ratings and emotions.
Qualitative description ofthe content analysis
Proxies' emotions incorporated those instances where the proxy made reference to their own
feelings within their responses when they were asked about the patient's symptoms. For
example, when asked about depression one proxy stated, "I would. ] mean] was getting
upset" (ID20; 19d). Proxies' own feelings were more evident when asked about patients' anx-
iety as compared to pain and depression. A variety of emotions were expressed with many
conveying empathy for their significant other and their suffering. The condition of the patient
caused the proxy considerable distress, as the following quote illustrates.
"It was really upsetting for me and my sister seeing him in that state, we like to
remember him as he was. "
(ID21; lIb)
Sadness was also expressed at the loss of the patient's control, functioning and future life.
Attributions of blame and responsibility were focused on the self and the health care system.
Pertaining to the self were feelings of guilt, helplessness and regret at actions or failures to
act. One proxy spoke about how guilty she felt for not believing that her husband was dying
and for not taking the matter more seriously (ID 26). There was also regret and guilt for not
being more forceful with health carers and for their sense of helplessness at not knowing how
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best to proceed. The daughter of one patient spoke about how she had withheld doses of opoid
analgesics from her mother, for fear of overdosing her. This had resulted in her mother being
in considerable pain (ID 5). In several instances, proxies vocalised their anger at health pro-
fessionals involved with the care of the patient. Anger resulted from not being listened to, loss
of control, lack of information and the standard of patient care. Three proxies talked about
their own distress when the nurses came to change dressings. Shock and disbelief were evi-
dent in two cases where the death was sudden and the patient was young. Although most of
the reactions were negative and throughout many of the interviews proxies were tearful, some
reactions were more positive. Amongst these were satisfaction with care, humour, relief that
events were over, and a positive outlook for the future.
Affect-based judgments included instances where proxies' responses were based on
their feelings about events or the patient, rather than other indicators such as observations,
communication and behaviours. Since pain, anxiety and depression are considered more sub-
jective in nature, affect-based judgments were common, as the proxy attempted to view
events from the patient's perspective. The son of a patient with a hearing and visual impair-
ment whose functioning had declined, spoke of his father's depression,
"Thinking ofhim sat there in that house, sat in the chair, waiting and it was such
a silent world and that distressed him most. Just sitting there, hours and hours,
between when his carer left to when the carer came back. I can't imagine how
awful it must be. It must be terrible. "
(ID 24; 24b)
Many of the relationships were long standing and as a consequence knowledge of symptoms
was based on similarities between how the proxy felt and how the patient felt or on the intui-
tion gained from their life together and their shared experiences. Further prompting did not
reveal the basis for the intuition other than it was a feeling that the proxy had about the
patient's experiences. As one proxy responded, "Um [sighs] it's hard to explain really. Just a
feeling about my mother" (ID 5; 11 b).
When asked about the patient's pain, the husband of another patient replied,
"Um having been married thirty years I knew she was in pain. You get to know
someone that you live with and you know when they're in pain. "
(ID25; Ic)
The words "us" and "we" were also indicative of shared feelings. The bond between the
patient and the proxy meant that proxies felt able to make judgments based on their own
assumptions. This was apparent in some instances where the proxy stated that the patient was
unaware of their condition due to their level of consciousness, knowledge about prognosis or
lack of communication about terminal illness. Since the patient was not aware, anxiety and
depression were not considered a problem. In contrast, awareness of circumstances led some
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proxies to believe that the patient was in pain, anxious or depressed, as they would have been
given the same circumstances. Proxies' own concerns were apparent in a small number of
cases. This was exemplified in the response of a husband talking about his wife's pain,
"Well, I would put it very, very high. That was my main concern. When 1 knew
that things were really hopeless, I was concerned that when she had it [pain], 1
could almost experience the pain myself. "
(ID 13~ 8b)
Another instance was a proxy talking about her mother's depression,
"1 would say it was significant ..urn. because .. like anyone you would be
wouldn't you? Ifyou, ifyou don't know what is happening and you see lots of
different people traipsing in and out, lots ofdifferent district nurses and all the
rest ofit. "
(ID 5; 26b)
Quantitative analysis offrequency ofcodes and self-report measures
In order to examine whether there were any differences between those with high and low CSI,
SAl and BDI scores in relation to the proportions who invoked the codes and those who did
not, a Fisher's exact test (two-tailed; a =.05) was performed. Groups were divided based on
the CSI and SAl into high and low groups signifying the level of caregiver strain and anxiety.
The numbers reporting mild or no depression (N=26/30) from the BDI scores meant that there
were too few in the high group to perform analyses. Scores on the CSI of ~6 and 2.7 were used
to divide the sample into low and high groups respectively. Division of the sample for the SAl
was based on the population averages for males and females as detailed above. In all but two
instances, the proxies with higher levels of caregiver strain and anxiety were more likely to
invoke both codes. The only exceptions were where proxies with low CSI scores invoked the
proxies' feelings code for pain and depression more often compared to those with high CSI
scores. However, none of the differences were statistically significant.
The absolute frequency or number of times the code was applied was also compared
between proxies with high and low scores. Proxies in the high CSI and STAl group tended to
apply both codes more often, with the exception of depression in the low CSI group (Tables
Table 6.2: The absolute frequencies of codes for CSI.
Code Affect-based judgments
High CSI (N=15) Low CSI (N=15)
Proxies' feelings

















Table 6.3: The absolute frequencies of codes for SAl.
Code Affect-based judgments
High SAl (N=18) Low SAl (N=12)
Proxies' feelings
















6.2 & 6.3). Analysis of the frequencies using the Mann-Whitney test (two-tailed; a =.05)
indicated that none of the differences were statistically significant.
Quantitative analysis of VOICES rating and self-report measures
In order to statistically analyse the VOICES ratings in relation to proxies' self-reported levels
of caregiver strain and anxiety, the ordinal ratings from VOICES were assigned a score such
that on the frequency scale 5 = most of the time to 1 = never, and on the severity scale 5 =
severe to 1 = none. As the data violated the assumptions of parametric analysis, the Mann-
Whitney test was used. In all instances, the Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) two-sample test
(a =.05) showed that the data met the assumption of the Mann-Whitney test for similarity of
distributions. A series of two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests were performed. Due to the number
(N=24), only those where a significant difference was found, are reported (full analysis con-
tained in Appendix 0). In nearly all the analyses, proxies in the high CSI and SAl groups
rated patients' symptoms as more severe and intense and several of these almost reached sig-
nificance. Examples for the CSI ratings existed for pain severity and frequency in the last
week and month of life. However, only pain frequency in the month was significantly differ-
ent (z =-2.20, p=.03; K-S z= 1.10,p=.18), with the mean ranks for CSI high (18.90) and low
Table 6.4: Analysis of differences in VOICES ratings between those with high and low
levels of self-reported anxiety.
SAl High SAlLow Mann-Whitney (K-S)
Mean N Mean pN Rank z pRank
Anxiety frequency (week) 18 18.64 12 10.79 -2.48 .02 .08
Anxiety severity (week) 18 18.25 12 11.38 -2.18 .04 .08
Anxiety frequency (month) 18 18.31 12 11.29 -2.22 .03 .23
Depression frequency (week) 18 18.06 12 11.07 -2.07 .05 .12
Depression severity (week) 18 18.28 12 11.33 -2.22 .04 .12
Two-tailed, a =.05.
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groups (12.10). Statistical analysis comparing proxies in the high and low SAl groups and
their VOICES ratings revealed that they were different in several aspects. As Table 6.4 shows
,
proxies with higher levels of self-reported anxiety rated patients' anxiety and depression in
the week, and anxiety frequency in the month as more frequent and severe than those with
lower levels of self-reported anxiety. In addition to this, anxiety severity in the month almost
reached significance (p=.08, n/s).
6.5 Discussion
In the sample of proxies' studied, self-reported caregiver strain and anxiety were high. Given
that most of the proxies were the primary caregiver before the patient's death or admission to
a hospice, this is not unexpected. The strain of caregiving can impose significant burdens and
can cause emotional distress before and after the patient's death (McCorkle, 1988). Moreover,
anxiety is commonly experienced during the grieving process, as highlighted earlier (Parkes,
1965; Bartrop et al., 1992; Zisook, et al., 1990). Surprisingly, few proxies' scores on the Beck
Depression Inventory were above the cutoffpoints indicating normal or mild depression, even
though elevated levels of depressive symptomology frequently occur during bereavement
(Parkes, 1965; Vachon et al., 1982; Parkes & Weiss, 1983). Consequently, the investigations
focused on caregiver strain and anxiety.
By dividing the sample into groups based on their CSI and SAl scores, it is clear that
there are significant differences between proxies based on their levels of caregiver strain and
anxiety and their ratings of patients' symptoms using VOICES. In almost all instances, prox-
ies in the high CSI and SAl groups rated patients' symptoms as more severe and frequent
when compared to those in the low CSI and SAl groups. Caregiver strain appeared to have an
effect on pain ratings because the differences either reached or almost reached significance
(even with the small sample size). Difficulties experienced by the proxy in managing patients'
pain may have been a contributor to the results found here. In several of these cases, the
patients had to be admitted to the hospice because of uncontrollable pain and other symptoms.
Physical care and coping with symptoms can be one of the most demanding aspects of caring
for terminally ill cancer patients (Holing, 1986), and is frequently given as a reason for refer-
ral to inpatient palliative care services (Seamark et al., 1996). With regards to anxiety, it was
noted that proxies' levels were related to their ratings of patients' anxiety and also to depres-
sion in the last week of life. A possible explanation for this linkage might be that the patient's
anxiety and depression caused distress to the proxy, thus leading to their own elevated levels
of anxiety. It is known that patients' distress and symptoms can adversely affect their car-
egiver's psychological adjustment (Sales, et al., 1992). Alternatively, another explanation that
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supports Higginson et al. 's (1994) assertion is that proxies' responses may be a reflection of
their own feelings rather than the experiences of the patient.
To gain a better understanding of the processes underlying proxies' responses, and to
clarify the relationship between proxies' levels of caregiver strain and anxiety in relation to
their ratings of patients' symptoms, a qualitative analysis of their responses to the PSCI was
conducted. This analysis showed that there was a general tendency for those with greater car-
egiver strain and anxiety to mention their feelings and use affect-based judgments. However,
this did not reach statistical significance and may have arisen by chance. Empathy was fre-
quently expressed as proxies attempted to view events from the patient's perspective. Under-
standably, this caused proxies distress and sadness. Loss of control and hopelessness at the
situation and in dealing with the patient's pain were frequently mentioned.
The present findings may be valuable in explaining the results from several studies that
have found that proxies' intensity of caregiver burden is related to incongruency between
patient and proxy ratings of patients' symptoms (Kurtz et al., 1996; Miaskowski et al., 1997;
Sneeuw et al., 1998). Since proxies' inability to deal with the increasing demands of caregiv-
ing creates a variety of feelings, such as guilt and helplessness that are apparent in their think-
ing when judging the patient's pain. In some instances, this could lead to an overestimation of
patients' symptoms, as seen in the studies cited.
Although it is not possible to discern the influence of proxies' feelings on their
responses, it is clear from this investigation that their own feelings formed part of their think-
ing when judging patients' pain, anxiety and depression. This was supported by the identifica-
tion of affect-based judgments in their responses, where their own concerns and feelings were
used as a basis to judge patients' symptoms. An example was knowledge based on similarities
between patients and proxies, or an intuitive sense of the patient's experiences in long-stand-
ing relationships. In some cases, similarities may provide an accurate representation of
patients' experiences, but this cannot be assumed. Furthermore, as the situation is novel to
both, the patient may not respond as expected and this may lead the proxy to make erroneous
judgments. In light of the findings that there is a propensity for those with greater caregiver
strain and anxiety to express their feelings and use affect-based judgments, there is a necessity
to take this into account when using information derived from proxies. Considering the find-
ings, the influence of proxies' anxiety on patients' symptoms is clearly an area that requires
further investigation. Moreover, as anxiety and depression were significantly correlated in
this study, the influence of depression also needs to be explored.
Theoretically the results can be explained within the psychological literature in a
number of ways. The relationship between proxies' anxiety and patients' anxiety and depres-
sion could be attributed to attention and mood congruency biases in memory (Christianson,
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1992; Bower, 1981; 1987). Similarly, cognitive theories of emotion, such as Beck's schema
theory (1979; 1985) may explain why proxies' mood states may influence their interpretation
of events. Examining proxies' responses there was strong evidence to support Schwarz and
Clore's (1988) how-do-l-feel-about-it? heuristic or affect-based judgments, which center on
how the proxy feels about events. A factor probably contributing to the use of affect-based
judgments was the subjective nature of the symptoms investigated and the difficulty of the
task. Given that emotions are variable over time, current appraisals of events in a specific
mood may change as a function of the stability of the emotion. In Chapter 7, the consistency
of proxies' responses over time will be explored.
6.5.1 Limitations
There are several limitations to the research conducted. Firstly, the investigations centred on
verbal expression of emotion through the retrospective verbal protocols. A possible explana-
tion for the findings is that proxies, who are more verbally expressive and candid about their
own feelings with regard to caregiver burden and anxiety, might be more likely to express
their own feelings in their responses to questions about the patient's symptoms. It is also
important to highlight that emotions can be expressed non-verbally through behaviours and
facial expressions, and physiologically. These manifestations may not be associated with one
another. Evidence to support this comes from verbal-autonomic dissociation observed in stud-
ies where subjective distress is rated as low, but physiological arousal is elevated when talk-
ing about loss (Newton & Contrada, 1992; Bonanno et al., 1995). Indifference may be present
in the severely depressed (Watts, 1992). Thus, emotions may be present but not revealed in
the present study as the emphasis was on verbalisation. Added to this, repressive coping styles
may limit expression and thinking about aspects surrounding the patient's death. Secondly,
proxies may not be consciously aware of the effects of some feelings, even though they have
been shown to affect judgments (Winkielman, et al., 1997). Therefore, the effects of some
emotions may not be amenable to investigation using the verbal protocol approach. Thirdly,
caregiver strain is not itself an emotion it is associated with a number of emotions; in these
investigations it was not related to proxies' anxiety or depression but to expression of feelings
such as helplessness and affect-based judgments. What aspects of the perceived burden of
caring influence proxies' responses are not known.
6.5.2 Summary
Throughout the thesis the importance of making accurate judgments about patients' symp-
toms has been highlighted. It is not possible to say with any certainty whether the proxies'
feelings influence their judgments from these investigations. However, identification of prox-
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ies' feelings and judgments based on proxies' feelings suggests that they may influence their
perception of the patients' experiences at higher levels. The next chapter will consider the
consistency of proxies' responses over time.
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CHAPTER 7: Proxies' responses over time
7.1 Introduction
There has been very little proxy research wherein the effect of elapsed time has been consid-
ered and/or specifically studied. Chapter 2 cites several exceptions. For example, Sneeuw et
at. (1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999) in their prospective studies of proxies employed repeated
measures designs to investigate the responsiveness of proxies to patients' quality of life over
time. Others have investigated changes in the proxy's responses both before and after the
patient's death (Higginson et at. 1994; Hinton, 1996), or have retrospectively compared prox-
ies interviewed at three months with those interviewed at nine months (Cartwright et al.,
1973). From these studies, changes have been shown to occur with the passage of time. For
prospective studies, some change is to be expected, as it is likely related to the patient's con-
dition. However, when using proxies to evaluate care retrospectively, changes in their
responses could seriously undermine their validity. These issues will be discussed and the
effects of time on proxies' responses during bereavement will be explored.
7.1.1 Changes over time
Of the little evidence that does exist, there are two studies that indicate that proxies' responses
do change with time (Higginson et at. 1994; Hinton, 1996). As discussed in Chapter 2, prox-
ies evaluation of patients' mood showed that depression and anxiety ratings were lower than
their prospective ratings, and in some cases, anxiety ratings were closer to patients' ratings
(Higginson et al. 1994; Hinton, 1996). In contrast, pain ratings became more severe retro-
spectively when compared to proxies' prospective ratings and to those of the patients them-
selves (Hinton, 1996). In some cases, the ratings were even polarised to the extremes of the
rating scale (Higginson et al., 1994). These studies provide some evidence to support the
notion that proxy ratings can change during the terminal and bereavement phases. What is not
known is whether and how proxies' accounts change during bereavement when retrospective
end of life studies are conducted. To date, only one study, conducted by Cartwright et al.
(1973), has included a comparison of proxy interviews performed at different time periods
during bereavement. The aim of the study was to understand how the timing of interviews
affected recruitment, accuracy of information, certainty in responses and feelings about the
place of death. It consisted of comparing information gathered at three months and nine
months after death. Unfortunately, different groups were compared so it was not possible to
assess how proxies' responses may have changed with the passage of time.
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7.1.2 Timing of interviews
At present, almost all retrospective studies have been conducted with few reasons given for
the timing following the patient's death. Other than the obvious difficulty in obtaining tightly
controlled and representative samples, the only other comment investigators often make on
the issue of timing is the ethics of interviewing proxies too soon. On this latter issue several,
studies have used three months into bereavement as a guideline to contact relatives for
research purposes (Hinton, 1996; Cartwright & Seale, 1990). Cartwright and Seale (1990)
base this timing on Parkes' (1972) study that showed that tearfulness in widows declines sub-
stantially between one and three months. However, interviews have been conducted at vary-
ing lengths following the patient's death, from as little as eight weeks for information
pertaining to patient care (Addington-Hall et al., 1991) up to several years for information
regarding morbidity and medical history (Tepper et al., 1993; Rogot & Reid 1975). Notwith-
standing, most retrospective palliative care surveys are conducted on average between 3-12
months after the patient's death (Cartwright et al., 1973; Cartwright & Seale, 1990; Adding-
ton-Hall et al., 1995a; Addington-Hall & McCarthy, 1995c; McCarthy et al., 1997; Adding-
ton-Hall et al., 1998; Teno et al., 2001).
Cartwright et al. 's (1973) study contains several findings that are pertinent to the issue
of timing. In particular, they found that more refusals as a proportion of failures (62%) were
evident at 3 months after death compared to 9 months (48%), although a greater proportion of
people could not be contacted at 9 months because no one was living in the area. The impor-
tance of memory on the accuracy of recollections and how it affects timing is another topic
that has not received much attention within this context. In Cartwright et al. 's (1973) study,
factual information regarding the patient's death, such as cause of death, age and place of
death were as accurate on both occasions, regardless of the timing. Similarly, no significant
differences were found for symptoms, care or help received. They also assessed adequacy or
certainty of responses, as it was thought that this might be affected. Overall, the findings did
not support this, but a smaller number of proxies at 3 months were uncertain about the place
of death. Since few details were given for either study, the methodological rigour and analysis
could not be critically evaluated. Based on the authors' own conclusions, only small differ-
ences were apparent due to the timing of the interview. Considering this evidence, and that
from Higginson et al. (1994) and Hinton's (1996) studies, a more complete exploration of
whether and where discrepancies occur is required. This would be best achieved interviewing
the same proxies at different periods during bereavement. This would be very useful for iden-
tifying areas where accounts differ and the possible reasons why, and would be instructive for
those conducting retrospective studies that rely on proxies. Before exploring these issues a
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brief overview of the relevant literature is presented. Within this are factors that could influ-
ence individuals' responses, thus causing them to change.
7.1.3 Factors likely to affect proxies' responses over time
Memory
Retrospective reports by proxies rely heavily on their memory for events. These memories are
autobiographical in the sense that the proxy, through active participation in the care of the
patient or through observing events experiences them. Furthermore, research that has exam-
ined memory for self and memory for others suggests that they are fundamentally similar
(Kihlstrom et al., 1988). Therefore, in order to understand some of the errors in retrospective
reports, it is first necessary to appreciate the significance of autobiographical memory. In pre-
vious chapters, errors in survey reports were discussed as they related to retrieval strategies,
reference periods and factors associated with the event itself, such as saliency and frequency.
In relation to time, it is clear from the literature that memory for events declines over time
(Baddley, 1990). Investigations into the subjective qualities of memories, such as perceived
completeness and vividness, also support a decline directly following an event, with a more
gradual decline after weeks (Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1996) and months (Friedman
& deWinstanley, 1998), with little further decline between three and six months (Friedman &
deWinstanley, 1998). It should be noted that the personal events studied in the investigations
mentioned (Thompson, 1982; Thompson et al., 1996; Friedman & deWinstanley, 1998),
involved thanksgiving celebrations and experiences with college roommates, which are far
less momentous than the events surrounding the death of a significant other. It may be that the
significance of the event along with rehearsal of events through thinking or talking may
increase memorability for events increasing retention. Alternatively, coping strategies such as
distraction or not wanting to think about events may reduce the intensity of the events and
their distinctiveness in memory.
In the aforementioned studies, the focus was on the consistency of reports over time.
The literature from both self-report (Schrader et al., 1990; Bryant, 1993) and proxy report
(Higginson et al., 1994; Hinton, 1996) suggests that symptom ratings of pain, anxiety and
depression can change over time. These findings are consistent with the psychological litera-
ture where memory for events is thought to change over time (Conway, 1992; Brewer, 1986;
1996; Thompson et al., 1982). The way in which autobiographical memory is structured
explains these changes. For instance, Conway's model (1992) posits that events are stored in
hierarchical knowledge structures containing different types of information rather than as epi-
sodes. At the top level the knowledge base are plans, themes and goals, within this are general
knowledge, knowledge about self and significant others over periods of up to years. The mid-
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dle level contains knowledge about specific events over shorter periods, such as months or
weeks, which can be thematically organised. At the bottom of the hierarchy, specific events
are stored as sensory/perceptual knowledge (thoughts, images and sensations) that is associ-
ated with a specific event. With each retrieval, memory is reconstructed by complex proc-
esses, each of which are influenced by situational demands (Conway, 1997). This accounts
for differences in memories and for the differences in the types of knowledge retrieved. As
the analysis in Chapter 5 illustrates, the recall of events included great detail and proxies'
thoughts about a specific event, and decontextualised information; normative and trait knowl-
edge. These constructions may playa functional role in adapting to a situation. For example,
Taylor's (1991) mobilisation-minimisation theory may explain the changes that result in a
decrease in ratings over time. Here, adaptation processes seek to minimise the intensity of
negative events such as loss.
Judgments
References to the inextricable relationship between memory and judgments were made in pre-
vious chapters. It is clear from the literature that the fallibility of memory can lead to bias in
judgments (e.g. availability heuristic, mood-congruence). The complex interplay between the
social context and the basis for proxies' judgments were also discussed (Chapter 5). Knowl-
edge, beliefs and expectations in the form of trait knowledge, norms and comparisons over
time were important anchors upon which proxies based their decisions. Alterations in proxies'
cognitive and affective states may also have a bearing on how their judgments change. As dis-
cussed in Chapter 6, the experience of living through bereavement can result in various
changes in the mental processes that characterise grief. These changes may induce changes in
the way events are perceived and judged. Further to this, adaptive psychological mechanisms
used to cope with loss could explain changes over time. For example, in Lazarus and Folk-
man's (1984) theory of stress, the extent to which an event is perceived as stressful is depend-
ent on how it is appraised by the individual. In an effort to cope with the situation, Folkman
and Lazarus (1990) suggest that individuals engage in strategies to reduce the threat, such as
positive reappraisal and avoidance. Since bereavement over the loss of a significant other is a
highly stressful event, there is ample evidence to support Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) the-
ory as it applies to coping with loss (Stein et al., 1997; Folkman, 1997; Moskowitz et al.
1996).
7.2 Aims
By investigating the differences and similarities in the accounts given by proxies through
their ratings of patients' symptoms using VOICES and through qualitative analysis of the
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Proxy Semi-structured Cognitive Interview (PSCI), it is possible to examine whether and how
perceptions change over time. This may have a bearing on the use of retrospective measures,
such as VOICES, during the bereavement period. If there are significant changes in the
reports between different time periods, then this raises questions about the validity of the ret-
rospective approach in palliative care research.
Research question four
How do proxies' perceptions of patients' pain, anxiety and depression change during the
bereavement period?
7.3 Methods
As a means to investigate whether and how proxies' responses change over time a repeated
measures design was used. The design and procedures are presented in Section 3.6. Partici-
pants who were interviewed at 3-5 months (mean 3.9 months) following the patient's death
(Time 1) were invited to take part in a follow-up interview (Time 2). After completing the
Caregiver Strain Index (CSI) (Robinson, 1983), State Anxiety Inventory (SAl) (Spielberger et
al., 1983) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al., 1996), a shortened version
of the PSCI (contained in Appendix K) was undertaken. Qualitative analysis of the PSCI will




From the sample of thirty participants who were interviewed at time 1, 13 agreed to be inter-
viewed again at time 2. Descriptive statistics of patient and proxy characteristics were pro-
duced using SPSSlWin 10.1 and are summarised in Table 7.1 and 7.2. A series of chi-square
analyses were conducted to examine differences between those who took part and those who
declined. The analyses focused on patient and proxy demographic/characteristics. In some
instances, categories were collapsed to enable analysis. Where the frequencies were less than
Table 7.1: Patient demographics and characteristics.
Category Criteria N (%)
Age Range 25-86 years
Mean 67 (S.D. 13.2)




Table 7.2: Proxy demographics and characteristics.
Category Criteria N (%)
Class 5 3 (23.1)
Relationship to patient Partner 8 (61.5)
Son/daughter 5 (38.5)
Amount ofcontact 24 hours per day 10 (76.9)
between the patient and
proxy in the last week of 12-24 hours per day (7.7)
life 3-6 hours per day 2 (15.4)
Residence Lived with patient 10 (76.9)
Did not live with patient 3 (23.1)
5, which violates the assumptions of chi-square, Fisher's exact test was used. Since none of
the analyses were significant at the level of a =.05, this indicated that the follow-up sample
was not significantly different from those interviewed at time I and who did not participate at
time 2. (Appendix P contains the full analysis). The test statistics were patient age (z=-.1.39,
p=.17); patient sex (X 2 =.l4,p=.71), patient socioeconomic status (X 2 =.07, p=.79), proxy age
(z=-1.17,p=.24), proxy sex (p=.13), proxy socioeconomic status (X 2 =22, p=.64), place of
death (p=.69) and proxy residing/not residing with the patient (p=1.00). Amount of contact
between the patient and proxy, and ethnicity could not be analysed, due to a lack of variability
that resulted in too few numbers in some categories to analyse the data. Place of care con-
sisted of various combinations of care provision again there too few numbers in the catego-
ries. The Mann-Whitney test was used to analyse the continuous variables (CSl, SAl, BDl)
because the variables were not normally distributed and sample sizes were small (N=13). The
Kolmogorov-Smimov (K-S) two-sample test (a =.05) showed that the data met the assump-
tion of the Mann-Whitney test for similarity of distributions; CSI (K-S z =.88, p=.45), SAl
(K-S z=.14,p=.15), and BDI (K-S z=.77,p=.66), as Table 7.3 shows, there were no signifi-
cant differences between the groups on these measures.
7.4.2 Proxy self-report measures
Proxies' ratings on the CSI, SAl and BDI were analysed and compared with their ratings at
time 1. Out ofa possible maximum of thirteen, over half the sample (8/13) reported moderate
to high levels (score ~7) of perceived caregiver strain with a range of3-10. The mean score on
the SAl (40.5, S.D.13.0) was above average for adult populations of males (mean 35.72,
S.D. 10.4) and females (mean 35.20, S.D.IO.61). Similar to the larger sample, 30% had scores
above the normative range for males (46.21) and females (45.81). Scores ranged from 24-72.
Reported levels of depression from the BDl suggested that the majority (10/13) of the sample
had normal or mild levels of depression (mean 11.5, S.D.Il.2). The variance and range (3-43)
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Table 7.3: Analysi~ of dif~erencesbetween proxies who took part in the follow up (time
2) and t~ose who did not III self-reported levels of carergiver strain, anxiety and
depressIOn. .
Non follow up sample Follow up sample Mann-Whitney
N Mean rank N Mean rank -
- P
CSl 17 17.0 13 13.54 -1.08 .28
STAl 17 13.91 13 17.58 -1.132 .26
BDl 17 15.03 13 16.12 -.336 .7-+
Two-tailed, a =.05
showed great variability in scores. Three proxies' scores indicated elevated levels of depres-
sion. One proxy had a score (17) indicating mild to moderate depression (16-19). Another
proxy's score (23) signified severe to moderate depression and one had a score (43) denoting
severe depression.
Comparisons between proxies' scores at time I and time 2 were made for the CSI SAl,
and BDI. Since the assumptions of parametric analysis were violated, the Wilcoxin signed
ranks test was used. Using a two-tailed value with a =.05, no significant differences were
observed for the CSI (z=-.14,p=.89) or the BDI (z=-.197,p=.84). Differences were found
for the SAl (z = -2.01, p=.045) with greater levels of anxiety reported at time 1 (Md= 47)
compared to time 2 (Md= 40).
7.4.3 Analysis procedure
Data from the interviews were analysed in two ways. Proxies' responses to the VOICES ques-
tions regarding patients' pain, anxiety and depression at time I and 2 were analysed quantita-
tively using SPSS/Win 10.1 and Microsoft EXCEL. The second approach involved using
qualitative analysis techniques to examine the proxies' verbalisations of their thoughts
regarding particular questions used in the PSCI. Responses were analysed at both times.
7.4.4 Quantitative differences between time 1 and time 2
Cohen's kappa was used to examine levels of exact agreement in the VOICES responses
given at time I and time 2. This was chosen because it is designed to control for chance agree-
ment between raters. It was observed that some of the differences were within one rating of a
previous rating. Since kappa treats all combinations of disagreements on an equal basis, for
instance, a change from severe to mild is treated the same as a change from severe to signifi-
cant, weighting the kappa was considered. This involves assigning a proportion to each and
every type of disagreement, so that more conflicting cases affect the measure more than the
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less conflicting ones do (Cohen, 1968). Unfortunately, for there to be a valid interpretation, a
minimum sample of N> 2k
2
is required (Cicchetti & Fleiss, 1975, cited in Cicchetti. 1976).
where k is the number of points on the continuous-ordinal scale, there are six points on the
VOICES scale (including don't know responses), meaning a valid interpretation would only
be possible if there were greater than 72 subjects. In light of this, a more basic alternative is to
group categories based on clinical and empirical findings. From Chapter 4, it is evident that
little differentiation was made between some descriptors. For example, rarely was often con-
sidered so infrequent as to be absent. Likewise, severe and significant were viewed similarly,
as were most of the time and often. These observations are what provide the basis for the
groupings shown in Figure 7.1. As it turns out, grouping is in fact a form of weighting. How-
ever, unlike the conventional linear agreement weights for continuous-ordinal scales (Cic-
chetti, 1976), the weights are nonlinear function of the scale point separations.
Figure 7.1 Grouping of VOICES frequency and severity descriptors.
Frequency groupings
Most of the time >









> Never MildNone > None
Cohen's kappa values range from 0 (no agreement) to 1 (almost perfect agreement).
Assessing the value of kappa is problematic, as varying degrees of acceptability have been
reported. Higginson and McCarthy (1993), who were using previous levels as a guide,
decided that levels of K =.3 were acceptable. Others have followed Landis and Koch's (1977)
guidelines (Hinton, 1996; Kristjanson, et al., 1998; Lobchuk & Degner, 2002). In keeping
with this, benchmarks for the present analysis are kappa values (strength of agreement); <.00
(poor), .00-.20 (slight), .21-.40 (fair), .41-.60 (moderate), .61-.80 (substantial), and .81-1.00
(almost perfect) (Landis & Koch, 1977). Other factors that need to be considered when calcu-
lating kappa are bias and prevalence (Byrt et al. 1993). Bias and prevalence relate to the bal-
ance of the matrix used to calculate kappa. Bias appears when certain disagreements occur
more often than others, for example if a large number change their rating in a particular way
(from severe to significant and vice versa). While prevalence occurs when participants tend to
favour particular responses over others, such as when a high proportion choose none. These
factors can influence the value of kappa and are considered in relation to the analysis pre-
sented here.
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7.4.5 Proxies' responses to VOICES
Pain
Overall exact and grouped agreement for pain was not good. Two proxies stated that the
patient did not have pain when they had previously stated that the patient did have pain. For
pain frequency in the week, agreement was fair. Almost half (6/13) gave exactly the same
response, whereas four of the proxies changed their ratings to less frequent levels. One
proxy's rating became more frequent. In contrast to the last month, exact agreement was mod-
erate for pain frequency (K =.45); grouping the ratings increased this to a substantial level
(K=.64). Here, notable inconsistencies were observed. In particular, one proxy changed their
response from sometimes to never, while another changed from often to rarely.
Few (5/13) proxies gave exactly the same rating for pain severity in the week and in the
month (6/13). Thus, exact agreement at both time periods was poor to fair (Table 7.4). Com-
bining the severity groupings increased the level of agreement in the week (K =.28) and
month (K =.39) to fair agreement. This increase was due to a number of proxies changing
their responses from severe to significant or vice versa. However, there were large variations
in ratings as Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show, and as a consequence, agreement was poor.











The high proportion of participants answering most ofthe time in the last week of life (Figure
7.2) resulted in prevalence effects in the kappa matrix. The net effect of this was higher mar-
ginal totals in the matrix, which translates into a lower kappa value. A balanced spread in the
matrix increased the value to K =.35 in this instance. Notwithstanding, agreement remained
fair. Similarly, the numbers answering significant to pain in the last month (Figure 7.3)
showed slight prevalence effects. Here the imbalance in the matrix lowered kappa from
K =.36 given an even spread of responses, to K =.25, still agreement was fair.
Anxiety
The strength of agreement for anxiety ranged from moderate (K =.33) to substantial (K =.80).
Table 7.5 shows that there was a considerable degree of consistency in ratings particularly for
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Figure 7.2 ~roxies ' rati.ngs of pat ients ' pain frequency in the last week and month f r f
time I an d time 2 . Ole
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o Frequency in the last month (time 2)
most of the time often some times rarely never not known
Figure 7.3 Proxies ' ratings of patients ' pain severity in the last week and mo nth of life at











[II Severity in the last week (time I)
~ Severi ty in the last wee k (time 2)
Severity in the last month (time I)
o Severity in the last month (time 2)
severe signi ficant moderate mil d none don 't know
anxiety in the month as eleven (11/13 ) proxies gave exactly the same ra tings. Compared to
frequency ratings in th e month, agreement was lower in the week, wh ere thr ee part ic ipant
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said the patient had anxiety at time I , and then answered don 't know or never at time 2 (Fig-
ures 7.4 & 7.5).
Table 7.5: Kappa measures of agreement for proxies ' ratings of pat ient s' anxiety at




K appa (ex act K appa (groupe d
Anxiety agreement) ag reement)
Frequency .43 .54
Severity .5 1 .64
Frequency .80 .77
Severity .57 .53
Agreement for anxiety in the week and month were similar, showing moderate to sub-
stantiallevels. There was little variation in these scores over time. Two exce ptions in the
week were severe and moderate ratings at time I being rated as don 't know at time 2.
Figure 7.4 Proxies ' ratings of patients ' anxiety frequency in the last week and month of I
at time 1 and time 2.
5-.------------------------------,
III Frequ ency in the last week (time 1)
~ Frequ en cy in the last week (time 2)
Frequenc y in the last month (time I)




most of the time often sometimes rarely never
not known
Figures 7.4 and 7.5 show that the spread of responses was more even for anxiety rat-
ings, and consequently, no prevalence was detected.
Depression
In contrast to anxiety and pain ratings , agree ment for depression at time I and time 2 were
better in the week th an in the last month . In the week, moderate agreement ( K =.48) wa
observ ed for depression frequency, while in the month agree ment was poor (K =.17). Group-
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Figure 7.5 Proxies ' ratings of patients ' anxiety severity in the last week and th f lif
. . mon 0 ll e
nme I and time 2.








.~ Severity in the last week (time I )
Ii] Severity in the last week (time 2)
Severity in the last month (time I )
o Severi ty in the last month (time 2)
severe significant moderate mild none don 't know
ing the ratings had little effect as major changes were observed (Table 7.6). Four ratings in the
week and five in the month changed between yes and no or don t know. In the month , there
were both increases (2/13) and decreases (1/13) in ratings of depression frequency (Figure 7.6
& 7.7). As noted, the major changes contributed to the poor levels of agreement for depres-
sion severity in the month. Here, three ratings became less severe and one became more
severe at time 2. In the week, there was less variation with the two ratings of less severe at
time 2.
Table 7.6: Kappa measures of agreement for proxies' ratings of patients' depression at










A noteworthy observation regarding proxies' ratings of depression, were the numbers
reporting no depression. In the last week of life at time I , four reported no dep ression com-
pared to six at time 2. Similarly, in the last month of life, three reported no depression com-
pared to seven at time 2 . Due to the numbers reporting no depr ess ion, there was some
evidence of prevalence. However, the amount wa s sma ll and lowered the kappa value by no
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more than .06 to .09 . A hint of bias was observed for depre ssion severity in the week , which
had the effect of lowering the kappa va lue. Altogether, the combined effect s of prevalence
and bias lowered the kappa values by .06 to .07.
Figure 7.6 Proxies' ratings of patients ' depression frequency in the last week and month
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Figure 7.7 Proxies ' ratings of patients' depression severity in the last week and month 01
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mild none don't know
7.4.6 Qualitative analysis
As the questions from the PSCI were structured around the symptoms of pain, anxiety and
depression, the analysis was loosely structured into these categories. The analysis differs from
the type of content analysis conducted in Chapter 5, where the focus was on the content and
frequency of codes as a means to elucidate proxies' question answering processes. The pur-
pose of the analysis conducted more investigative in the sense that the meanings of the utter-
ances were interpreted from the data (Grbich, 1999). All of the texts were entered into
winMAX 98Pro, a qualitative computer analysis program to aid the analysis process. The the-
matic analysis process was as follows:
1. Transcripts at T 1 and T2 from each of five participants were read and reread
several times along with field notes taken at the time of the interviews. Notes
regarding the content and initial interpretations were made that characterised
differences and similarities in the data. These notes and interpretations served
as preliminary themes.
2. The themes identified from the analysis of the first few transcripts was used
to guide analysis of further transcripts. New themes were added as they
emerged.
3. Associations between similar themes were made, and themes were modified
or combined as the analysis progressed. Initially, the symptoms were used as
a rough guide to organise the process of analysis, though it became apparent
from the themes and patterns that emerged that they went beyond these cate-
gones.
4. To ensure the interpretations were valid, themes were continually compared
with the transcripts at T2 and T2 and between transcripts from different par-
ticipants.
5. Some interpretations represented broader categories from which more spe-
cific themes were identified. These categories represented themes with
related characteristics (e.g. bear in mind) or an underlying construct (e.g.
construction ofevents). These are discussed in more detail below.
The main categories and themes are presented in Figure 7.8, along with an example of
the themes from the interviews. The analysis was conducted separately from the VOICES
responses, to reduce bias in coding the interviews. However, within the responses some prox-
ies made reference to their ratings, which could not be avoided. Since a major aim of the
study was to examine whether and how proxies' responses changed over time and how this
related to their ratings of patients' pain, anxiety and depression, the qualitative analysis is dis-
cussed in relation to the VOICES ratings is unavoidable.
Construction ofevents was a major category that emerged from the proxies' responses.
It further subdivided itself into the themes ofproxies' beliefs and proxies' feelings. Within the
context of the retrospective interviews, this category referred to changes in the way similar
stories were viewed by proxies at different times. The similarity in the responses given by
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Figure 7.8 Categories and themes from qualitative analysis.
Time 1 Time ~
\\c\S Sadness appraised as depression
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feelingsmay have affectedher
judgment of events (lD5)
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"C'r Pain severe, but states that the pain Accounts for pain relief more; pain~relief alleviated the pain (101) controlled(IDl)
some proxies was astounding, given the timing of the interviews relative to the patient's
death. Many recalled very detailed information about events. However, in several instances,
perception of events did appear to change over time. When this occurred the theme proxies'
beliefs emerged. In this case, changes in beliefs about the patient's ability to cope with events.
norms and expectations were often identified as a possible source for a change in proxies'
perspective of events. An illustrative example comes from a proxy talking about depression in
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the month before her husband died. The responses were similar at both times. with the proxy
describing her husband's sadness and change in mood. At time 1 she recalls this as a "moder-
atish and noticeable" depression. At time 2 on the other hand, she makes references to her
husband's resilience under the circumstances, "I know he was frightened but 1 don't think he
was depressed. ..He was extremely brave" she adds, "I was surprised how well he handled it"
(ID 2; 24b). In this example, the VOICES rating changed from depression to no depression at
time 2. Overall, comparison of this theme with the VOICES ratings showed that the ratings
changed almost equally to become either higher or lower ratings of symptom intensity and
severity. Talking about his wife as "a coper", one proxy talked about the increasing need for
medication and how well she coped with the significant pain she experienced. At the follow
up interview, he again refers to his wife's ability to cope but states that she was not coping so
it must have been severe, as she had to resort to medication (ID 20). There were exceptions to
this (N=3), where the proxies' perspective and story were completely different from their ear-
lier responses. A good example of this was from a proxy talking about his father's pain. At
time 1, he mentions the distress of seeing his father's behaviour change because of the pain,
"towards the end he started swearing and he never swore" he adds "1 saw a major change in
Dad". In contrast, at time 2 the pain is observed through his father's facial expressions and
movements and no reference is made to his earlier behaviour (ID 24).
The second theme in the category perspective was proxies' feelings. Although proxies'
feelings were an integral part of many of the responses, this theme included those proxies who
acknowledged that it might have influenced their responses. A proxy talking at time 2 about
his earlier interview provides an illustrative example of this,
"I suppose her pain was more controlled than]first said to you. 1just saw it as
total pain. It sall out ofperspective then. "
(ID 1; lOb)
In this example, the proxy's rating of the patient's pain became less severe in the last week of
life. Another proxy talked about how detached she had felt from events "Before [time J} it
was like] was talking about someone else" (ID 29; 26b). She added that, over time, she had
thought about things more and had realised how much her husband had managed to cope with
over the last few weeks of his life. Despite greater emphasis on these aspects, in her discus-
sions of anxiety and depression in the last month of his life, her ratings of these symptoms to
the VOICES questions did not change. Several other proxies expressed their feelings such as
anger, guilt and anxiety but made no reference to the effect this had on their responses. These
instances were discussed in Chapter 6.
As a category,/ocus represents a change in central elements within the two time peri-
ods. This was evident as a symptom focus change from one symptom to another or a greater or
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decreased emphasis on the symptom of interest. By way of illustration, when asked about
pain at time 1, one proxy talked about the discomfort and pain experienced by her husband,
whereas at time 2, when answering the same question the focus was on his breathing (ID 3).
Similarly, others talked about problems such as water retention, constipation and itchiness,
which were perceived to be particularly difficult to control. Comparing these observations
with the VOICES ratings, revealed that in these instances, ratings of the symptoms tended to
be less severe or frequent (N=4). For example, at time 1, although the proxy had mentioned
that itchiness was a problem, the emphasis was on the patient's pain. While at time 2 the
proxy states,
"1 would say that the itching was very distressing rather than the pain like, that
wasn t a problem. "
(ID 6; 7a)
Since the pain was not considered a problem, the proxy changed his VOICES ratings from
moderate pain most ofthe time at the first interview to no pain at the follow up interview.
Reference periods included a focus change across the time periods from the last week
or month or a period that overlaps or extends beyond these times. For example, talking about
her husband's pain in the last week at time 1, one proxy (ID 29; Ib) spoke at length about the
severity and frequency of the pain over the last few weeks of his life. At the follow up inter-
view (time 2) the proxy specifically talked about the last week of his life, when the pain was
more controlled and only one incident of pain was recalled. In this case, VOICES ratings of
pain in the last week of life changed greatly from severe pain most ofthe time (time 1) to mod-
erate pain rarely (time 2). This theme coincided with major changes in responses and
VOICES ratings across time, which is understandable given that proxies are talking about dif-
ferent time periods. There was no consistency in the direction of changes with some more
severe and frequent and other less so. However, it was noteworthy that on whichever occasion
the rating was kept within the reference period the rating was lower.
Another theme within this category related to reference periods was reminiscence. Here
proxies' responses changed from an emphasis on symptoms in the period assessed to periods
in the illness trajectory where the symptom was less of a problem to the patient. For instance,
at time 1, one proxy (ID 6; 19b; 24b) spoke of his wife's depression in the week and month
she died and her sadness at leaving the family. At time 2, when talking about depression, he
mentions several anecdotes from when she was diagnosed up until her death where his wife
managed to cope well with the illness and maintained her sense of humour. In this case,
VOICES ratings changed from moderate depression most ofthe time in the last week and sig-
nificant depression sometimes in the last month, at time 1 to no depression at the follow up
interview. Periods often mentioned in this theme were prominent events such as holidays.
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anniversaries and family gatherings. This theme was not consistently associated with changes
in VOICES ratings. In fact in many instances where this was observed, the ratings remained
the same.
Bear in mind as a category incorporated three themes representing changes in proxies'
responses as a result of considering factors in one interview that were not considered in the
other. Patient s condition, as a theme, were changes as a result of the patient's condition
being considered. This incorporated the patient's level of consciousness or other conditions
such as confusion, or an overlap in symptoms. In all instances where this theme was identi-
fied, the change across the time periods moved towards less certainty in the proxy's response
(N=14), with only one exception where the opposite was observed. Thus, at time 2, responses
tended to change from yes to don't know or no responses (N=9), while in two instances
VOICES ratings stayed the same. A second theme within this category was patient contact.
This occurred in two cases where responses at time 2 took into account that contact was lim-
ited to visiting the patients in a hospice or hospital. Talking about his father's pain at time 2
one proxy stated,
"I went up there [hospital] everyday, he was in pain. You could tell from the way
he was moving that it was hurting you know. Again it s hard to tell really
because outside ofthe times] was visiting] couldn't really say. "
(IDI0;2b)
In this case the proxy rated the VOICES pain as sometimes, whereas at time 1, the amount of
patient contact was not considered and the rating was most ofthe time. In both cases, symp-
tom frequency ratings became less often during the time the patient was in the hospice. Pain
severity ratings also became less severe in one of these cases. However, there was one excep-
tion with anxiety rated more severely, and this was because the patient was told they were
going to die during their stay in the hospice (ID 15). Another theme that emerged, and that
tended to lower ratings, was pain relief. At time 1, five proxies' ratings did not take into
account the effects of pain relief when asked about pain. This was verified with them during
the interviews. This is significant because a number of proxies (at time 1) talked about the
patient being in intense pain despite admitting that the pain relief was effective.
VOICES ratings
Comparing proxies' responses with their VOICES ratings was useful for identifying instances
where proxies recalled similar stories and perceived the events in a similar way while chang-
ing their VOICES ratings. In every such case, the ratings did not fit into the categories identi-
fied. In almost all instances, the change was by one rating. The most commonly occurring was
a change between severe and significant (N=6). Another was between most of the time and
often. A possible explanation for this was the similarity in the descriptors. This was borne out
143
in several of the responses where symptoms were often referred to as severe on both occa-
sions but the rating changed between significant and severe. In two responses, the proxies
explicitly stated that the symptom was present almost all the time at both interviews, but rated
VOICES as most ofthe time on one occasion and often at another. In far fewer cases, was the
rating changed from rarely to none (N= 1). The findings add support to the grouping of the
VOICES descriptors as described in the quantitative analysis above and the findings in Chap-
ter 4.
Reliability and validity
The analysis conducted in this chapter focused on changes in proxies' responses over time.
Although references are made to the frequency of themes and categories, the emphasis was on
describing and interpreting changes. Both field notes and transcripts of the interviews were
vital in capturing a valid interpretation of what the proxies were saying. As the sole inter-
viewer, having contact and knowledge of proxies' VOICES ratings may have inadvertently
created bias in analysing the data. To reduce this during the analysis, the transcripts were kept
separate from the VOICES ratings. As mentioned earlier, knowledge of the ratings became
evident in some instances as the proxy in their responses mentioned them. Unfortunately, this
could not always be avoided. In order to reduce possible biases and to ensure that the interpre-
tations were valid, comprehensive and reliably applied across all of the transcripts, the cate-
gories and themes were discussed with another researcher. Any differences were debated until
agreement was reached. In some cases, it was also possible to verify some themes with the
proxy at the time of the interview (respondent validation). In particular, pain relief, contact,
patient condition and proxies' feelings. To avoid undermining their responses, no other
themes were verified with the proxy. Consistency of themes was also established by going
back over some of the transcripts several months after the analysis to examine whether the
interpretations and themes identified were the same. The analysis was comprehensive as it
was based on all the transcripts and not just on excerpts.
As a result of the analysis of the data at time 1 and time 2, it is apparent that there are
instances where the changes in VOICES ratings do not coincide with any of the identifiable
themes and categories or were not consistently associated with changes. These anomalies may
be attributed to the reliability of the VOICES instrument or other factors that could not identi-
fied through the methods employed. It should be noted that proxies might not always be
aware of the factors that are likely to influence their responses. For example, the theme prox-
ies' feelings included responses that showed an awareness of that feelings were having an
effect on their own responses. These feelings may influence judgments without conscious
awareness. The present interpretation relied on identifying and attaching meanings to consist-
144
encies and inconsistencies in proxies' accounts. In a minority of instances, the responses and
VOICES ratings were completely different. There was no way of identifying why this
occurred.
7.5 Discussion
Through their responses, proxies revealed the complexity of cognitive processes underlying
their judgments at each interview, and across time through comparison of their interviews.
Analysis of the VOICES ratings was a means to specifically identify consistency and dispar-
ity in responses, whereas, qualitative analysis of the PSCI increased awareness of factors
likely to influence change. From the VOICES ratings, varying levels of agreement were
found depending on the symptom, the reference period and the aspect assessed (frequency,
saliency). Overall, anxiety ratings showed a considerable level of agreement in the week and
month. This was evident during the interviews, where in many instances; patients' anxieties
were associated with particular events, such the last rites, symptom control, patient diagnosis
and hospice admission. These events were especially vivid and recalled with incredible detail
and consistency over time, supporting the memory literature regarding saliency and memora-
bility (Bower et al., 1979; Christianson, 1992). When differences emerged, ratings tended to
be lower at time 2. One explanation is that proxies are more likely to state that they were
uncertain (don't know responses) due to the patient's condition or their contact with the
patient. This was identified in the bear in mind category. This was also exhibited in both pain
and depression. Other inconsistencies in all symptom ratings coincided with the category
focus, with differences in the reference periods assessed. This highlights the need to continu-
ally reiterate to the proxy the period being assessed to confine their responses accordingly.
Overall, pain and depression ratings were not as consistent as anxiety. Pain ratings in
the week were disparate, which resulted in poor to fair agreement. Accounting for slight dif-
ferences in ratings by grouping variables did indicate better agreement for pain in the last
month of the patient's life. Apart from the patient's condition, another explanation for the
uncertainty and changes in responses in the last week might have been the proxy's level of
involvement in the patient's care. Since many of the patients were cared for in the hospice
during the last week, where previously they had been at home with the proxies involved in
their pain management. In contrast to pain ratings, depression ratings were more consistent in
the week than the month. The numbers reporting no or don t know in the week remained con-
sistent. Most differences occurred because of uncertainty at time 2, when proxies had previ-
ously stated that the patient had depression. Discrepancies in pain and depression ratings
tended to coincide with a variety of themes observed in proxies' responses.
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Proxies' beliefs, under the category construction ofevents, corresponded with both
increases and decreases in VOICES ratings for pain and depression, although ratings did not
always alter. Changes in the way similar events were viewed was a major category. Here, dif-
ferences in proxies' beliefs regarding patients' ability to cope, norms and expectations were
apparent from their responses. Norms and expectations were more likely to be expressed for
depression, where sadness was to be expected rather than depression. For pain, the patient's
ability to cope was mentioned more often. Combined with the theme reminiscence, these
results may indicate an attempt by the proxy to deal with the loss by reappraising the situa-
tion, or by thinking back to less distressing times (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; Taylor, 1991).
Individual differences in adapting during bereavement may explain why some VOICES rat-
ings diverge over time. Alternatively, it is also possible that proxies may have more opportu-
nity to talk to other bereaved individuals and may undergo events during the intervening
period between interviews. These, in tum may have a significant influence on their perception
of events. Anecdotal evidence from proxies interviewed suggests that several had been in
contact, through hospice support groups and social support networks with other individuals
who had recently experienced bereavement.
A change in the focus ofevents, highlighted in the category focus, was more notable for
pain, with an emphasis on change to other symptoms perceived by the proxy as more trou-
bling to the patient. The poignancy of these symptoms may have remained more vivid over
time. Further to this, the interview itself may have prompted proxies to express these prob-
lems within other questions, as the focus was very precise not providing evaluation of symp-
toms other than pain, anxiety and depression.
The present investigations highlight the importance of timing in gathering information
from proxies retrospectively. Some measures within the survey can be put in place to reduce
some changes over time. For example, the category bear in mind, included themes that could
be integrated into the design of surveys, such as accounting for pain relief, amount of contact
and reference periods. Changes in proxies' internal states during bereavement are more prob-
lematic for the retrospective approach. What is important is the accuracy of these reports in
relation to the patient's experiences. In these investigations, it was not possible to assess
which account (time 1 versus time 2) was more valid or whether either actually reflected
events. This requires further inquiry. Ideally, it would be necessary to compare patients'
accounts with those of their proxies at different periods throughout bereavement. This would
be useful for determining the most suitable time for interviewing. Overall, these investiga-
tions do indicate that, in many cases, ratings become less severe and less frequent with the
passage of time. In addition, proxies became less certain about whether the patient had experi-
enced the symptom at the follow up interview. This shares similarities with Cartwright and
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Seale's (1973) study where proxies were less certain at 9 months compared to 3 months.
However, this was in relation to place of death.
Significant differences in some proxies' responses with the passage of time do raise
important methodological questions with the retrospective approach for patients at the end of
life. As this exploratory investigation has shown, there is consistency for some symptoms
(e.g. anxiety) over certain reference periods. Given the importance of this method in the audit
of patient care and the lack of research into the validity of proxies, researchers cannot afford
to dispense with it at present. Instead, future research should focus on determining the most
appropriate reference period, symptoms and timing. The findings from this study are a useful




Care at the end of life is important for meeting the physical, social, psychological and spirit-
ual needs of patients and their families. However, evidence suggests that there are significant
shortcomings in the provision and planning of these services (Addington-Hall & McCarthy,
1995a). Audit and evaluation are vital to ensure that patients and families receive appropriate
care. Given the methodological problems associated with evaluating the care of the dying,
investigators have turned to alternative sources for information on patients' experiences, such
as bereaved relatives. The systematic review in Chapter 2 revealed that a limited number of
studies have addressed the validity of retrospective proxy reports in palliative care. In those
studies that have, small sample sizes and conflicting time periods limit the conclusions that
can be drawn from them. By examining the literature from both prospective and retrospective
proxy validity studies various factors that influence agreement between patients' and proxies'
accounts were revealed. Agreement on subjective aspects of patients' functioning was found
to be poor. A pattern that is highlighted repeatedly in proxies from other areas of health
(Chapter 1).
The motivation for this investigation hinges on the fact that there is poor agreement for
these aspects of patients' functioning. Since pain, anxiety and depression are by nature sub-
jective and of critical importance in palliative care, they were the focus of the present investi-
gation. Despite finding several factors that contribute to the level of incongruency observed,
none of the studies reviewed in the aforementioned chapters had specifically investigated
what proxies were actually basing their judgments on. Since there was little evidence on the
validity of proxies after the patient's death, this Ph.D. endeavoured to identify the current
shortcomings and understand the possible reasons for them as a means to improve measures.
Four research questions embodied the aim and form the basis of the present work.
8.1 Research aims and findings
8.1.1 Research question one
Research question one set out to investigate the descriptors used in VOICES for describing
the frequency and severity of patient pain, anxiety and depression. The purpose was to exam-
ine how proxies' interpreted the terms, identify any ambiguities with them, and assess their
validity. By analysing the proxies' responses to the severity descriptors, a number of behav-
iours, feelings and thoughts were identified. In some instances, such as for high levels of pain,
the participants had a consistent view of the term. Many of them described it as sharp, pro-
longed, distressing and uncontrollable. At lower levels, pain was regarded as more of an ache
that was manageable and periodic in nature. Not surprisingly, the category feelings/cognitions
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was predominant for anxiety and depression. Proxies' descriptions showed a good awareness
of anxiety and depression symptomology, even though none of the participants interviewed
had any formal medical training. There was also evidence that some proxies could distinguish
between anxiety and depression. A reduction in functioning, interest in activities and mood
negativity characterised depression. In contrast, functioning was hardly ever mentioned for
anxiety, instead awareness of concerns prevailed. Like proxies, pain severity descriptions,
persistence of anxiety and depression was associated with higher levels, whilst sporadic epi-
sodes were commonly described at lower levels.
This investigation identified several problems with the VOICES descriptors. For the
severity verbal rating scale, the term significant was poorly understood by participants. This
was evident in their diverse interpretations and their tendency to use other descriptors on the
same scale to explain its meaning. To avoid ambiguity associated with this term, it should not
be used'. Another term that caused problems was rarely in relation to frequency of anxiety
and depression. When used in conjunction with a short assessment period, the term is almost
synonymous with never and is therefore superfluous. Over twelve months, this may not be a
problem. A possible solution is to adopt proxies understanding of the term "rarely" by replac-
ing it with "occasionally" or "occasional episodes". The lack of differentiation between most
of the time and often also needs attention, as the term often is redundant. One suggestion
would be to change most ofthe time to all ofthe time and retain often. This would effect a sep-
aration between the two points on the scale. It should also be noted that several proxies stated
that their relatives were in pain all of the time, thus lending support for its inclusion. The
descriptor sometimes is another term whose meaning was vague. In spite of the uncertainty in
its precise meaning, it was generally perceived to be the middle point of the frequency scale.
The recommended changes may reduce some of the diversity in the interpretation of
the descriptors. The authors ofVOICES need to decide on the level of sensitivity they require,
as some variations in interpretation of the descriptor may not be problematic. For instance, is
it necessary for the scale to distinguish between daily episodes of pain and several episodes of
pain in per week?
8.1.2 Research question two
Based on the findings arising from research question one, research question two sought to
understand what proxies were recalling when they actually used VOICES to answer questions
about their relatives. This is important if measures to increase the accuracy of proxies'
accounts are to be implemented successfully, incongruency and biases need to be better
3. More recent versions of VOICES no longer use this term.
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understood. The areas explored were responses difficulties, strategies upon which decisions
are made, cues used to form the basis for judgments and reference periods.
The findings indicated that proxies experienced response difficulties specifically when
asked to assess patients with terminal illnesses. Difficulties were evident when the patient's
level of consciousness decreased, which was more likely in the week before death when the
their health deteriorated and/or because of symptom control measures. This made it difficult
for the proxy to assess the patient's symptoms as there were few cues, either verbal or non-
verbal from which to draw upon. A lack of communication between the patient and proxy also
presented some difficulties, particularly in assessing anxiety and depression. Discussing psy-
chological distress may be very difficult for the patient and proxy, given that death is immi-
nent. The findings suggest that proxies are aware that patients often do not want to discuss
their emotions, and consequently they compensate for this in their judgments. Anxiety and
depression are very difficult to differentiate, because the symptoms are very similar. How-
ever, this did not appear to be a problem for most participants, although a small number did
talk about anxiety and depression being the same thing.
Despite the fact that there appears to be a preponderance of possible response difficul-
ties, it is important to highlight that the vast majority of proxies did not encounter any. For
those who did, measures need to be included in the design that ensure that those proxies will-
ing to give a response, despite their uncertainties, be excluded. Under these circumstances,
proxies' responses are likely to be inaccurate and may affect the outcomes of the study. Prox-
ies should be given the option, within the survey, to state that they are unable to judge the
patient's symptoms. For example, "Ifyou are uncertain about whether your relative had pain
or not in the week before they died because oftheir condition, please indicate". Although, the
amount of data would be reduced, its validity would be improved. Such a trade-off is vital if
researchers are to gather credible data.
The capacity of this study to identify the heuristics or rule-of-thumb methods used by
proxies was limited because of ethical concerns for the participants. The estimation strategies
employed by proxies to respond to frequency questions may influence levels of agreement if
patients and proxies use different strategies. One possible solution is to phrase the question in
such a way that the strategy is evident. For example, if proxies are asked to assess a symptom
by averaging episodes over a specified reference period. This would introduce some consist-
ency into the responses and might improve congruency between the patient and proxy. Prox-
ies' judgments about symptom severity were also found to vary. Some proxies chose the most
severe level or the most frequent level, while others where not able to verbalise their strategy
at all. It is recommended that the question contain all of the information that is required,
including any constraints. For example, "on average over the last month. how severe was his/
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her pain" or "over the last week, what was the most severe level ofpain he/she experi-
d? "ence ..
Various cues were used by proxies to judge the presence, frequency and severity of the
patients' symptoms. Decisions about pain were based on three main indicators, namely, non-
verbal and verbal communication, and medication usage, and two minor ones, functioning
and control. In Chapter 4, the latter indicator was much more important, and was used by the
majority of proxies. This is likely because control is a more perceptual experience that is hard
to discern without other clues. Like control, anxiety and depression are, in essence, subjective
experiences. However, the findings imply that regardless of this, proxies are able to identify
what they thought were anxiety and depression through various more overt indicators. Anxi-
ety was inferred from patients' verbalisation of concerns, behaviour and functioning in the
month. Cues for depression included verbal and non-verbal communication, as well as disrup-
tion to functioning. By having knowledge of the patient's usual demeanour (trait knowledge),
proxies were able to compare it with their present mood state and/or changes that occurred
over the disease trajectory. Since health professionals do not have access to such detailed
knowledge about a patient, they may have to rely on other indicators. This may account for
the differences between health professionals' and significant others' ratings when compared
to the patients' self-reports. For significant others, this knowledge may be invaluable for mak-
ing accurate judgments about the patient's psychological status. Clearly, more research is
needed to compare the indicators used by proxies with the patient's actual symptoms so that
the reliability of the cues can be assessed. There is evidence from research using third parties
to assess mood states in patients with Alzheimer's disease, that various indicators can be used
to detect anxiety, depression and anger. For example, the Apparent Affect Rating Scale relies
on observations of the patient's facial expression, voice quality, body movements and verbal-
isations (Lawton 1996). Overall, the findings provide evidence that, in judging patients symp-
toms, proxies integrate several pieces of information in sophisticated ways.
From the analysis most proxies kept within the reference periods for pain in the week
and month and for anxiety in the week. Even where reference periods were extended (anxiety
in the month and depression in the week and month) the numbers were relatively small. How-
ever, in a large survey this might constitute a considerable number. As discussed in section
5.5.8, where forward telescoping occurred it was usually the result of the proxy discussing a
salient event, such as the patient's diagnosis, treatment or a deterioration in the patients condi-
tion, which coincided with the patient becoming anxious or depressed. Apart from an empha-
sis on the reference period within the survey, other measures to help control for this were
presented in Section 5.6. For example, using the proxies personal frame of reference to aid
accurate recall.
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8.1.3 Research question three
The retrospective approach has been criticised primarily because information is gathered
when the proxy is going through the grieving process. This is thought to account for many of
the differences observed in ratings taken before and after the patients death (Higginson et al..
1994; Hinton, 1996). In Section 6.1, it was noted that few studies have actually examined the
effect of proxies' psychological distress in relation to congruency between patients and prox-
ies' reports. The aim of Chapter 6 was to explore whether proxies' own feelings formed part
of the basis for their judgments, and in so doing, influenced their ratings of patients' pain,
anxiety and depression using VOICES.
The recognition that proxies' own feelings were included in their responses was not
unexpected given the types of relationships and the amount of contact they had with the
patient. Many experienced and shared anxieties about symptom relief and patient care and
death. Although it is not possible to ascertain the influence of proxies' feelings on the accu-
racy of their responses in the present investigations, it is clear that their feelings formed part
of their thinking when judging patients' symptoms. This was supported by the identification
of affect-based judgments in their responses, where their own concerns and feelings were
used as a basis to judge patients' symptoms. An example was knowledge based on similarities
between patients and proxies, or an intuitive sense of the patient's experiences in long-stand-
ing relationships. In some cases, similarities may have provided an accurate representation of
patients' experiences, but this cannot be confirmed. Since the situation is also novel to both,
the patient may not respond as expected and this may lead the proxy to erroneous judgments.
In light of the finding that there is a propensity for those with greater caregiver strain
and anxiety to express their feelings and use affect-based judgments, and for the significant
differences found for some of the VOICES ratings (Section 6.4.2), it is necessary to take these
factors into account when using information derived from proxies. Although feelings and
affect-based judgments tended to occur in proxies with greater caregiver strain and anxiety,
the results were non-significant. More research is required to explain the underlying proc-
esses. Further investigation is also required in order to ascertain the affects of anxiety on
proxies' ratings, so that methods to account for them can be implemented. If there is no sys-
tematic bias, one suggestion put forward by Magaziner (1992) is to increase sample sizes such
that the standard error ofjudgments is minimised. Where there is bias, as in the case of car-
egiver strain, the direction and magnitude should be determined so that measures, such as
weighting, can be used when interpreting the results (Magaziner, 1992). Some prospective
studies have started assessing the degree of bias (Sneeuw et al., 1997a; 1997b; 1998; 1999;
2001; Lobchuk & Degner, 2002a). So far findings from these studies suggest that the magni-
tude of bias is small to moderate.
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8.1.4 Research question four
Another gap in the knowledge is the reliability of proxies , responses over time, which have
obvious implications for the audit of care and the validity of the retrospective approach. For
instance, if proxies' responses change significantly, how do they change and when is the best
time to interview? Previous research comparing proxies' responses before and after the
patient's death has shown that they are liable to change. With the exception of the present
work, no studies included a follow-up on the same group of proxies during bereavement.
Thus, there is no prior work with which to compare the present findings. Research question
four was formulated in response to this omission in the proxy validity literature. It set out to
examine whether and how proxies' perceptions change over time.
By comparing VOICES ratings at two different time periods, a number of inconsisten-
cies were revealed. Possible reasons for these differences were extracted from a qualitative
analysis of the responses to the same questions at time I and time 2. As discussed in Section
7.4.6, there are some similarities and differences. For the week reference period, pain ratings
were found to have poor to fair agreement, even accounting for the slight changes in ratings
by grouping them. Agreement was better in the month as it ranged from fair to substantial.
There are several explanations for these findings. Firstly, the patients condition in the week
created greater uncertainty at time 2, with more don t know and no responses than at time 1.
This supports the need for the survey to include an option stating that they are unable to judge
the patient's symptoms, as proposed in Section 8.1.2. Secondly, pain relief was not always
accounted for when rating patients pain. This finding was observed in several instances at
time I. More recent versions of VOICES, instead of assessing the severity of pain, ask how
effective the pain relief is from completely some of the time to not at all. This overcomes the
problem of not taking into account pain relief and supports VOICES approach to assessing
pain. The change in symptom focus (e.g. pain to oedema) observed in a few instances could
be attributed to the focused nature of the research because only pain, anxiety and depression
were assessed. However, proxies should be encouraged to include symptoms that they think
are important, so they are not expressed within other rating scales. For example, itchiness was
a distressing symptom for one participant and his wife, yet there is no way of expressing it in
VOICES. Additional spaces should be included in the questionnaire so that this type of addi-
tional information can be assessed. The measures recommended may reduce the degree of
incongruence and proxies' inclination to overstate patients' pain retrospectively (Higginson et
al., 1994; Hinton, 1996).
In contrast to pain, the consistency of anxiety ratings was extremely good (moderate to
substantial) and could be explained in part by the saliency of events in memory associated
with anxiety provoking events. As mentioned in Section 7.4.6, the level of detail recalled by
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some proxies was both remarkable and consistent in both the time periods examined. Events,
such as admission to hospital or hospice, symptom control and patient diagnosis were viewed
as the catalyst for much of the patient's and proxy's anxiety. This may explain the finding that
proxies retrospective assessments of patients' anxiety are more in agreement with the patients
own rating (Hinton, 1996).
It is difficult to draw equally definitive conclusion on the matter of depression.
Although the results suggest that there are substantial changes in proxies' ratings over time,
there were too few cases where depression was in evidence. Consequently, the findings need
to be viewed with caution. For those cases that were identified, there were low levels of
agreement in the month, with more uncertainty expressed and greater numbers reporting no
depression at time 2. Agreement was better during the week, with fair to moderate levels
observed. As it did with pain, the patient's condition appeared to contribute to the uncertainty.
particularly when the patient became confused or there was a decrease in their level of con-
sciousness. The proxy's construction of events coincided with some changes in their ratings
of both depression and pain. Changes in the way similar events were viewed is probably a
function of the way in which the proxy is coping with events. In general, ratings became less
frequent and severe, although some ratings did not alter. In a few instances, ratings even
became more frequent and severe. The present work concurs with studies that have examined
the validity of proxies retrospectively, where depression is underestimated and pain becomes
polarised (Higginson et al., 1994; Hinton, 1996). Future research should focus on the assess-
ment of proxies' capacity to cope, in relation to their interpretations of events and VOICES
ratings, in an effort to elucidate possible relationships. Moreover, the relationship between
proxies' psychological status should be studied in connection with changes over time to find
out whether their emotions playa role in the fluctuations. There was some hint of this with
two proxies where they admitted that their feelings had altered the way in which they per-
ceived events.
Another finding that was identified in the analysis of research questions two and four
concerns reference periods. Although some proxies did talk about events outside the reference
periods (week, month), there was no way of determining whether or not they influenced their
responses. That is are they including information from outside the reference period in their
estimates. Examining proxies' responses over time, it was possible to detect the likely affects
of forward telescoping on their VOICES ratings. Whenever the ratings were within the refer-
ence period, the ratings were lower, thereby supporting previous research (Sudman & Brad-
burn, 1973; Bradburn et al., 1979).
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8.1.5 Contributions to the field of research
The research presented in this Ph.D. is both novel in its aims and unique in its approach to the
study of proxies for patients at the end of life. The validity of proxies has been evaluated in
various areas of health care including palliative care, epidemiology, decision making, and
quality of life. Other investigators have published reviews in specific areas, for example for
patients with chronic diseases (Sprangers & Aaronson, 1992; Lobchuk & Degner. 2002) and
epidemiology research (Nelson et al., 1990). However, a review of the literature of proxies for
patients with terminal illness had not been undertaken before. Since significant others are
often the source of information for patients, a systematic review of the current evidence was
performed. Clear comparisons were drawn across the literature with regard to the type of
information (e.g. objective and subjective), characteristics associated with the proxy (e.g. car-
egiver burden) and patient (e.g. impairment), the assessment itself (e.g. detail required), and
their affects on the accuracy of proxies' responses. The review adds to the field, by broadly
analysing the use and accuracy of proxies in general. It went further than others by locating
the work within the wider context of social and cognitive psychology, survey methodology
and palliative care literature. As a consequence, it provides a greater understanding of the
possible reasons for incongruence in proxy reporting. For investigators in the area of pallia-
tive care research and audit, the review is informative because it highlights areas where proxy
reports are likely to be more accurate than others, for instance when reporting on more con-
crete, observable aspects of the patients experiences. It also provides factors to consider when
using proxy derived data, such as caregiver burden and the amount of contact between the
patient and proxy.
Using the review as basis, this Ph.D. explored areas where discrepancies were known
to exist and to bridge some of the gaps in the knowledge. For instance, it is known that car-
egiver strain is associated with levels of agreement, but little is known about how emotions
influence judgments within this context. Accordingly, the reliability of responses during the
bereavement period is not well understood. The information proxies use to form a judgment
about patients' symptoms are particularly important for assessing the validity of proxies'
responses. Research question two identified a variety of cues and knowledge upon which
proxies draw. Apart from showing that proxies attempt to extract information on the actual
experiences, these findings provide researchers with a means to design measures so that they
can better assess symptoms. This could include a number of the overt manifestations such as
medication usage and their facial expressions in relation to pain. This Ph.D. represents the
first investigation of these issues.
The present research is grounded in well-established bodies of literature and the find-
ings have theoretical as well as practical significance. Theories that have been utilised within
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the context of health care and palliative care to expound coping, have been equally applicable
in the context of the present work. For example, Folkman and Lazarus' (1984) theory of stress
explains changes in proxies' responses over time in terms of a reappraisal of events. In addi-
tion to this, theories from other disciplines have been applied. In many cases, this has not been
done before. As an example, the cognitive psychology literature on emotions and memory
was used to raise awareness of issues likely to affect proxies' responses during bereavement.
Bower's (1981; 1987) mood congruency literature was drawn upon to explain possible biases
in proxies' responses as a result of their own feelings of anxiety and depression. One of the
criticisms of this theory is the automatic connections between feelings and cognition and the
passive role of cognitions (Swartz & Clore, 1989; Wyer et al., 1999). Instead, Swartz and
Clore (1988) propose that emotions can play an active part in the processing of information.
For example, in chapter 6, affect based judgments were identified in proxies' verbalisations.
Although the investigations were not a test of what Swartz and Clore (1988) call affect-based
judgments, or Bower's (1981; 1987) mood congruency theory, the findings do indicate that
proxies' own feelings may act as information.
Another difficulty for Bower's (1981; 1987) mood congruency theory is that not all
studies have found the effects described therein, which suggests that other processes may
intercede (Forgas, 1991; Mogg et al., 1987; Mayer et al., 1995). One possibility is that regula-
tory processes, where individuals try to improve their mood by thinking of more positive
information may mediate the influence of mood on memory (Isen et al., 1978). For bereaved
individuals, this could be a method of coping with their loss. For instance, several proxies
recalled happier occasions when asked about their relatives' symptoms. This was exemplified
in the theme reminiscence in Chapter 7. Another intervening process may be motivation.
Wegner and Petty (1997) found that when individuals are motivated to be accurate and aware
of the potential of their feelings to bias responses, they tend to counteract the effects, often
over correcting. The importance of gathering information from proxies was stressed to the
participants in this study. It is possible to surmise that some proxies may have taken the influ-
ence of their own feelings into consideration, in order to be accurate in their judgments. Two
proxies actually acknowledged that their feelings had biased their judgments at time 1. This
was taken into account in their evaluations at time 2. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that
others may have done so too. Thus, the relationship appears to be far more complex than
envisaged in Bower's theory (1981; 1987).
Caution also needs to be exercised when comparing studies conducted in experimental
settings, with those in the context of bereavement. Firstly, under experimental conditions,
emotions are evoked by the presentation of material. These moods are transitory and do not
reflect the complex emotion of grief. Secondly, when interviewing a bereaved relative, the
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period of time between the experience and the recollection is much longer than under strict
experimental conditions. Finally, the information sought in palliative care surveys is con-
nected with other information and experiences, unlike recall in experimental conditions. Stud-
ies in naturalist settings, such as those from eyewitness testimony, also differ from the
emotions experienced during bereavement. Consequently, theories based on these types of
investigations may not always generalise to the palliative acre setting.
Research methods and theories on the cognitive aspects of surveys (Oksenberg & Can-
nell, 1977; Tourangeau, 1984; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Willis et al., 1991) provided a
foundation upon which to identify and elucidate the levels of comprehension. memory and
judgments used by individuals when answering questions. This is the first time that it has
been applied to palliative care surveys and it offers a way to gather a wealth of information
and understanding regarding proxies' responses. Using it, it was possible to identify response
difficulties with the instrument itself and to effectively evaluate patients' symptoms at the end
of life. The identification of strategies used in making judgments, as well as content based
information raised awareness of the basis for responses and mental operations that could con-
tribute to error. The method complements quantitative methods used in the validity studies, by
adding to and enriching some of the findings. Although the research focus was on VOICES,
the work and recommendations may contribute to the development of new and existing meas-
ures whenever proxies are used. The appropriateness of the methods to palliative care surveys
will be discussed in the methods and design section (8.3.2).
8.2 Future research
Throughout the thesis and Section 8.1, future research questions and avenues of investigation
have been presented. Additional work is also required to assess the psychometric properties of
the VOICES questionnaire. The reliability of the questionnaire could not be assessed in this
study, as the numbers were small. Any changes as a result of the recommendations also need
to be evaluated to see whether or not they improve the accuracy of responses and the degree
of congruency between the patient and proxy. The research presented in this Ph.D. is based
primarily on the interpretations of participants who are of caucasian western European ethnic-
ity. A similar approach with individuals from other cultural and ethnic backgrounds could be
useful in developing appropriate terminology for culturally specific VOICES questionnaires.
For example, the hospice in south east London that was used for the present investigations
serves a population covering a wide ethnic diversity.
The Caregiver Strain Inventory (Robinson, 1983) was the instrument chosen to assess
proxies' perceptions of the burden of caring for their dying relative. The instrument primari ly
focuses on tangible domains such as employment, finances, physical, social and time. Critics
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have argued that tools such as the CSI take a narrow view of the dynamic and multidime-i.
sional nature of caregiving (Nolan et al., 1994; Grant et af., 1998). As Grant et al., (1998)
points out, "many of the central tasks which create real challenges for caregivers are those
tied to preserving the dignity and self-esteem of dependant relatives" (p.60). Attempts to con-
ceal the caregiver's role are a common stress for caregivers (Nolan et af., 1994). Indeed dur-
ing this study several anecdotes support this observation. Yet this was not captured using the
CSI. Future research may benefit from using methods better suited to assessing the multidi-
mensional nature of caregiving. This could include both the negative and positive aspects of
providing care. These methods would allow researchers to address other questions, such as,
does the strengthening of family ties improve communication leading to better agreement, or
whether particular facets of caring influence proxies' perceptions of patients' symptoms.
Anxiety and depression were the emotions chosen in the present investigations because
it is known that memory and judgments can be biased by these emotions and that they are
common in bereavement. The Beck Depression Inventory was employed, as this has been
used in other bereavement studies (Stroebe et al., 1985). However, the levels of depression
detected were small. Whether this was because the levels were truly low or because of the
measure itself is not known. Grief specific measures, such as the Revised Grief Inventory
(Sanders et al., 1985; 1991) or Revised Texas Inventory of Grief (Faschingbauer, 1981),
might have been better able to detect depression in bereavement. The study also used the State
Anxiety Inventory, which is not usually used to detect anxiety in bereaved relatives even
though levels above the norm for adult populations were identified. Thus, future research
might be improved by enlisting grief specific measures as other emotions, apart from depres-
sion and anxiety, could be identified and compared with proxies' reports. Support for this
research comes from the various emotions expressed in proxies' responses (e.g. anger, guilt).
Given the paucity of literature on the validity of proxies' accounts retrospectively one
suggestion would be to assess proxies' responses, using VOICES over time in a larger sam-
ple. This could be integrated into the design of an existing survey and would enable research-
ers to identify other factors that might influence proxies' reports, such as patient and proxy
characteristics. Furthermore, the reliability of the VOICES questionnaire could be ascer-
tained.
In the present investigations there was no assessment from the patients to compare with
proxies' accounts. This type of prospective/retrospective design is difficult to conduct due to
recruitment and attrition problems. One solution would be to compare proxies' retrospective
accounts with those of the nursing care records where patients have assessed their own symp-
toms before death. This would negate the need to interview patients and proxies before death.
Proxies' reports could then be compared to these records over time to establish the best time
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to interview retrospectively. Moreover, including coping measures into the design would pro-
vide valuable insights into proxies' perceptions of events and coping during bereavement.
8.3 Limitations
8.3.1 Sample size
The representativeness of the sample needs consideration when interpreting the findings pre-
sented in this thesis. All the patients were known to the hospice services and in the majority of
cases the proxy was the main caregiver. This means that the amount of contact and interaction
they had with the patient was high and most were actively involved in symptom management.
In practise, retrospective surveys include data from a variety of sources, and not just proxies
selected through the hospice services. In some instances, proxies may not have access to all of
the information requested. For example, in this study many don t know responses and incon-
sistencies in pain ratings occurred when the patient was under the care of the hospice during
the last week of life.
The sample might not be representative of deaths in general in regard to patients'
symptoms. The numbers with pain were higher (83% in the week and 86% in the last month
of life) than levels reported in other studies (Brescia et al., 1992; Vainio & Auvinen, 1996).
Accordingly, proxies' reports of patients' anxiety and depression were more prevalent than
has been reported elsewhere (McDonnell, 1989; Hardman et al., 1989; Coyle et al., 1990;
Addington-Hall et al., 1992). The numbers of patients admitted to a hospice in the last stages
of their illness indicate that their carers were experiencing problems managing at home. The
guilt associated with this might have biased their views of patients' symptoms. Several prox-
ies had received follow-up care and some had attended a support group. This might have alle-
viated some of their distress since palliative care has been shown to reduce psychological
distress (McCorkle, 1998, cited in Lev & McCorkle, 1998). This could account for the lower
levels of depression found in the bereaved relatives interviewed. Alternatively, proxies who
are more depressed might have chosen not to participate in the study, especially given the top-
ics discussed. Therefore, the sample may differ from those who are not receiving such care or
on characteristics that were not compared (e.g. depression, anger).
The response rate was comparatively low (35%) in these investigations, probably due
to the sensitivity of the topics discussed and the opt-in approach chosen for recruitment. A
number (200/0) of potential participants could not be contacted because they lived outside the
area. While a further 6% had no relative or contact address. These exclusions highlight a
problem inherent in using proxies. For example, in the follow-up study four proxies had
moved away and could not be contacted at time 2. This adds weight to Cartwright et al. 's
(1973) findings, where a greater proportion of proxies could not be contacted at nine months.
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Despite these problems no differences were found between those who took part and those
who did not. Therefore, the sample is representative of deaths known to hospice services.
8.3.2 Methods and design
Since there is no assessment from either the patient or the proxy during the terminal stage of
the disease, it is not possible to infer what their responses would have been prior to the death,
or how these might have changed retrospectively. This limits the ability of the research to
assess the validity of the retrospective approach. It is also not possible to say whether the
proxy's account is a valid representation of the patient's experiences. Moreover, the investiga-
tion will not reveal whether or not an account given at one interview is more or less valid than
an account given at another. Given the constraints of the timeline and the resources afforded
by a Ph.D, it is not possible to execute a broader investigation Moreover, difficulties associ-
ated with recruitment and attrition, which is frequently encountered in palliative care research
(McWhinney et al., 1994), could hamper attempts to assess patients and follow up proxies at
varying intervals in bereavement.
The methods and framework of the analysis in the present work are located within an
information processing paradigm, where the emphasis is on the mental processing that under-
lies individuals' responses. The validity of the approach has been ascertained in various areas
that have examined attitudes and behaviour (Bolton, 1991; 1993; DeMaio et al., 1993; Bickart
& Fe1cher, 1994). However, neither the verbal protocol analysis nor the deductive analysis
framework has been used in the context of palliative care before. Using a framework based on
models of question answering (e.g. Oksenberg & Cannell, 1977; Tourangeau, 1984; Tou-
rangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Willis et al., 1991) it was possible to find evidence to support the
stages proposed. However, the stages posited in models such as Willis et al. (1991) represent
the optimal response sequences. In reality, numerous factors can influence how individuals
actually respond. One such factor is motivation, which is likely to influence the amount of
effort the individual puts into thinking about the question ((Di Jkstra & van der Zouwen.
1987). In this study, the relevance of the information, in terms of personal significance, is
likely to motivate proxies to think more carefully about their answers. However, the cognitive
effort expended throughout the interview, such as the difficulty experienced in answering
some of the questions and the emotive nature of the inquiry, may have lead to satisficing. As
noted in the review in Chapter 2, this is where an answer that appears satisfactory is chosen
and partial or no integration and retrieval of information is performed (Krosnick, 1991).
In Chapter 3 the assumptions regarding verbal protocol analysis are detailed, namely
that individuals have conscious access to relevant cognitive processes (Ericsson and Simon,
1980, 1984). On the whole, proxies were able to provide valuable insights into their thinking.
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When answering questions about symptom severity, however, there were several instances
where proxies were unable to verbalise their thinking, even though they provided a response.
One possible reason for this was that the proxies did not have access to some of the cognitive
processes that underlay their responses. This could include processing that occurs at the pre-
cognitive stage or that is based on imagery rather than language (Glass & Arnkoff, 1982).
Another possible reason is that proxies avoided thinking too much about the questions in
order to avoid distress, which in tum was reflected in their verbalisations. During the inter-
views, few actually stated that they did not want to think about the question. In two particular
cases though, proxies referred back to past answers when responding to present questions. In
both instances when they were asked to verbalise their thinking in relation to questions about
the patient's depression, they stated that it was the same as their anxiety response. Whether
this was to avoid thinking about the questions or because they could not differentiate between
anxiety and depression is not known. Other ways of avoiding thinking thoroughly about the
question might have been rapid responses. Clearly, more work is required in order to better
determine the validity of the approach in the field of palliative care research.
Given that the emphasis is very much on the individual, the methods chosen fail to
account for context effects, such as the interaction between the individual and the interviewer.
Yet this can impact on the responses given. As Sudman et al. (1996) points out the interview
itself should be seen as a social interaction, where assumptions are made about the communi-
cations. In normal conversation, utterances are interpreted within a context. Similarly, when
an interviewer asks questions during an interview, the individual interprets the questions in
the light of features such as the interviewer's behaviour, previous questions, and response
alternatives (Sudman et al., 1996). For example, the way the questions are asked, the inter-
viewer's interview style and responses, prompts and the topic can all have a bearing on the
type and amount of information expressed. Since VOICES provided the initial motivation for
this Ph.D. the questions in this study were very specific to this measure and were structured
around it. Less structured approaches might have yielded different results or explained
aspects that the present investigations could not. For instance, it might have elucidated some
of the changes that were observed over time. Furthermore, the interviewer may have taken a
less passive role.
It is important to acknowledge that all research is value-laden as it is designed and con-
ducted. It can also be interpreted in particular ways depending on the researcher's goals and
background. The methods chosen for these investigations are primarily located within cogni-
tive psychology with an emphasis on the individual and their understanding of the phenome-
non of interest. Therefore, the experiences of the investigator and their perceptions as an
individual who has experienced bereavement, worked as a Registered Nurse and studied psy-
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chology, are likely to influence how the proxies' responses were interpreted. For example,
knowledge of psychological theories of coping was used in interpreting changes in proxies'
responses over time. Although these theories did not guide the thematic analysis used in
addressing research question four, they were explanatory following the analysis process.
8.4 Interviewing bereaved relatives
Given the sensitive nature of the interviews and the timing I was acutely aware of the
possibility of distressing participants. During the interviews many participants were tearful as
they recalled events. Expressions of anger, guilt, shock and sadness were also evident. At
times when participants became distressed the interview was stopped and they were asked if
they wanted to proceed. All were insistent on continuing so time was given as necessary. In
two instances the interviews were shortened by excluding some of the questions about the
VOICES symptom descriptors and prompting was kept to a minimum. This was based on my
feelings regarding the participant's level of comfort with the interview. In almost all cases the
bereaved relatives felt that the interviews were beneficial in helping others and/or in enabling
them to talk about their feelings. For three participants it was the first time they had actually
talked about events for fear of upsetting other family members. So they were appreciative of
the opportunity to share their experiences with someone from outside the family. A good rap-
port was built with many of the participants during the interviews. On average each visit
lasted between two to three hours. This rapport was important because it facilitated the open
expression of both negative and positive experiences. To maintain the flow of the interviews
and build rapport the interviews did not always adhere to the layout of the PSCI. For example,
pain relief was often the first point proxies made when talking about pain. Flexibility during
the interviews enabled participants to fully express themselves and their needs, providing sup-
port and enhancing the quality of the data collected.
8.5 Conclusion
The findings of this Ph.D. have significant implications for the retrospective approach in pal-
liative care. If investigators ignore the potential biases introduced by using proxies (signifi-
cant others and health professionals), then estimates of some symptoms will be inaccurate.
The potential consequence is that any evaluation of the adequacy of services and care to
patients at the end of life will be unreliable. The findings presented here highlight where the
potential biases and inaccuracies lie and presents a number of recommendations to compen-
sate for them. How and to what extent these measures are implemented depends on the level
of accuracy that is required. Nonetheless, it is important to note that proxies' judgments
regarding the patients' symptoms of pain, anxiety and depression indicated that they have
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some validity because they were basing their judgments on observable events, and not just
reflecting on their own distress. Thus, pursuing ways to improve the validity of their
responses, rather than discounting them is a worthwhile objective for future research.
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Appendix A
Factors likely to affect the validity of proxies'
retrospective reports
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Factors associated with the
validity of proxies in palliative
care research
Factors associated





























Reliability and validity I



























The following protocol was drawn up following negotiations with social workers at the hos-
pice:
Level One (All participants)
All participants regardless of their psychological state will be given booklets and information
on local bereavement and counselling services in their area. A full debriefing will be available
to all participants, to allow them the opportunity to express their feelings about the interview.
Level Two (Distressed participants)
If concerned about an participant, for example their distress is unabated, ask if there is some-
one you can contact who can come and sit with them. Alternatively, ask them to contact their
GP or give permission for you to contact their GP. Debriefing as above.
Level Three (Very distressed participants)
Participant showing signs of extreme distress (suicidal tendencies, hopelessness, and inability
to cope). Ask for consent to contact their GP or a social worker. If they are unwilling to give
consent contact the Social Work Department. Debriefing as above.
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Appendix C






I understand that you have recently experienced a bereavement and that your relative was in
the care of •••••. I realise that this is a very difficult time for you and I am sorry for any
distress caused by this letter. The reason I am writing to you is to ask for your help with a
study we are conducting. I will start by explaining the main reason for the research I am carry-
ing out.
When patients are very ill they cannot always tell health professionals how they feel. So
health professionals often rely on those closely involved with the patient, like yourself. to
respond on behalf of the patient. It is really important to understand how you make decisions
about the care they receive, as doctors and nurses use this information to plan the patient's
care. Research studies so far show that what other people tell health professionals about the
patients' feelings do not always match what the patient says themselves. There may be many
reasons for this. One reason may be that the questions asked may mean different things to dif-
ferent people.
What we want to do is to ask some questions about three problems people who are very ill
often experience; these are pain, anxiety and depression. The questions refer to the week and
month before death. If you think that you are not the best person to answer these questions
and there is someone else (a relative, friend or neighbour) who has had more contact with the
patient in this period could you let me know. I appreciate these symptoms may be difficult to
discuss, so I will do my best to deal with these issues as sensitively as possible. If necessary
we can stop the interview at anytime.
The research is important because it can be used in the future to help plan and monitor the
quality of care offered to terminally ill patients and their families and friends.
Your cooperation with the study is voluntary. All information you give will be strictly confi-
dential and anonymous. It will in no way effect any services you may receive in future.
The study involves an interview with myself, Christine McPherson. I am a Registered Nurse
studying in the Department of Palliative Care and Policy at King's College London. The
interview will be carried out in your home or a quiet private place of your choice. The length
of the interview will be decided by you. With your permission the interview will be tape-
recorded so that an accurate record can be taken. Once the information has been obtained
from these tapes, they will be destroyed.
I would be extremely grateful if you could help with the study as the information you provide
will help us understand these symptoms from your viewpoint.
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If you would like more information please do not hesitate to contact me on •••••
••••• Monday, Wednesday or Thursday between 10.00 am - 7.00 pm.
If you do want to take part please fill in the form enclosed and return it in the stamped
addressed envelope provided. Within 1-2 weeks I will contact you to arrange a convenient








Title: Proxies retrospective perceptions of dying patients' pain, anxiety, and depression
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care
or legal rights being affected.













Demographic and patient/proxy characteristics
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The following questions are about your relationship to the deceased and information regard-
ing their death.







o Other relationship (please state) _
Can you tell me when he/she died? _
Where did he/she die?
o Home
o Hospice
o Other (please state) _
Where was he/she cared for in the week before he/she died?
o Home
o Hospice
o Other (please state)
o Ifmore than one place (please state) _
Can you tell me what he/she died of? _
How old was he/she when he/she died?
------
Did you live with him/her? _
How much contact did you have with him/her during their last week of life? _
What was his/her previous occupation? _
What was his/her ethnicity? _
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Thefollowing are general questions about you.
Gender: Male/ Female (circle)
Can you tell me how old you are? _
What is your occupation/previous occupation? _






Here is a list of things, which other people have found difficult when caring for someone.
Could tick the box (yes/no) to indicate how you felt during the week before he/she died.
Yes No
1 Sleep was disturbed
2 It was inconvenient
3 It was a physical strain
4 It was constraining
5 There were family adjustments
6 There were changes in personal plans
7 There were other demands on my time
8 There were emotional adjustments
9 Some behaviour was upsetting
10 It was upsetting to find he/she had
changed so much from their former self
11 There were work adjustments
12 It was a financial strain
13 I felt completely overwhelmed
Total Score




Proxy Semi-structured Cognitive Interview
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Proxy Semi-structured C02nitive Interview
Introduction
What I am going to do is to ask you questions about three problems people who are very ill
sometimes experience, these are pain, anxiety and depression. There are no right or wrong
answers, just say what comes to mind even if it seems out of place or trivial. Do not worry
about trying to put your thoughts in any sort of order. We are really interested in what you
have to say even if it may seem a bit muddled. Take your time, I will leave a pause after the
questions for you to think. Just to remind you, if at any time you feel unable to respond or
continue with the interview let me know and we can stop it at any time.
Pain (Week)
Now I want to talk about any pain he/she might have experienced in the week before he/she
died.






Prompt: was he/she uncomfortable on moving such as
changing position or during activities, like dressing
and washing (Ifno go to 1b; Ifdon't know go to I e)
Ib. In your own words, can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no pain go to question 1d.)
I c. Were there any things that were more important than others in deciding whether he/she
was in pain?
I d. Do you think a certain level of pain is expected given their condition? If so, can you
explain?
l e. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question ld then go to question lc.)
Za. How often did he/she experience pain in the last week of life?






2b. When you answered question (2a.) how did you judge how often he/she was in pain?
2e. In your own words, what do you think to experience pain "often" means?
2d. Again in your own words, what do you think to experience pain "sometimes" means?
2e. What do you think to experience pain "rarely" means?
(If no pain or don't know go to 3e.)






3b. Can you tell me what were you thinking about when you answered that question?









(If no pain or don't know go to 8a.)




o Not very distressing
o Don't know
4c. What made you choose that option?
Pain relief in the last month
5a. Did the doctor(s) give any treatment to help relieve the pain?
DYes
o No
o Not needed Go to 6e
o Don't know
5b. Who were you thinking ofwhen I asked you that question?
6a. How effective was the pain control? Did it relieve the pain?
0 Completely all the time
0 Completely some of the time
0 Partially
0 Not at all
0 Don't know
6b. What do you think "effective pain relief' means?
6c. Another response to choose from was "partially". What do you think this means in rela-
tion to pain relief?
6d. What were you thinking about when you answered that question?
(Go to 7a.)
6e. Can you tell me why (you don't know or why he/she didn't receive help)?
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7a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being 'no at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing']
Pain (Month)
Now I want to talk about any pain he/she might have experienced in the month before he/she
died.






Prompt: was he/she uncomfortable on moving such as
changing position or during activities, like dressing
and washing (Ifno go to 8b; Ifdon't know go to 8c.)
8b. In your own words, can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no go to question 11a.)
8c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know or said no?
(Go to question 11a.)
9a. How often did he/she experience pain in the last month of life?





9b. When you answered that question (9a.) how did you judge how often he/she was in
pain?







lOb. What were you thinking of when you answered that question?
10c. On a scale of pain severity 0 (painfree) to 10 (severe pain), where would you rate this?
Anxiety (Week)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk about any anxiety or trouble with nerves he/she
might have experienced in the week before he/she died.







Prompt: did he/she appear worried or concerned,
express any fears (If no go to 11b; If don't know go to
lle.)
11b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking about when you answered
that question?
(If no anxiety go to 11d.)
11c. Were there any signs that were more important than others in deciding whether he/she
was anxious?
11d. Do you think a certain level of anxiety is expected given their condition? If so, can you
tell me more about this?
(If no anxiety go to 12c.)
lIe. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question 11 d then go to question 12c.)
J2a. How often did he/she experience anxiety?






12b. How did you decide how often he/she was anxious?
12c. In your own words, what do you think to experience anxiety "often" means?
12d. Again in your own words, what do you think to experience anxiety "sometimes"
means?
12e. What do you think to experience anxiety "rarely" means?
(If no anxiety or don't know go to 13c.)






13b. How did you decide how intense their anxiety was?









(If no anxiety or don't know go to 16a.)
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Help to relieve anxiety
14a. Did he/she get any help to cope with these problems?
DYes
o No
o No help needed
o Don't know
14b. What help did he/she receive?
o Counselling
o Medication
o Other (please state)
Go to question 14f
14c. Can you tell me some more about the help he/she received?
14d Did the help relieve the anxiety?





14e. Can you tell me why you chose that option?
(Go to 15a.)
14f Can you tell me why (you don't know or why he/she didn't receive help)?
15a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of 1 to 10, °being 'not at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing']
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Anxiety (Month)
Changing the subject, 1 now want to talk about any anxiety or trouble with nerves he/she
might have experienced in the month before he/she died.







Prompt: did he/she appear worried or concerned,
express any fears (If no go to 16b; If don ~ know go to
16c.)
16b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking about when you answered
that question?
(If no anxiety go to question 19a.)
16c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Go to question 19a.)
17a. How often did he/she experience anxiety in the month before death?





17b. When you answered that question (17a.) how did you judge how often he/she was anx-
ious?







18b. How did you decide how intense his/her anxiety was?
18c. On a scale of anxiety severity 0 (no anxiety) to 10 (severe anxiety), where would you
rate this?
Depression (Week)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk about any depression he/she might have experienced
in the week before he/she died.






Prompt: did he/she appear down, sad, withdrawn or
tearful (Ifno go to 19b.; Ifdon't know go to l Oe.)
19b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no depression go to question 19d.)
19c. Were there any signs that were more important than others in deciding whether he/she
was depressed?
19d. Do you think a certain level of depression is expected given their condition? If so, can
you tell me more about this?
(If no depression go to question 20c.)
1ge. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question 19d. then go to question 20c.)
20a. How often did he/she experience depression in the last week of life?






20b. When you answered that question (20a.) how did you judge how often he/she was
depressed?
20c. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "often" means?
20d. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "sometimes" means?
20e. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "rarely" means?
(If no depression or don't know go to question 2ie.)






21b. What were you thinking of when you answered that question?










(Ifno depression or don't know go to question 24a.)
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Help to relieve depression
22a. Did he/she get any help to cope with these problems?
DYes
o No
o No help needed
o Don't know
22b. What help did he/she receive?
o Counselling
o Medication
o Other (please state)
Go to question 221
22c. Can you tell me some more about the help he/she received?
22d. Did the help relieve their depression?





22e. Can you tell me why you chose that option?
(Go to 23a.)
221 Can you tell me why (you don't know or why he/she didn't receive help)?
23a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of 1 to 10,0 being 'not at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing']
Depression (Month)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk any depression he/she might have experienced in the
month before he/she died.
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Prompt: did he/she appear down, sad, withdrawn or
tearful (Ifno go to 24b,· Ifdon't know go to 24c.)
24b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no depression go to question 27a.)
24c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Go to question 27a.)
25a. How often did he/she experience depression during the last month of life?





25b. When you answered that question (25a.) how did you judge how often he/she was
depressed?






26b. How did you decide how intense his/her level of depression was?
26c. On a scale of depression severity 0 (no depression) to 10 (severe depression), where
would you rate this?
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27a. If I asked you in the week before death do you think your answers would be different.
Ifso, how?




Differences between questions in the proxy
semi-structured cognitive interview and
questions from the retrospective palliative care
questionnaires
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Differences between questions in the PSCI and questions in the retro-
spectivepalliative care questionnaires investigated.
1. VOICES and the RSCD questionnaire assess symptoms over a period of
twelve months, whereas the PSCI assesses questions relating to the last
month and week of life. For example, VOICES asks
During the last twelve months ofhis/her life, while he/she was at
home, or while in the nursing or residential home, did he/she suffer
any pain?
Yes 01 No 02 Don't know 03
2. One of the points raised in the introduction was the length of the assessment
period. Although assessment of the last year may be useful in auditing serv-
ices and information, symptoms can vary enormously during such an
extended period of time. Consequently, it was decided that the PSCI's period
of assessment would be in the later stages of patient's illness, when more reli-
ance may be placed on others to assess patient's symptoms.
3. VOICES collapses anxiety and depression into one question, "During his last
year, did suffer from anxiety and/or nerves or get
depressed"? Although the question is useful for assessing the psychosocial
care of the patient, one of the roles of audit is to identify specific areas where
improvements can be made. By differentiating between the anxiety and
depression, treatments and care can be better targeted. There is also the dan-
ger of a proxy responding "no" because the patient did not have anxiety or
because they did not have depression even though they did experience one of
them. By separating out the two conditions it should also be possible to assess
whether proxies have difficulty differentiating. In the end, it might tum out
that the two conditions are in fact better combined.
4. VOICES does not provide severity scales for pain, anxiety or depression, yet
it does for other symptoms.
A Not at Don't Not
A lot Some little all know treated
Vomiting or
06feeling sick 01 02 03 04 05
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5. In the Regional Study of the Care of the Dying upon which VOICES is based,
pain severity was assessed by the amount of distress it caused patients. As
symptom distress focuses on the affective elements of a symptom that are
very subjective aspects. It was thought that this might be difficult to assess
given the potential biases highlighted in the introduction. Therefore, an alter-
native was a symptom severity scale similar to the one adopted in another ret-
rospective survey conducted by the developers of VOICES.
6. Frequency is assessed for anxiety/depression (as shown below) in VOICES,
but not for pain. The RSCD assesses the length of time the patient had pain,
for example, 3 months, 6 months. This gives an indication of the presence or
absence of pain over a given period but does not assess the frequency when
pain is present. Therefore, the same frequency response scale used to assess
anxiety/depression, was used to assess pain frequency in this study.
During his last year, did suffer from anxiety and/or
nerves or get depressed?
Please tick one box











Prompts were kept to a minimum in the interest of maximising participant's interpretation of
questions. If they were unsure of the question, it would be repeated. Care was taken to avoid
"cueing" responses that reflected those of the interviewer instead of those of the participants.
Participants often looked to the interviewer for confirmation that their replies were adequate
or commented on their ability to provide the right information. To avoid reinforcing particular
responses, the interviewer stressed that there were no right or wrong answers and that it was
the participants' views that were of interest.
Timing ofevents
In some instances, the participant appeared to talk about periods outside the periods being
assessed. When they did so, they were asked again about the timing of the events. For exam-
ple, when asked about the last week or month of life, participants often made reference to
events in the last few months prior to the patient's death. In order to clarify the period, the
interviewer would ask "Was that in the last week or month"? When references were made to
places of care, such as "In the hospital..., " the interviewer inquired about the time period this
covered. This was an indirect method of ascertaining the timing of events.
Symptoms
In a number of instances when asked about the severity and frequency of their relative's
symptoms, the participant was unsure about whether the symptom was rated in one or another
of the response options. This often occurred when there was variability in the symptom's
severity or frequency over time. When this happened participants were asked: "If they were
sent the questionnaire to complete, how they would respond?" For example, would they
choose both or one or none of the response options and why.
Some prompts were included in the PSCI, for example,








Prompt: did he/she appear worried or concerned,
express any fears (Ifno go to 16b; Ifdon ~ know go to
16c.)
These prompts were used when participants answered "don't know" or "no" when asked
about the presence or absence of a symptom. The reason for this, was to examine whether par-
ticipants were answering "don ~ know" or "no" because they didn't consider that the patient
had the symptom as it wasn't severe enough, or because they were unsure about the symptom
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Modifications to the Proxy Semi-structured
Cognitive Interview following the pilot study
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The pilot study resulted in few modifications to the interview. The changes were to the PSCI
and VOICES.
1. The most significant change was to the use of the word "suffer" in VOICES.
This is used to assess patients' symptoms, for example, "While he was in that
hospice, did he suffer any pain related to his final illness"? In the PSCI the
question was "During the last week of life did suffer any pain"?
Participants in the pilot study found that the wording had implications regarding
the responsibility of the patient's symptom. As those interviewed were the main
caregiver this had emotional undertones of blame for not controlling the symp-
tom. One might also argue that suffer might not be an appropriate term to use in
cases where a symptom is mild and the patient is not seen to suffer. Therefore,
the word suffer was replaced with experience as this was considered a neutral
term.
2. Originally PSCI included items assessing the distress caused by anxiety and
depression. As these symptoms encompass distress within the symptomology it
was thought that these questions were redundant. As one participant pointed out,
"Anxiety is distress isn't it? ... so how do I know whether it caused
her distress when it's the same thing?"
3. During the follow up study one participant commented on how difficult it was to
discuss these issues now in comparison to the earlier interview. This initiated the
inclusion of the question "How does being interviewed now compare to the pre-
vious interview"? at the end of the follow up interview.
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Appendix J
Recruitment letter and participant consent for




My name is Christine McPherson, I interviewed you several weeks ago as part of a research
study I was conducting. The interview asked for your views on the care of your deceased rel-
ative. In particular, any pain, anxiety and depression he/she may have experienced during
their illness. I would like this opportunity to thank you again for your assistance with this
research. I realised that this was a very difficult matter to talk about.
The reason I am writing to you is to ask for your help with a follow up study. The study will
involve being interviewed again by myself. I am a Registered Nurse studying in the Depart-
ment of Palliative Care and Policy at King's College London. The interview will be carried
out in your home or a quiet private place of your choice. The interview will be much shorter
than the first interview. It is estimated to take approximately half an hour to conduct. The
questions will be about your relative's care and any pain, anxiety and depression he/she might
have experienced.
This follow up study is important in understanding these symptoms from your viewpoint. It
can be used in the future to help plan and monitor the quality of care offered to terminally ill
patients and their families and friends.
Your cooperation with the study is voluntary. All information you give will be strictly confi-
dential and anonymous. It will in no way effect any services you may receive in future.
If you would like more information please do not hesitate to contact me on •••••
•••••. If you do want to take part please fill in the form enclosed and return it in the
stamped addressed envelope provided. Within 1-2 weeks I will contact you to arrange a con-








Title: Proxies retrospective perceptions of dying patients' pain, anxiety and depression
Please initial box
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the
above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care
or legal rights being affected.













Shortened version of the Proxy Semi-structured
Cognitive Interview used in the follow up study
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Proxy Semi-structured C02nitive Interview (Shortened Version)..:
Introduction
What I am going to do is to ask you questions about three problems people who are very ill
sometimes experience, these are pain, anxiety and depression. There are no right or wrong
answers, just say what comes to mind even if it seems out of place or trivial. Do not worry
about trying to put your thoughts in any sort of order. We are really interested in what you
have to say even if it may seem a bit muddled. Take your time, I will leave a pause after the
questions for you to think. Just to remind you, if at any time you feel unable to respond or
continue with the interview let me know and we can stop it at any time.
Pain (Week)
Now I want to talk about any pain he/she might have experienced in the week before he/she
died






Prompt: was he/she uncomfortable on moving such as
changing position or during activities, like dressing
and washing (Ifno go to 1b; Ifdon't know go to 1e)
1b. In your own words, can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no pain go to question 8a.)
1e. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question ld then go to question 8a.)
2a. How often did he/she experience pain in the last week of life?






2b. When you answered question (2a.) how did you judge how often he/she was m pam.
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3b. Can you tell me what were you thinking about when you answered that question?
4a. How distressing do you think he/she found the pain?
o Very distressing
o Fairly distressing
o Not very distressing
o Don't know
4c. What made you choose that option?
Pain relief in the last month
5a. Did the doctor(s) give any treatment to help relieve the pain?
DYes
o No
o Not needed Go to 6e.
o Don't know
5b. Who were you thinking of when I asked you that question?
6a. How effective was the pain control? Did it relieve the pain?
o Completely all the time
o Completely some of the time
o Partially
o Not at all
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o Don't know
6d. What were you thinking about when you answered that question?
(Go to 7a.)
6e. Can you tell me why (you don't know or why he/she didn't receive help)?
7a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of 0 to 10, 0 being 'no at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing 1
Pain (Month)
Now I want to talk about any pain he/she might have experienced in the month before he/she
died.






Prompt: was he/she uncomfortable on moving such as
changing position or during activities, like dressing
and washing (Ifno go to Sb.; Ifdon t know go to 8c.)
8b. In your own words, can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no go to question I I a. )
8c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know or said no?
(Go to question IIa.)
9a. How often did he/she experience pain in the last month of life?





9b. When you answered that question (9a.) how did you judge how often he/she was in
pain?
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lab. What were you thinking of when you answered that question?
IOc. On a scale of pain severity 0 (painfree) to 10 (severe pain), where would you rate this?
Anxiety (Week)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk about any anxiety or trouble with nerves he/she
might have experienced in the week before he/she died.







Prompt: did he/she appear worried or concerned.
express any fears (If no go to 11b; If don't know go to
lIe.)
11b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking about when you answered
that question?
(If no anxiety go to 17a.)
lle. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question lld. then go to question 17a.)
12a. How often did he/she experience anxiety?






12b. How did you decide how often he/she was anxious?
12c. In your own words, what do you think to experience anxiety "often" means?






13b. How did you decide how intense their anxiety was?
15a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of 1 to 10, °being 'not at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing 1
Anxiety (Month)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk about any anxiety or trouble with nerves he/she
might have experienced in the month before he/she died.







Prompt: did he/she appear worried or concerned,
express any fears (If no go to 16b.; Ifdon't know go to
16c.)
16b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking about when you answered
this question?
(If no go to question 19a.)
16c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Go to question 19a.)
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I7a. How often did he/she experience anxiety in the month before death?





I7b. When you answered that question (17a.) how did you judge how often he/she was anx-
ious?






I8b. How did you decide how intense his/her anxiety was?
I8c. On a scale of anxiety severity 0 (no anxiety) to 10 (severe anxiety), where would you
rate this?
Depression (Week)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk about any depression he/she might have experienced
in the week before he/she died.






Prompt: did he/she appear down, sad, withdrawn or
tearful (Jfno go to I9b.; Jfdon t know go to lve.)
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19b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no depression go to question 27a.)
1ge. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Ask question 19d then go to question 27a.)
20a. How often did he/she experience depression in the last week of life?





20b. When you answered that question (20a.) how did you judge how often he/she was
depressed?






21b. What were you thinking of when you answered that question?
23a. How distressing was this symptom to you?
[On a scale of I to 10, 0 being 'not at all distressing' and 10 being 'extremely distressing 1
Depression (Month)
Changing the subject, I now want to talk any depression he/she might have experienced in the
month before he/she died.
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Prompt: did he/she appear down, sad, withdrawn or
tearful (Ifno go to 24b.; Ifdon't know go to 24c.)
24b. In your own words can you tell me what you were thinking of when you answered that
question?
(If no depression go to question 29a.)
24c. Can you tell me why you chose don't know?
(Go to question 29a.)
25a. How often did he/she experience depression during the last month of life?





25b. When you answered that question (25a.) how did you judge how often he/she was
depressed?






26b. How did you decide how intense his/her level of depression was?
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26c. On a scale of depression severity 0 (no depression) to 10 (severe depression). where
would you rate this?
29a. How does being interviewed now compare to the previous interview?
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2c. In your own words, what do you think to experience pain "often" means?
2d. Again in your own words, what do you think to experience pain "sometimes" means?
2e. What do you think to experience pain "rarely" means?
Severity
3c. How would you describe "severe pain"?
3d. How would you describe "significant pain"?
3e. How would you describe "moderate pain"?
3f How would you describe "mild pain"?
Numerical rating






12c. In your own words, what do you think to experience anxiety "often" means?
12d. Again in your own words, what do you think to experience anxiety "sometimes"
means?
12e. What do you think to experience anxiety "rarely" means?
Severity













20c. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "often" means?
20d. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "sometimes" means?
20e. In your own words, what do you think to experience depression "rarely" means?
Severity













Differences between individuals who took part
in the study and those who did not
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Did not take
Took part part Test statistic Significance p
Patient age




Mean 71 71 tailed)
STD 13.41 13.16
Relationship
Spouse 20 33 X2, df= 1 X2 =.49 0.48
Not spouse 10 26
Patient Death





Male 15 32 X2, df= 1 X2 =.40 0.53
Female 15 24
Proxy sex
Male 11 17 X2, df= 1 X2 = .35 0.55
Female 19 39
Two tailed, a. = .05.
Note: The relationship variable was collapsed to enable analysis, as some groupings
contained frequencies of only 1 or 2. There was a greater variety of relatives in
the non-participant group including several not found in those who took part, e.g.
siblings, parent, aunt, and friends. The complete breakdown is presented below:
Took part N Did not take part N
Partner 18 Partner 33
Son/daughter 10 Son/daughter 5













Indicates difficulties proxies might experience when answering a question
No verbalisation of strategy
No apparent strategy (e.g. guess)
Don't know
Incoherent response
Explicitly states that the question is difficult to answer no reason given why
States that the question is difficult to answer because ofpatient's level ofconscious-
ness (e.g. due to medication or confusion)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of lack of communication
between proxy and patient (not due to patient scondition)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of overlap with pain, anxiety
and depression
Unable to give a response (e.g. too distressed or makes reference to the fact that they
do not want to think about it)
Inadequate response (e.g. response does not answer the question, talks about another
symptom)
Expresses uncertainty (e.g. words such as "probably" or "doubt ". or asks for clarifi-
cation)
Response changed during reply (e.g. says "severe" then changes to "significant", or
says "no" to symptom then changes to "yes" during response)
Symptom frequency judgments
Symptom constant/almost constant (no frequency estimation)
Episode enumeration
Here the proxy will recall particular episodes within the period ofassessment. Their
judgment will be based on a count each ofthe episodes (e.g. "He had pain on the
Wednesday and on the Friday in the week before he died")
Rate-based estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the regularity ofthe occurrence ofthe
symptom (e.g. "She normally got the pain every night ")
Enumeration estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the variable number ofoccurrences ofthe
symptom. This would include strategies such as averaging over the assessment period
or other strategies excluding rated-based estimation and counting/recall episodes
(e.g. "It wasn ~ as often at the beginning but it gradually became worse so over that
































lb. 1c. 2b. 3b. 8b. 9b. lOb.
Comparative judgements
Anchoring
Anchor on norm what would be expected (e.g. "1would think most people would be 2 4depressed if they knew they were going to die")
Anchor on self or another (e.g. "I would be screaming with agony if it were me')
General characteristicltrait of the patient (e.g.
"He had always been a positive per- 2 2 2 6 7 6son')
Anchor on what they were like previously during the illness (e.g. "he was worse in 5 2 3 II 2 4the last week than in the month ')
Anchor on another response option and adjust (e.g. "It wasn ~ severe it wasn ~ as bad 3
as that so 1 would say significant" or "It was more often than sometimes so 1 would
say often')
1ntensity rating questions only
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most frequent rating 3
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most severe rating 5 6
Variable symptom severity with no explanation for choice of rating
Intensity rating based on average of variable pain intensity (e.g. "it was severe in the 3
last week, but the week before it was mild. so 1 would say overall it was moderate ')
Frequency used as an indicator of symptom severity 2
Basis ofsymptom judgment
Reference to verbal communication between patient and proxy II 14 6 8 8 4 4
Reference to non-verbal communication, behaviours or cues to symptom such as the 15 13 6 8 14 8 10
patient's appearance
Reference to verbal communication with a third party (e.g. nurses,family members)
Reference to patient's thoughts and feelings (e.g. frustration, concentration, anger) 3 2 2 5 7 4
Reference to patient's functioning (e.g. activities ofdaily living, social functioning) 6 3 6 6 3 6
Reference to patient's coping/control (e.g. references to control or lack ofcontrol. 3 2 2 2 7 5
coping)
Reference to medication/help (e.g. explicit references indicating help with the symp- 13 5 12 9 14 8 8
tom)
Event cues
Person mentioned (e.g. nurses,family) 7 4 4 7 2
Place mentioned (e.g. hospice, home) 4 4 4 10 2 4




Code description lb. le. 2b. 3b. 8b. 9b. lOb.
Reference period
Anchor on a significant event (e.g. illness, hospital admission) 2 4 3
Anchor on a date (e.g. wedding, holiday)
Anchor on a season of the year (e.g. summer, spring)
Mentions reference period being assessed (e.g. week or month) 8 4 8 10 17 4 9
Reference to period outside the specified period (last month or week) 3 2
Proxies' emotions
Proxy's emotional reaction to event mentioned 2 4
Affect-basedjudgments
Explicit inferences about how the patient was feeling or thinking based on proxies 4 5 3 7 6 3 5
own feelings about events





lIb. llc. i2b. 13b. i6b. 17b. i8b.
Response difficulties
indicates difficulties proxies might experience when answering a question
No verbalisation of strategy





Explicitly states that the question is difficult to answer no reason given why
States that the question is difficult to answer because of patient's level of conscious- 6 2ness (e.g. due to medication or confusion)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of lack of communication 3 2 3 2 2between proxy and patient (not due to patient scondition)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of overlap with pain, anxiety
and depression
Unable to give a response (e.g. too distressed or makes reference to the fact that they
do not want to think about it)
Inadequate response (e.g. response does not answer the question, talks about another
symptom)
Expresses uncertainty (e.g. words such as "probably" or "doubt", or asks for clarifi- 2 3 2 2
cation)
Response changed during reply (e.g. says "severe" then changes to "significant", or
says "no" to symptom then changes to "yes" during response)
Symptom frequency judgments
Symptom constant/almost constant (no frequency estimation)
Episode enumeration
Here the proxy will recall particular episodes within the period ofassessment. Their
judgment will be based on a count each ofthe episodes (e.g. "He had pain on the
Wednesday and on the Friday in the week before he died")
Rate-based estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the regularity ofthe occurrence ofthe
symptom (e.g. "She normally got the pain every night")
Enumeration estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the variable number ofoccurrences ofthe
symptom. This would include strategies such as averaging over the assessment period
or other strategies excluding rated-based estimation and counting/recall episodes
(e.g. "it wasn ~ as often at the beginning bur it gradually became worse so over that











llb. llc. 12b. 13b. 16b. 17b. 18b.
Comparative judgements
Anchoring
Anchor on norm what would be expected (e.g. "1 would think most people would be 2depressed if they knew they were going to die ")
Anchor on self or another (e.g. "I would be screaming with agony if it were me ')
General characteristic/trait of the patient (e.g.
"He had always been a positive per- 5 2 6 10 2son')
Anchor on what they were like previously during the illness (e.g.
"he was worse in 2 5 5the last week than in the month ')
Anchor on another response option and adjust (e.g. "It wasn ~ severe it wasn 't as bad 2 2
as that so I would say significant" or "It was more often than sometimes so I would
say often')
Intensity rating questions only
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most frequent rating 2
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most severe rating
Variable symptom severity with no explanation for choice of rating 2
Intensity rating based on average of variable pain intensity (e.g. "it was severe in the
last week, but the week before it was mild, so I would say overall it was moderate "]
Frequency used as an indicator of symptom severity 3 3
Basis ofsymptom judgment
Reference to verbal communication between patient and proxy 15 7 6 4 12 5 4
Reference to non-verbal communication, behaviours or cues to symptom such as the 8 7 3 5 6 2 3
patient's appearance
Reference to verbal communication with a third party (e.g. nurses.family members) 2 3
Reference to patient's thoughts and feelings (e.g. frustration, concentration. anger) 17 5 4 7 20 4 6
Reference to patient's functioning (e.g. activities ofdaily living, social functioning) 2 8 3
Reference to patient's coping/control (e.g. references to control or lack ofcontrol. 2 4 4
coping)
Reference to medication/help (e.g. explicit references indicating help with the symp- 4 8 3
tom)
Event cues
Person mentioned (e.g. nurses.family) 7 2 6 2 2
Place mentioned (e.g. hospice, home) 7 9 3 2




Code description lIb. lIe. 12b. 13b. 16b. 17b. 18b.
Reference period
Anchor on a significant event (e.g. illness, hospital admission) 7 3 2 2 2
Anchor on a date (e.g. wedding, holiday)
Anchor on a season of the year (e.g. summer, spring)
Mentions reference period being assessed (e.g. week or month) 15 7 13 10 .j
Reference to period outside the specified period (last month or week) 3 2 5 2
Proxies' emotions
Proxy's emotional reaction to event mentioned 10 5 5 2
Affect-basedjudgments
Explicit inferences about how the patient was feeling or thinking based on proxies 18 2 3 2 14 4 6
own feelings about events





19b. 19c. 20b. 21b. 24b. 25b. 26b.
Response difficulties
1ndicates difficulties proxies might experience when answering a question
No verbalisation of strategy




Explicitly states that the question is difficult to answer no reason given why
2
States that the question is difficult to answer because of patient's level of conscious- 5 2 2
ness (e.g. due to medication or confusion)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of lack of communication 2 2 4between proxy and patient (not due to patient's condition)
States that the question is difficult to answer because of overlap with pain, anxiety 2 2
and depression
Unable to give a response (e.g. too distressed or makes reference to the fact that they
do not want to think about it)
Inadequate response (e.g. response does not answer the question, talks about another
symptom)
Expresses uncertainty (e.g. words such as "probably" or "doubt ". or asks for clarifi-
cation)
Response changed during reply (e.g. says "severe" then changes to "significant", or
says "no" to symptom then changes to "yes" during response)
Symptom frequency judgments
Symptom constant/almost constant (nofrequency estimation)
Episode enumeration
Here the proxy will recall particular episodes within the period ofassessment. Their
judgment will be based on a count each ofthe episodes (e.g. "He had pain on the
Wednesday and on the Friday in the week before he died")
Rate-based estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the regularity ofthe occurrence ofthe
symptom (e.g. "She normally got the pain every night")
Enumeration estimation
Here the proxy will base their judgment on the variable number ofoccurrences ofthe
symptom. This would include strategies such as averaging over the assessment period
or other strategies excluding rated-based estimation and counting/recall episodes
(e.g. "1t wasn t as often at the beginning but it gradually became worse so over that













Code description I9b. 19c. 20b. 2Ib. 24b. }5f> 26b.
Comparative judgements
Anchoring
Anchor on norm what would be expected (e.g. "I would think most people would be 3 3 5 5depressed if they knew they were going to die")
Anchor on self or another (e.g. "I would be screaming with agony if it were me ') 2 2 :2
General characteristic/trait of the patient (e.g. "He had always been a positive per- Il 4 :2 11 4 5
son')
Anchor on what they were like previously during the illness (e.g. "he was worse in 4 7 3 7
the last week than in the month ')
Anchor on another response option and adjust (e.g. "It wasn ~ severe it wasn ~ as bad 3
as that so I would say significant" or "It was more often than sometimes so I would
say often')
Intensity rating questions only
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most frequent rating :2
Variable symptom severity with rating based on the most severe rating 2
Variable symptom severity with no explanation for choice of rating
Intensity rating based on average of variable pain intensity (e.g. "it was severe in the
last week, but the week before it was mild, so I would say overall it was moderate ')
Frequency used as an indicator of symptom severity 3 3
Basis ofsymptom judgment
Reference to verbal communication between patient and proxy 5 3 4 3 II 3 5
Reference to non-verbal communication, behaviours or cues to symptom such as the 8 7 5 5 8 3 4
patient's appearance
Reference to verbal communication with a third party (e.g. nurses,family members)
Reference to patient's thoughts and feelings (e.g. frustration, concentration, anger) 16 4 5 6 19 7 9
Reference to patient's functioning (e.g. activities ofdaily living, social functioning) 8 :2 3 9 :2 6
Reference to patient's coping/control (e.g. references to control or lack ofcontrol. 2 2 5 3
coping)
Reference to medicationlhelp (e.g. explicit references indicating help with the symp- 3 2 4
tom)
Event cues
Person mentioned (e.g. nurses,family) 4 3 5 3
Place mentioned (e.g. hospice, home) 2 2 3




Code description I9b. I9c. 20b. 2Ib. 24b. 25b. 26b.
Reference period
Anchor on a significant event (e.g. illness, hospital admission) 5 3 2
Anchor on a date (e.g. wedding, holiday) 2
Anchor on a season of the year (e.g. summer, spring)
Mentions reference period being assessed (e.g. week or month) 4 4 2 6 4 4
Reference to period outside the specified period (last month or week) 5 6
Proxies' emotions
Proxy's emotional reaction to event mentioned 2 2 6 2 3
Affect-basedjudgments
Explicit inferences about how the patient was feeling or thinking based on proxies 15 3 2 7 9 4
own feelings about events
Kappa .89 .86 .89 .88 .92 .87 .89
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Appendix 0
Analysis of differences in VOICES ratings
between those with high and low levels of self-
report caregiver strain
251
Analysis of differences in VOICES ratings between those with high and low levels of
self-reported anxiety.
SAl High SAlLow Mann-Whitney (K-S)
N Mean N Mean z p p
Rank Rank
Pain frequency (week) 18 14.94 12 16.33
-.449 .692 .948
Pain severity (week) 18 15.19 12 15.96 -.243 .819 .988
Pain frequency (month) 18 15.83 12 15.00 -.264 .819 1.000
Pain severity (month) 18 15.92 12 14.88 -.327 .755 1.000
Anxiety frequency (week) 18 18.64 12 10.79 -2.48 .020 .081
Anxiety severity (week) 18 18.25 12 11.38 -2.18 .040 .081
Anxiety frequency (month) 18 18.31 12 11.29 -2.22 .030 .226
Anxiety severity (month) 18 17.81 12 12.04 -1.812 .079 .512
Depression frequency (week) 18 18.06 12 11.07 -2.07 .050 .120
Depression severity (week) 18 18.28 12 11.33 -2.22 .040 .120
Depression frequency (month) 18 17.36 12 12.71 -1.486 .158 .635
Depression severity (month) 18 17.71 12 13.00 -1.330 .215 .759
a = .05.
Analysis of differences in VOICES ratings between those with high and low levels of
self-reported caregiver strain.
SAl High SAlLow Mann-Whitney (K-S)
N Mean N Mean z p p
Rank Rank
Pain frequency (week) 15 16.07 15 14.93 -.374 .740 .925
Pain severity (week) 15 18.50 15 12.50 -1.947 .610 .181
Pain frequency (month) 15 18.90 15 12.10 -2.20 .030 .181
Pain severity (month) 15 18.40 15 12.60 -1.861 .074 .375
Anxiety frequency (week) 15 15.53 15 15.47 -.021 1.000 1.000
Anxiety severity (week) 15 15.27 15 15.73 -.151 .902 1.000
Anxiety frequency (month) 15 16.70 15 14.30 -.774 .461 .660
Anxiety severity (month) 15 17.03 15 13.97 -.984 .345 .660
Depression frequency (week) 15 14.50 15 16.50 -.660 .539 .999
Depression severity (week) 15 14.70 15 16.30 -.523 .624 .999
Depression frequency (month) 15 16.17 15 14.83 -.435 .683 .925




Analysis of differences between proxies who
were followed-up and those who were not
253
Statistical
Non follow-up Follow-up analysis Significance
Patient age
Mean 17.44 12.96 Mann- Whitney z = -1.39, p =.17
(two-tailed)
Proxy age
Mean 17.55 13.35 Mann-Whitney .:=-1.17,p= .24
(two-tailed)
Patient sex
Male N=9 N=6 Chi-square X? =.14, P = .73
Female N=8 N=7
Proxy sex





Class I N=2 N=2 Chi-square X2 =.07,p = .79
Class II N=2 N=l
Class III N=3 N=3
Class IV N=6 N=4
Class V N=O N=3
Class VI N=4 N=O
ProxySES
Class I N=l N=3 Chi-square X
2
=22, P = .64
Class II N=3 N=2
Class III N=5 N=3
Class IV N=3 N=2
Class V N=2 N=3
Class VI N=3 N=O
Place ofdeath





Nursing home N=O N=1
Residence
Residing with N=14 N=IO Fisher's exact
P = 1.00
patient (two-tailed)
Not residing with N=3 N=3
patient
a =.05.
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